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NOTE

The following pages have been printed to accompany the

writer's collection of Cases on Agency, for use in the Department

of Law of this University. Nothing has been attempted beyond

the merest outlines of the subject. Explanation as well as Illus-

tration has in general been left to be supplied by the cases.

F. R. M.

University of Michigan,
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INTRODUCTION

The subject of Agency belongs to a comparatively re-

cent period in our law. Blackstone scarcely refers to it.

"The law of principal and agent," says Blackstone's

learned editor, Professor Hammond (Bk. I, p. 710), 4, is

derived from the canon law, and has only been intro-

duced into the common law in recent times. If the

older books of English law arc examined, no such

words as 'principal and agent' will be found in them.

Wherever any question is discussed which would now

be treated under that head, it is treated of as master

and servant. Principal and agent does not occur in

Viner's Abridgement, or those preceding it; and it is

only at the end of the eighteenth century that we find

it beginning to appear as a separate title, as yet of

very limited application."

"As late as Blackstone," says Mr. Justice Holmes

in his book on the Common Law (p. 228), "agents

appear under the general head of servants, and the

first precedents cited for the peculiar law of agents
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were cases of master and servant. Blackstone's lan-

guage is worth quoting: 'There is yet a fourth species

of servants, if they may be so called, being rather in

a superior, a ministerial capacity; such as steioards,

factors, and bailiff'*: whom, however, the law considers

as servants pro tempore, with regard to such of their

acts as affect their master's or employer's property.'

(1 Comm. 427)."

Agency belongs distinctively to a commercial ag> ,

and its growth has kept pace with the progress of com-

mercial development. It furnishes the means by which

2 INTRODUCTION.

the range of individual and corporate activity is enor-

mously increased. As soon as it is conceded that one

man may be represented by another in business trans-

actions, and that he may have as many such repre-

sentatives as occasion may require, the field of commer-

cial activity is immensely widened. The modern

business man may thus be constructively present in

many places and carry on diverse and widely separated

industries at the same time.

The fundamental maxim of Agency, both as to right

and liability, is Qui facit per alium, facit per se. Its

second great maxim, also of right and liability, refer-

ring to the time when the relation is created, is Omnis

ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequi-

paratur.

Agency belongs in the field of contract law. The

relation between the principal and his agent is, as will

be seen, a contractual relation, while the purpose of its

creation is to bring about contractual relations between
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the principal and third persons.

.1 ; .?

1

I It

Jl^\.

OUTLINES OF THE

LAW OF AGENCY

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS.

§ 1. Agency defined.

2. Agency is a contractual

relation.

3. Can usually exist only by

assent of the principal.

4. Exceptions — Authority

created by law.

5. How agent compares with

servant.

G. Distinction usually of

little practical importance.

7. Occasionally distinction

important.

S. How agent compares with

independent contractor.

9. Agency differs from trust.
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§ 10. Agency to be distinguished

from sale.

11. Agency differs from lease.

12. The contract appointing —

Power of attorney.

13. Classification of agencies

— Actual or ostensible.

14-17. Universal, general

and special agency.

18. How to be proved.

19-23. Professional and

non-professional agents.

24-26. Distinctions be-

tween these classes of

agents.

§ 1. Agency defined. — Agency is a legal relation,

founded upon the express or implied contract of the

parties — or created by law — by virtu e of which one

party — called the Agent — is employed and authorized

to represent and act for the other, called the Principal

— in business dealings with third persons.

It Is said that agency is a "legal relation." It is unfortunate that

in our law we have no word which clearly represents the idea of

such a relation as agency or partnership and at the same time dis-

tinguishes it from other relations. The word "relation" is used in a

great many senses. We speak about parties coming into contract

3

4 DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [§§1-2.

relations with each other, as when A and B enter into a contract.

When a tort is committed, the parties are also often said to come

into relations with each other. In this case, however, the relation,

if it be such, is purely a temporary one; it is not permanent.

On the other hand, we speak of the relation of husband and wife,

the relation of parent and child, or the relation of guardian and

ward. In these cases it is obvious that the word "relation" is used

in an entirely different sense. The idea of permanence is involved,

and, more than all, we see that here are rights, duties and liabilities

which the law rather than the act of the parties has created, and

which the parties are usually unable, by any act or agreement of

their own, to alter or diminish. To such relations, in order to dis-

tingush them from the temporary sort above referred to, the term

status or condition is often applied. Lying between the casual rela-

tions first referred to and these relations of status, are certain others,

more permanent than the first class and more open to contractual

limitation and control than the second — cases wherein the parties

have agreed to occupy certain legal relations to each other for a time

subject to their control and upon conditions largely determinable
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by their agreement. The most conspicuous of these relations are

those of Agency, Master and Servant, and Partnership.

We use the term, legal relation, therefore, not to distinguish it

from illegal relations, but to indicate that this is a relation in law —

a relation which the law recognizes.

§2. Agency is a contractual relation. —Agency

is a contractual relation and not a status. Even

though it be conceded that it finds its origin in the re-

lation of master and servant and that that relation was

originally the relation of master and slave, it is clear

enough that, regarded as an instrument for creating

contractual obligations between the principal and third

persons, agency does not exhibit those essential char-

acteristics of status necessary to mark it as such. As

stated by Sir William Anson, "so far as we are con-

cerned with Agency for the purpose of creating con-

tractual relations, it retains no trace in English law of

its origin in status. Even where a man employs as

his agent one who is incapable of entering into a con-

tract with himself, as where he gives authority to his

child, being an infant, the authority must be given, it

§§ 2-4.] DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. 5

4

is never inherent. There must be evidence of intention

on the one side to confer, on the other to undertake,

the authority given, though the person employed may,

from defective status, be unable to sue or be sued on

the contract of employment."

See Anson on Contract, 330.

§ 3. Can usually exist only by assent of the prin-

cipal. — As a rule, therefore, authority to act as agent

can exist only by the express or implied assent of the

principal, either previously given or subsequently con-

ferred.

We shall find hereafter that there may be express creations of

the relation and implied creations. In fact, we shall doubtless find

that the cases in which the existence of the relation is implied from

the acts of the parties are the more numerous.

It is not at all necessary that the authority shall have been con-

ferred in advance, although it commonly is. After the act has been

done, the authority may be conferred and, by retroactive effect, it
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goes back to the beginning.

§4. — Exceptions — Authority created by law. —

In a few cases, however, authority to act as agent lor

certain purposes arises by mere operation of law, as an

incident of some other relation in which, the parties al-

ready stand. Of these cases there are four chief types :

(1) The authority of the wife to buy necessaries on

her husband's credit.

(2) The similar authority of an infant child to bay

necessaries, in certain cases, upon his father's credit

(3) The authority of the vendor of personal prop-

erty in certain cases to sell the goods still in his posses-

sion to secure his pay.

(4) The authority of a ship-master to buy neces-

saries on the owner's credit.

In these cases the assent of the principal is not neces-

sary, and his dissent would in most cases be unavailing.

6 DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [§§ 4-5.

This authority is said to be created by law, or to be

authority by necessity.

§ 5. How agent compares with servant. — The rela-

tion of principal and agent bears a close resemblance to

that of master and servant, but is not identical with it.

The characteristic of the agent is that he is a busi-

ness representative. His function is to bring about

contractual relations between his principal and third

persons.

The function of the servant i s to execute the com-

mands of his master chiefly in reference to tilings, but

occasionally with reference to persons when no con-

tractual obligation is to result.

A person who is ordinarily a servant may at times

act as agent, and vice versa.

"The distinction between a servant and an agent," it is said by

Mr. Justice Holmes in his edition of Kent's Commentaries (Vol. 2,

p. 260, note), "is the distinction between serving and acting for."

When I employ an agent, I am seeking to employ some one who
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shall represent me in business dealings with other persons. The

purpose of the employment of the agent and his authorization is to

represent me and to deal for me with other persons. He is to come

in contact with other persons and he is to enter into contractual

relations for me with them.

On the other hand, if I want a ditch dug or any other kind of

manual service performed, the only thing that the person I employ

has to do is to deal with things. The main purpose of his employ-

ment is to accomplish some kind of manual labor and not to make

contracts at all. He has neither occasion nor authority to effect

contractual relations or impose contractual obligations upon me to

another person. Such a person is a servant.

If I say to A, "Go into the market and buy me a horse," my

purpose is that he shall go out and find a person who has a horse

for sale and make a contract with that person to sell that horse to

me. A is here an agent. If, when he brings the horse to me, I say

to him, "Put the horse in the stable and care for him," and A does

so, he then is a servant.

There are cases, of course, in which the servant is to come into

contact with other persons. The porter on a parlor car is an illus-

tration. Although a large portion of his duties may be to assist

§§ 5-7.] DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIOl 7

passengers and look out for their comfort, he is a servant. The

case of the conductor is not so simple. If he has no other duties

than to manage the train; if he has no power to make contr

for carriage; if his sole duty is to collect tickets a: re is no

occasion in which he has the right to enter into contractual rela-

tions for his employer, then he will be purely a servant.

If, on the other hand, he is authorized not only to manage the

train but to make contracts for carriage, to collect pay, to make the

ordinary bargains that are made between carrier and passenger,

then he is also an agent. It is obvious, therefore, that the p.me per-

son may be at times a servant and at times an agent.

The agent usually is vested with more or less discretion, while

the servant is commonly required to act according to the directions

of his master; and this has sometimes been suggested as the basis

for distinguishing between the two relations.

See Baltimore & Ohio Employees' Relief Ass'n v. Post, 122 Pa.

St. 679, 9 Am. St. Rep. 147.

The true distinction, however, is believed to be that already men-

tioned.
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§ 6. Distinction usually of little practical im-

portance. — The distinction between the two relations,

though in many aspects radical in theory, is, usually,

not of much practical importance, as the same rules

of law, in general, apply equally to both relations.

There is, in many quarters, a somewhat absurd repugnance to the

U6e of the word "servant," because it is supposed to emphasize social

distinctions which ought not to exist among us. This leads, in

popular language, to the substitution of the word "agent." and this

popular use is often exhibited by the courts, with the result that

even in legal language the word "agent" is coming to be more and

more used where the word "servant" would be more appropriate.

Fortunately it is usually immaterial and leads to uo serious diffi-

culty.

§ 7. Occasionally distinction important. —

There is, however, occasionally a case in which the dis-

tinction becomes important. A statute, for example,

may use one word or the other under circumstances

which call for strict construction, and it then becoi

important to distinguish.

Regina v. Walker, Agency Cases, 1, is a case of this nature.

What was the point there involved? Wakefield v. Fargo, Agency

S DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [§§ 7-8.

Cases, 4, presents another illustration. What was the question

there? Hamberger v. Marcus, 157 Pa. St. 133; Wildner v. Ferguson,

42 Minn. 112, 6 L. R. A. 338, and Lewis v. Fisher, 80 Md. 139, 45

Am. St. Rep. 327, present olher illustrations.

In Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, Agency Cases, 8, was Corbett an

agent or a servant? In "Wilson v. Owens, Agency Cases, 9, in what

relation did Egan stand? "What is said here as to the similarity of

the two relations?

In Tete v. Lanaiix (1893), 45 La. Ann. 1343, 14 So. Rep. 241,

there was a necessity, in view of a peculiar statute, to determine

whether a certain person was a clerk, or a broker. Said the court:

"A clerk is one who hires his services to an employer at a fixed

price under a stipulation to do and perform some specific duty or

labor which requires the exercise of skill. 'The broker is he who is

employed to negotiate a matter oeiween two parties, and who for that

reason is the mandatory of both.' R. C. C. 3016. The leading and

essential difference between a clerk and a broker is that the former

hires his services exclusively to one person, while the latter is

employed to make bargains and contracts between other persons
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in matters of trade, commerce and navigation. For the services of

the former there is a fixed stated salary, while for the latter a com-

pensation, commonly styled brokerage, is allowed."

§ 8. How agent compares with "independent con-

tractor." — The agent — and the servant also — is fur-

— .iii.ii i, im Jb^mtf m \*'*k-

ther to be distinguished from th e "independent co n-

Uunjjg" who is one who exercises some independent

employment, in the course of which he undertakes to

accomplish a certain result, being responsible to his

employer for the end to be achieved and not for the

means by which he accomplishes it.

Judging from what has been already said, does the servant or

the agent more closely resemble the independent contractor? Why?

Thus in a recent case wherein a loaded vessel ju3t leaving port

was found to be on fire, and the master employed S. & Co., who were

doing business as shipping-merchants, to take charge of her and

rescue her cargo, the court said: "The employment of S. & Co.,

under these facts, was something more than the appointment of an

agent. It was more in the nature of an employment or hiring than

an appointment to an agency. It was in the nature of a contract

between the captain of the vessel, as the owner's agent, and S. & Co.,

whereby the latter agreed to extinguish the fire, and if necessary

unload the vessel of its cargo, and do everything else for the pro-

8§ 810] DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. 9

tection of the vessel and cargo. They were employed to do a par-

ticular thing, and were contractors, Instead of agents, in the general

understanding of agency."

See Horan v. Strachan (1890), 80 Ga. 408, 12 S. E. Rep. C78, 22

Am. St. Rep. 471.

§9. Agency differs from trust. — Agency differs

in material respects from the ordinary trust.

See Hartley v. Phillips, (1901), 198 Pa. 9, 47 Atl. Rep. 929;

Knowles v. Scott, [1891] 1 Ch. 717; James v. Smith, [1891] 1 Ch.

384; Cleghorn v. Castle, (1900) 13 Hawaiian 186.

It is true that agency is often said to be a relation

of trust and confidence, and that property in the hands

of an agent is often held to be impressed with a trust

for the benefit of the principal, yet the two relations

are not identical._3— truetr-m-vohes control over prop-

erly, ageney may be totally disconnected with any pa>

ticular property. __The_Jjais4eeIJoIds'a legal__Utie JL Jhe

agent has usually no title at all. The trustee may act

hrins own name, the agent acts normally in the name
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of his principal. Trust is not necessarily a contract

relation, agency is properly to be so regarded. A trust

does not necessarily or even usually involve any author

ity to enter into contracts which shall bind another,

the authority to make such contracts is the distinguish-

ing characteristic of agency. Other distinctions exist

but these are sufficient to mark the contrast.

See, for example, Central Stock Exchange v. Bendinger, (1901),

48 C. C. A. 726, 109 Fed. Rep. 926, 56 L. R. A. 875.

§ 10. Agency to be distinguished from sale. —

Agency is further to be distinguished from sale. Not

that thi" 1 two contracts are not ordinarily readily

enough distinguished, but because so many cases arise

wherein either through inadvertence or design con-

tracts have been given some of the characteristics of

each, and it is necessary to decide which of them so

10 DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [§§ 10-18.

predominate as to determine the nature of the trans-

action. A typical ease is presented where goods are

put into the nanas of a person under a contract which

in seme of its parts seems to treat that person as an

absolute purchaser of the goods and in other parts

merely as an agent to sell them. No hard and fast rule

can be laid down for the determination of these contro-

versies. Names go for very little, and if the parties

have made a contract which really operates to transfer

the title it must be deemed a sale, even though the

parties have expressly declared that it shall be deemed

an agency.

See Mechem on Sales, §§ 41-49; Ex parte White, (1871), L. R.

6 Ch. App. 397; Arbuckle v. Kirkpatrick (1897), 98 Tenn. 221, 39

S. W. R. 3, 36 L. R. A. 285, 60 Am. St. Rep. 854; Braunn v. Keally,

(1892), 146 Pa. St. 519, 23 Atl. R. 389, 28 Am. St. Rep. 811; Nor-

wegian Plow Co. v. Clark (1897), 102 Iowa 31, 70 N. W. Rep. 808.

§11. Agency differs from lease. — So agency may

be distinguished from lease. As in the preceding case
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of sale, the tAvo contracts are usually very much un-

like; but, here as there, cases are met with wherein

one relation has apparently been disguised under the

name of the other. Here as there, also, names are of

no consequence, and the true nature of the contract

determines the case. If, therefore, though the contract

be called a lease, the alleged tenant is so far under the

direction and control of the alleged landlord as to make

the latter the real party in interest and the former

merely his representative, the contract will be held to

be one of agency.

See Petteway v. Mclntyre,— N. Car. — , 42 S. E. Rep. 851.

§ 12. The contract appointing — "Power of attor-

ney." — The contract by which the relation of principal

and agent is created is called a "contract of agency";

the right of the agent to represent the principal is

§§ 12-13.] DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. 11

called his '-authority" or "power" j whejj the, authority

is conferred by formal instrument in writing, it is said

to be confi ired by "letter of attorney," or, more com-

monly by "power of attorney." When the authority is

conferred by power of attorney, the agent is frequently

called an "attorney," or more commonly, an "attorney

in fact."

If an agent is called upon to execute a deed, he signs it, "John

Smith," as principal, "by Richard Roe, his attorney," or, more com-

monly, "his attorney in fact"; he may say. "agent." The words,

"attorney in fact," are used chiefly to distinguish him from an

attorney at law.

See Loudon Savings Fund Society v. Hagerstown Savings Bank,

3G Pa. St. 498, 78 Am. Dec. 390, Cas. Ag. 371.

§ 13. Classification of agen -ies — Actual or osten-

sible. — Agencies are sometimes classified as actual or

ostensible.

The agency is actual when the agent has really been

employed and authorized by the principal; the agency
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is ostensible when the principal intentionally, or by

want of ordinary care, leads a third person to believe

another to be his agent who has not really been em-

ployed and authorized by him.

This distinction is one which is made in the Code of California,

and has been adopted by several of the States in enacting their

Codes.

A man is an actual agent when he really has been employed, but

he is an ostensible agent when the principal, either intentionally or

by want of ordinary care, has held him out as though he were agent.

So far as third persons are concerned, it usually makes no difference

whether the agen actual or ostensible. If one person causes

another reasonably to believe, and to act upon the belief, that a cer-

tain man is his agent, then, so far as that other person is concerned,

the assumed agent is agent. The agent always knows whether he has

been employed, the principal always knows. As between themselves

there is no difficulty. Third persons, however, cannot usually know

whether he has really been employed or not, but if the principal

leads the third person to believe that the man is an agent, then tl !

principal is bound.

This distinction runs all through the law of agency.

12 DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [§ 14.

§ 14. Universal, general and special agency.—

The most important classification of agencies is that

based upon the nature and extent of the authority con-

ferred into universal, general, and special agencies.

A universal agent is one authorized to do all acts for

his principal which can lawfully be delegated to an

agent.

A general agent is one having general authority to

act in reference to some transaction or to some kind

or series of transactions.

A special agent is one authorized to act only in a par-

ticular event and in accordance with specific instruc-

tions.

The distinction between the general and the special agent Is

not always easy to draw, and courts and writers have not agreed

upon the basis of it. judge Story has said: "A special agency

properly exists, when there is a delegation of authority to do a single

act; a general agency properly exists where there is a delegation to

do all acts connected with a particular trade, business or employ-
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ment." Story on Agency, §17. Professor Parsons has said: "A

general agent is one authorized to transact all his principal's busi-

ness, or all his business of some particular kind. A particular

[special] agent is one authorized to do one or two special things."

1 Parsons on Contracts, *41. Mr. Evans says: "General agents are

such as are authorized to transact all business of a particular kind;

whilst a special agent is authorized to act only in a single transac-

tion." Evans on Agency (Ewell's ed.) p. 2.

Mr. Wright says that the general agent "is usually a person to

whom the principal has entrusted the management of a particular

business, such as an estate agent, or the manager of a business;

while the special agent is an agent given authority to deliver a

particular message or buy a particular thing on one occasion, or

do some special thing, and has no implied authority aliunde from

his position or the nature of his business." Wright on Principal and

Agent, 2d ed. 87, 88.

Something of the distinction may be made clear by an illustra-

tion. If I have a business which I cannot conduct In person, I may

employ an agent to manage it for me. In the very nature of the

case, however, in conferring his authority, I must do so in general

terms. I cannot easily do more than to empower him to manage it

\ccording to his best judgment for my best interest. I cannot well

IS 14-17.] DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. 13

go Into details and prescribe how he shall conduct himself and what

he shall do In all the multitudinous contingencies which may arise.

I must give him authority in general terms and leave the details to

his discretion. On the ether hand, if I need a hor . I may send a

person into the market to buy one only on condition that it shall be

of the age, size, color, weight, disposition, speed and price which I

prescribe. This case admits of special and particular instructions;

the other did not. The former, the business manager, would be a

general agent. The latter, who is to buy the horse, would be a spe-

cial agent. But suppose I say to an agent, ''Go into the market and

buy me a horse," and limit him neither as to age, size, color, price

or otherwise. What kind of an agent is he? He has general

power, but is to act only on a particular occasion. It is believed

that the nature cf his power is the chief criterion, and that the dis-

tinction between the special and the general agent is one of degree

merely and not of kind.

Formerly very important results were made to flow from this

distinction; but the modern tendency is to minimize it, if not to

ignore it altogether.
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See Butler v. Maples, 9 Wall. 766, Cas. Ag. 340; Loudon Savings

Fund Society v. Hagerstown Savings Bank, 36 Pa. St. 498, 78 Am.

Dec. 390, Cas. Ag. 371.

§ 15. It has been said that a principal can

ha ve bu t onejiniYersa 1 agent, and it has been doubted

whether such an agency could practically exist. It can

only be created, if at all, by clear and unambiguous lan-

guage, and will not be inferred from any general ex-

pressions, however broad.

See Gulick v. Grover, 33 N. J. L. 463, 97 Am. Dec. 72S; Barr v.

Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609; Wood v. McCain, 7 Ala. 800, 42 Am. Dec. 612.

§ 10. A principal may have several general

agents and as many special agents as occasion may

require.

§ 17. The same person may at one time or in

regard to one transaction be a special agent of his prin-

cipal and at another time or in reference to other trans-

actions he may be a general agent. So, though he may

be authorized to act only in a particular case he may,

with respect of that transaction, have general power.

14 DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. [§§ 17-22.

See Jeffrey v. Bigelow (1835), 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 518, 28 Am. Dec.

476.

§ 18. How to be proved. — Whether an agency

is general or special is usually a fact to be proved. The

law itself makes no abstract presumption in reference

to it, though when an agency is once shown to exist,

the law would presume it general rather than special.

It is always true that anybody who relies upon the existence of

agency has imposed upon him the burden of proving it. He must

not only prove that it exists, but he must also show what kind~oTan

agency it is. The law never simply presumes that agency exists,

and it never simply presumes that an agent is general or special.

When it appears that an agency does exist, the court, if it makes

any presumption at all, presumes it to be general rather than lim-

ited, but, speaking generally, the fact of the agency must be shown

and also the nature and extent of it.

See Savings Fund Society v. Savings Bank, Cas. Ag. 371.

§ 19. Professional and non-professional agents.

—Agents may further be classified as professional and
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n o n-p r of ess iona I.

Of the professional agents, the most important are

the attorney at law, the auctioneer, the broker and the

factor.

§20. The attorney at law is one whose profes-

sion it is to give advice and assistance in legal matters,

and to prosecute and defend in the courts the causes of

those who may employ him for that purpose.

§ 21. The auctioneer is one whose business it is

to sell or dispose of property, rights or privileges, at

public competitive sale, to the person offering or ac-

cepting the terms most favorable to the owner.

§ 22. The broker is one whose business it is to

bring parties together to bargain, or to bargain for

them, in matters of trade, commerce or navigation.

Brokers are of many kinds, such as merchandise brok-

X

y.

§§ 22-26.] DEFINITIONS AND DISTINCTIONS. US

ers, stock-brokers, insurance brokers, peal estate

brokers, and tlie like.

§23. The factor is one whose business il is to

receive and sell goods for a commission. He is often

called a commission-merchant. If he guarantees pay-

ment for the goods he sells, he is said to act under a

del credere commission. When authorized t<> sell a

cargo which he accompanies on the voyage, he is called

a super-cargo.

§ 24. Distinctions between these classes of

agents. — These various classes of agents differ mate-

rially from each other. Thus the auctioneer is em-

ployed to sell or dispose of only, and not to buy, and his

sales are always public, lie is primarily the agent of

(lie seller only, blit lie becomes the agent of the bliyei;

also when he accepts his bid and enters his name upon/

the memorandum of the sale.
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§ 25. The broker sells at private sale, and has

not usually the possession of the goods or property

which he sells, lie is regarded as the agent of the per-

son who first employs him, and he can not represent

both parties to the transaction unless with full knowl-

edge of his relations to the other each principal sees fit

to confide his interests to him. The broker acts prop-

erly in the name of his principal only, and he has not

usually any property in his possession upon which he

could claim a lien.

§ 26. The factor is entrusted with the posses-

sion of the goods, and sells usually in his own name.

Unlike the auctioneer, his sales are private. The factor

has a special property in the goods, a lien upon them

for his advances and charges, and, unless restricted,

may sell upon a reasonable credit.

Each of these different classes of agents will be more

fully considered hereafter.

16

FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED.

[§§ 27-29.

CHAPTER II.

FOR WHAT PURPOSES AN AGENCY MAY BE CREATED.

§ 33.

34.

Illustrations.

Validity as between

principal and agent.

35. How when contract il-

legal in part.

§ 27. The general rule.

28. The exceptions.

29. The first exception.

30. Illustrations.

31. The second exception.

32. How these cases re-

garded in law.

§ 27. The general rule. — It is the general rule that
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an agency may be created for the transaction of any

lawful business-, and that whatever a person may law-

fully do, if acting in his own right and in his own be-

half, he may lawfully delegate to an agent.

§ 28. The exceptions. — The cases is which authority

cannot lawfully be delegated fall into one or the other

of two general classes:

I. Authority cannot be delegated for the perform-

ance of an act which from its nature or the terms of

the law requiring it, can only be performed by the

principal in person. The rule in this class of cases is

sometimes stated in this way : that authority cannot be

delegated for the performance of a purely personal

duty.

II. Authority cannot be delegated to do an act

which is illegal, immoral or opposed to public policy.

§20. The first exception. — It is a general rule

that a personal duty, trust or confidence imposed upon

one person cannot be delegated by him to another. So,

"if a public duty or trust is imposed on anyone, these,

not being things which one does in his own right, can-

not be delegated, but must be performed personally."

§§ 29 -31.] FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. 17

It is this principle which creates the limitation, here-

after to be considered, upon the power of an agi q1 to

delegate Ins agency. But the same rule may operate in

some cases upon the principal, and it prevents him

from delegating to an agent those things which by stat

ute, custom or the inherent nature of the act are re-

quired to be done by him in person.

See United States v. Bartlett, Dav. 9, 24 Fed. Cas. 1021; Combes'

Case, 9 Co. 76, b.

§30. Illustrations. — Thus, for example, an

elector who is entitled to vote at a public election must

do so in person, and can not vote by agent. And where

a statute required an affidavit to be made concerning

matters peculiarly within the knowledge of a certain

person, it was held that he must make the affidavit him-

self, and that one made by an agent would not suffice.

See Mechem on Public Officers, § 187; United States v. Bartlett

supra.

So it has been held that power to make, under a
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statute, an assignment for the benefit of creditors can

not be delegated to an agent, the court saying: "Where

an act authorized by statute must, from its nature or

the necessary construction of the statutory authority,

be done in person — for example, the statute authoriz-

ing a party to make his will — the power to do the act

cannot be delegated. Such cases fall within the excep-

tion to the general rule that a person may authorize

another to dispose of his property for him in any man-

ner he himself may do."

See Minneapolis Trust Co. v. School District, (1897) 6S Minn.

414, 71 N. W. Rep. 679. Compare In re Whitley Partners (1886)

32 Ch. Div. 337; Hyde v. Johnson, 2 Bing. N. C. 776, 29 Eng. Com.

L. 488.

§31. The second exception. — Under the second

head the rule is, that the law will not sanction the

IS FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. t§§ 31-33.

creation or enforce the performance of an agency which

has for its purpose or which naturally and directly

tends to promote, the commission of an act which is

cither illegal or immoral in itself, or which is opposed

to public policy.

It may be thought at first view that this is not an

exception to the rule at all— that the principal himself

could not do any of the acts which are so condemned.

This, of course, might be true of certain of them, but

there are still many cases wherein one might, with im-

punity, act in person, but could not appoint an agent

to act for him. Thus, for example, one may very fre-

quently resort to personal persuasion to procure legis-

lation, or obtain a contract or a pardon by personal

influence, and incur thereby no legal penalty, because

no express statute has made it an offense. Such prac-

tices, however, are undesirable, because they tend to

substitute personal influences for considerations of the

public good. They are opposed to public policy, and
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though the law may not reach them directly, it will at

least refuse to lend its aid to enforce them.

§ 32. How these cases regarded in law. — The

law scrutinizes undertakings of this nature with great

strictness, and judges of their validity by their general

nature and natural and probable results. It makes no

difference that in the particular case nothing improper

was done or intended to be done. The law determines

the case by the tendency of undertakings of that kind,

and holds the particular contract unlawful if its gen-

eral nature brings it within the prohibited class.

§ 33. Illustrations. — The cases which fall under

this prohibitum are exceedingly numerous, but a few

classes will be mentioned.

Thus, contracts for employment which lead the agent

to put himself into a position wherein his duty to his

.t ?3ti , f>*

§83.] FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. 10

principal and his own interesi may conflict, or wherein

his duty to one principal may conflict with his duty

to another principal, or which expose him to tempta-

tion to violate his duty to his principal;

See Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, Cas. Ag. 12;

Atlee v. Fink, 75 Mo. 100, 42 Am. Rep. 3S5, Cas. Ag. 14; Byrd v.

Hughes, 84 111. 174, 25 Am. Rep. 442, Cas. Ag. 23.

to procure or to suppress legislation by bringing per-

sonal influence to bear upon the legislators;

See Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543, 100 Am. Dec. 535, Cas. Ag. 17;

Spalding v. Ewing, 149 Pa. St. 375, 24 Atl. R. 219, 15 L. R. A. 727;

Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26, 61 N. W. 898, SO L. R. A. 737; County

of Colusa v. Welch, 122 Cal. 428, 55 Pac. R. 243.

to procure action on the part of municipal bodies In-

corrupt persuasion ;

See Hayward v. Nordberg M'fg. Co., 85 Fed. R. 4, 29 C. C. A. 438.

to procure contracts from governments and heads of

governmental departments by like influences;
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See Stanton v. Embrey, 98 U. S. 548, Cas. Ag. 631; Elkhart

County Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238, 49 Am. Rep. 746, Cas. Ag. 18;

Beal v. Polhemus, 67 Mich. 130; Weed v. Black, 2 McArth. (D. C.)

268, 29 Am. Rep. 618; Gorman v. United States, 34 Ct. pf Ch. 237;

Wasserman v. Sloss, 117 Cal. 425, 49 Pac. R. 566, 59 Am. St. R. 209;

Commonwealth v. Press Co., 156 Pa. St. 516, 26 Atl. R. 1035.

to procure the suppression or defeat of public prosecu-

tions by other than the open and legally established

methods of procedure;

See Weber v. Shay, 56 Ohio St. 116, 46 N. E. 377, 60 Am. St. R.

743; Kirkland v. Benjamin, 67 Ark. 480, 55 S. W. 840.

to secure appointment to public or private office, by

personal solicitation or influence;

See Edward v. Randle, 63 Ark. 318, 38 S. W. 343, 36 L. R. A. 174;

Basket v. Moss, 115 N. C. 448, 20 S. E. 733, 44 Am. St. R. 463;

West y. Camden, 135 U. S. 507, 34 L. ed. 254; Wilbur v. Stoepel, 82

Mich. 344, 46 N. W. 724, 21 Am. St. R. 568.

20 FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. [J 33

to procure pardons by like means;

See Deering & Co. v. Cunningham, 63 Kans. 174, 65 Pac. R. 263,

54 L. R. A. 410; Moyer v. Cantieny, 41 Minn. 242, 42 N. W. 1060.

to secure or suppress evidence;

See Lyon v. Hussey, 82 Hun 15, 31 N. Y. S. 281; Kennedy v.

Hodges, 97 Ga. 753, 25 S. E. 493; Quirk v. Muller, 14 Mont. 467, 36

Pac. R. 1077, 43 Am. St. R. 647, 25 L. R. A. 87; Crisup v. Grosslight,

79 Mich. 380, 44 N. W. 621.

to deal in prohibited articles or engage in forbidden

transactions;

See Sullivan v. Horgan, 17 R. I. 109. 20 Atl. R. 232; Helber v.

Schantz, 109 Mich. 669, 67 N. W. 913; Mexican International B'k'g

Co. v. Lichtenstein, 10 Utah 338, 37 Pac. R. 574.

to deceive and defraud the public;

See McDonnell v. Rigney, 108 Mich. 276, 66 N. W. 52; Merrill v.

Packer, 80 Iowa, 542, 45 N. W. 1076; Shipley v. Reasoner, 80 Iowa,

548, 45 N. W. 1077; McNamara v. Gargett, 68 Mich. 454, 36 N. W. 218.

to further and increase litigation ;

See Peck v. Heurich, 167 U. S. 624; Alpers v. Hunt, 86 Cal. 78,
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24 Pac. R. 846; contra, Vocke v. Peters, 58 111. App. 338.

to do acts in contravention of statutes;

See Irwin r. Curie, 56 N. T. App. Div. 514, 67 N. Y. S. 380; Dudley

v. Collier, 87 Ala. 431, 6 So. R. 304, 13 Am. St. R. 55; Parks v. Dold

Packing Co., 6 Misc. R. 570, 27 N. Y. S. 289; Lowey v. Granite Asso-

ciation, 8 Misc. R. 319, 28 N. Y. S. 560.

to procure election to public or private office by im-

proper means;

See Roby v. Carter, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 295, 25 S. W. 725 ; Dansereau

v. St. Louis, 18 Can. S. Ct. R. 587; Dickson v. Kittson, 75 Minn. 168,

77 N. W. 820, 74 Am. St. R. 447.

to endeavor to bribe or corrupt the servant or agent ot

another ;

See Woodstock Iron Co. v. Richmond etc. Co., 129 U. S. 643, 32

L. ed. 819; Lum v. McEwen, 56 Minn. 278, s. c. Lum v. Clark, 57 N.

W. 662; Boyd v. Cochrane, 18 Wash. 281, 51 Pac. 383.

§5 33-34.] FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. 21

to commit crimes;

See Mexican International Banking Co. v. Liechtenstein, 10 Utah,

338, 37 Pac. R. 574.

to procure marriage for a commission or other com-

pensation;

See Duval v. Wellinan, 124 N. Y. 156, 26 N. E. 343; Morrison v.

Rogers, 115 Cal. 252, 46 Pac. R. 1072; Hellen v. Anderson, 83 111.

App. 506.

to create "corners"' and monopolies;

See Leonard v. Poole, 114 N. Y. 371, 21 N. E. 707, 11 Am. St. K.

667, 4 L. R. A. 728; Samuels v. Oliver, 130 111. 73, 22 N. E. 499.

to engage in stock gambling transactions or unlawful

dealings in other commodities or merchandise; or

See Kahn v. Walton, 46 Ohio St. 195, 20 N. E. 203; Wagner v.

Hildebrand. 187 Pa. St. 136, 41 Atl. R. 34; Dows v. Glaspel, 4 N. Dak.

251, 60 N. W. 60; Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336, 33 L. ed. 172;

Cashman v. Root, 89 Cal. 373, 26 Pac. R. 883, 12 L. R. A. 511, 23 Am.

St. R. 482.

these, and all others of like character or tendency the
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law declares void.

See Bowman v. Phillips, 41 Kans. 364, 21 Pac. R. 230, 3 L. R. A.

631; Beebe v. Board of Supervisors, 64 Hun 377, 19 N. Y. S. 629;

Brown v. First National Bank, 137 Ind. 655, 37 N. E. 158. 21 L. R.

A. 206; Wood v. Mancheser Fire Ins. Co., 30 Misc. R. 230, 63 N. Y.

S. 427; Railroad Co. v. Morris, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 502, 3 Oh. Dec. 419.

Study the following cases, and be able to state how they illus-

trate the rule: Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, C

on Ag. 12; Elkhart County Lodge v. Crary, 9S Ind. 238, 49 Am. Rep.

746, Cas. on Ag. 18; Byrd v. Hughes, S4 111. 174, 25 Am. Rep. 4 i2.

Cas. on Ag. 23; Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548, Cas. on Ag. 631;

Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543, 100 Am. Dec. 535. Cas. Ag. 17; Atlee v.

Fink, 75 Mo. 100, 42 Am. Rep. 385, Cas. Ag. 14.

§34. Validity as between principal and

agent. — But to make these contracts void as between

the principal and the agent, it is necessary that the

agent shall have participated in the unlawful intent of

22 FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. [§§ 34-35.

the principal, or shall knowingly have assisted in giv-

ing it effect,

See Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. at p. 510.

§35. How when contract illegal in part. —

Where contracts of this nature are entire, that is, where

the mutual agreements are so connected and mutually

dependent that one part can not stand without the

others, the whole contract will be rendered void by the

illegality; but if the contract is severable, the invalid
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part may be rejected and the residue be given effect.
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CHAPTER III.

WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT.

In general.

Who May Be Principal.

37. The general rule.

38. Rule applies to corpora-

tions and partnerships.

39. Natural or legal incapac-

ity.

40. Insane persons as princi-

pals.

41. Infants as principals.

42. Married women as princi-

pals.

2. Who May Be the Agent.

43. Less competence required
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in agent than principal.

44. Infant as agent.

45. How authorized.

46. Married woman as agent.

47. As agent for her hus-

band.

52.

53.

§ 48. Husband as agent for hl»

wife.

40. Corporations as agents.

50. Partnerships as agents.

51. Incapacity arising from

adverse interest.

3. Joint Principals.

Agent may represent sev-

eral joint principals.

Parties, co-tenants, etc.,

as principals.

54. Clubs, societies, etc., as

principals.

4. Joint Agents.

55. Several agents may jointly

represent the same prin-

cipal.

56. If the power 13 joint and

several.

57. But where the agency is

one created by law.

§36.

In general. — Attention will next be given to

th" general question, Who may be principal or agent?

And as a not inappropriate part of the same gene

subject, the questions which arise where several per-

sons are jointly to be the principals or the agents, will

be here considered.

1. 'Who may he Principal.

§ 37. The general rule. — It is the general rule that

every person who is competent to act in his own ru

and in his own behalf may act by agent. We have seen

also that as a general rule a person may do by agent

QQ 3
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whatever he may do in person. The reverse of this is

also true in general, viz. : — that a person who is incom-

petent to act in his own right and in his own behalf

cannot act by agent ; neither can one do by agent what

he cannot do in person.

§ 38. Rule applies to corporations and partner-

ships. — This rule applies to collections of persons as

well as to single individuals. Hence corporations may,

and, from their nature, must usually act by agents;

and the existence of the agency and the effect of the

agent's acts are subject to the same rules which apply

to individuals. Thus it is said in a recent case, "It is

well settled that a corporation may contract and be

contracted wdth through an agent whose authority

may be implied from facts and circumstances showing

recognition or ratification by the corporation. Indeed,

it seems that the same presumptions are applicable in

this respect to corporations as to natural persons."

See Moyer v. East Shore Terminal Co. (1894) 41 S. Car. 300, 19
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S. E. Rep. 651, 44 Am. St. Rep. 709.

So partnerships may, unless restricted, perform by

agent the acts which are within the scope of the part-

nership business.

See St. Andrews Bay Land Co. v. Mitchell, 4 Fla. 192, 54 Am. Dec.

340, Cas. Ag. 26; Lucas v. Bank of Darien, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 280, Cas.

Ag. 27; Clark v. Slate Valley R. Co. (1890), 136 Pa. 408, 20 Atl. Rep.

562, 10 L. R. A. 238.

The rule applies to limited partnerships as well as

to ordinary partnerships.

See Park Bros. & Co. v. Kelly Axe Mfg. Co. (1892), 49 Fed. Rep.

618, 6 U. S. App. 26, 1 C. C. A. 395.

§39. Natural or legal incapacity. — Incapacity to

be a principal may be either natural or legal. It is

<J

/
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natural where it inheres in the very nature, character

or situation of the person, as in the case of insane per-

sons, very young infants, and the like. It is legal where

it results from the operation of some arbitrary rule of

law, as in the case of married women at the common

law, or of the infant who has nearly but not quite

reached the age which may be fixed for his majority.

§40. Insane persons as principals. — Insane per-

sons and other persons who, from unsoundness of mind,

arc incompetent to make contracts, are incompetent to

act by agent.

See Plaster v. RIgney (1899), 97 Fed. Rep. 12, 38 C. C. A. 25.

But if the incapacity was not known to the other

party, who has acted in good faith and taken no ad-

vantage of it, an executed contract will not be set aside

if the other party can not be restored to his original

condition.

See Drew v. Nunn (1879), 4 Q. B. Div. 661.
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§ 41. Infants as principals. — The rule has been laid

down, especially in the older cases, that an infant can

not appoint an agent, and that any such appointment

is void. The better rule is that the arjpointment is

simply voidable, like the infant's ordinary contracts,

and that as to those matters, l ike the purchase of neces-

saries, and the like, concerning which the infant could

act in person, he may act by agent.

See Coursclle v. We3'erhauser, 69 Minn. 328, 72 N. W. Rep. 697;

Patterson v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. L. 457, 54 Am. Rep. 178, Cas. on

Ag. 507; Askey v. Williams (18S9), 74 Tex. 291. 11 S. W. Rep. 1101,

5 L. R. A. 176; Beliveau v. Amoskeag Co. (1895), 68 N. H. 225, 40

Atl. Rep. 734, 44 L. R. A. 167; Trueblood v. Trueblood, S Ind. 195,

65 Am. Dec. 756, Cases on Agency 29; Armltage v. Widoe, "J M'

124. The last two cases show the older rule; the first one, the mod-

ern rule.

Even under the older rule, an infant might, under many clrcum-

2G WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. [§§41-42.

stances, employ a servant (Chappie v. Cooper, 13 M. & W. 252) though

he could not appoint an agent. Service may often be a necessary

for which the infant may bind himself, but the appointment of

an agent has in view the creation of contractual obligations, and the

contractual capacity of the infant is limited.

§ 42. Married women as principals. — Unmarried

men, at common law, might act by agent, but mar-

ried women were incompetent to act in their own be-

half, and could not therefore act by agent. In most

Suites this incapacity has been largely removed by

statutes which usually provide that a married woman

may acquire and hold property as her separate estate

and may make contracts respecting it, as though she

were unmarried ; and a married woman may now act by

agent in respect to those matters concerning which the

statutes have made her competent to act in person. It

was said in a recent case, concerning one of these stat-

utes, "these provisions have brushed away many of the

disabilities of the wife under the common law; have
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recognized her individual existence, and conferred upon

her distinct rights and powers respecting contracts, the

carrying on of business, the owning, controlling and

disposing of property, equal to those held and enjoyed

by her husband. She is clothed with, power to manage

her own affairs, and certainly has power to appoint

an agent or attorney to do that which she is capable

of doing in person."

See Munger v. Baldridge (1889), 41 Kans. 23ti, 21 Pac. Rep. 159,

13 Am. St. Rep. 273.

As will be seen in a later section (§ 48) where a

married woman may act by agent, she may appoint her

husband as such agent.

*»

In dealing with the question of the married woman's capacity to

act by agent, the starting point must be her common law incapacity,

which was practically complete. To a greater or less extent, this

incapacity has been removed by statute, but the statutes are not

IS 42-42.] WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. 27

uniform, nor do they usually completely remove the common law

disabilities. So far as the latter have not been so removed, they still

operate, and it is necessary, therefore, in each case to see how that

particular case is affected by the statute.

Compare Weisbrod v. Railway Co., 18 Wis. 35, 86 Am. Dec. 743,

Cas. Ag. 31, with Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N. Y. 199, 27 Am. Rep. 38, Cas.

Ag. 33.

2. Who may be the Agent.

§ 43. Less competence required in agent than in

principal. — Inasmuch as it is tbe principal who is to

be brought into contractual relations with third per-

sons, it is obvious that the question of his capacity is

more important than that of the agent. The agent acts

in a representative capacity and exercises a derivative

authority. A less degree of competency is therefore re-

quired in the agent than in the principal, and it is said

that any person may be an agent except a lunatic, im-

becile or child of tender years. Hence infants, married

women, slaves and aliens have been held competent to
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act as agents.

See Lyon v. Kent, 45 Ala. 656, Cas. on Ag. 37.

It is, of course, not meant that an infant, for example, is alwayrj

an appropriate agent: there are many occasions where much judg-

ment, discretion or special skill may be requisite, which an infant

would not ordinarily possess, but that is a consideration which ap-

peals rather to the principal's wisdom in selecting his representa-

tive than to any standard of ability which the law may require.

The most serious difficulty in this connection is to reconcile the

statement that an infant, slave or married woman may be an agent

with the declaration previously made that the relation of agency —

the relation between the principal and his agent — is a contractual

one. It is asked, how that can be a contractual relation which may

be entered into by one not having contractual capacity. This ap-

parent difficulty has seemed to some so serious that they have been

led to ascribe some other character to agency and to describe it

not as a contractual relation but as a status or "office." Whether

agency may properly be defined as Matus or not depends, of course,

upon what is meant by status, — a matter upon which the persons

who use that term are by no means agreed. (See Holland's Juris-

prudence, 9th ed., p. 133.) It must suffice here to say that the char-

acteristics of status generally insisted upon are not to b« found is

28 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. [§§43-45.

agency. To define agency as an office presents the same difficulties:

it certainly is not a public office, and to call it a private office is to

raise questions as difficult as those which this definition was sug-

gested to solve.

The true view doubtless is to regard the relation as a contractual

one, and to treat these as cases of imperfect relation as is done in

many other fields — the general contracts of the infant, for example,

which are merely voidable and not void, and then voidable by the

infant only and not by third persons.

§ 44. Infant as agent. — Though an infant may be

an agent, the relation is an imperfect one. The infant

agent may bind his principal, but neither the principal

nor third persons with whom the agent deals can ac-

quire the same rights against the infant agent which

they might have if he were an adult,

In the case of Cordross's Settlement, (1878) 7 Ch. Div. 728, Sir

George Jessel, M. R., said, "I will state that in my opinion it is good

law that an infant can exercise a power even though it be coupled

with an interest, where an intention appears that it should be exer-
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cisable during minority."

But while the infant agent can thus doubtless effectually execute

the authority conferred upon him in such sense that neither the

principal nor the other party can disregard the contract merely be-

cause the agent was an infant, it is also doubtless true that the

principal could not enforce any contractual obligation against the

infant agent nor could the third person with whom the agent dealt

enforce against the agent such a contractual liability, for example,

as that which results when an adult agent assumes to make a con-

tract without authority. (See post § .)

§ 45. How authorized. — The infant may be

the agent of his parent or of strangers, but in either

case it must be by virtue of some actual authorization.

Even when he is to act for his parent, it must be by

virtue of the parent's authority, for, except in some

cases respecting necessaries, a child has no implied

authority, merely because he is the child, to bind his

parent as his agent, as, for example, in buying or sell-

ing goods, making contracts or loaning the parent's

property. Such an authority may, however, be ex*

§§45-47.] WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. 29

pressly given or it may be presumed from the parent's

conduct, as, for example, by his acquiescence in it when

brought to his attention.

See Johnson v. Stone, 40 N. H. 1ST, 77 Am. Dec. 706, Cas. Ag. 78;

Bennett v s Gillett, 3 Minn. 423, 74 Am. Dec. 774, Cas. Ag. 79; Hall

v. Harper, 17 111. 82; Swartwout v. Evans, 37 111. 442.

§ 4(>. Married woman as agent. — A married woman

might at common law be the agent of third persons,

even in their dealings with her husband. It was, how-

ever, as in the case of the infant agent, an imperfect

relation, because the married woman at common law

had no capacity to enter into contract relations. Un-

der the modern "Married Women's Acts," her capacity

to act as agent is usually made much greater.

§ 47. As agent for her husband. — Both at the

common law and under the modern statutes, the mar-

ried woman is competent to be the agent of her hus-

band. Her authority as her husband's agent is of two

kinds:
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1. That created by law, even against the husband's

consent, to buy necessaries on his credit when he lias

neglected to supply her. This is a matter, however,

which does not concern us here, but belongs to the law

of husband and wife.

See Benjamin v. Dockham, 134 Mass. 418, Cas. on Ag. 71.

2. That which arises from his actual authorization,

either express or implied, as in the case of his other

agents.

The wife has no general authority as her husband's

agent merely because she is his wife. Her husband may

give her such authority, but it must be conferred either

expressly or impliedly, as in the ease of his other

agents.

Sec Benjamin v. Benjamin, 15 Conn. 347, 3D Am. Dec. 384, Cas.

Ag. 72; Cox v. Hoffman, 4 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.) ISO, Cas. Ag. 39;

Weisbrod v. Railway Co., 18 Wis. 35, 86 Am. Doc. 743, Cas. Ag. III.

30 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. [§§ 48-50.

§ 48. Husband as agent for his wife. — Where a

married woman is competent to act by agent (see ante

§ 42), her husband may be appointed as the agent. "If

she appoints her husband as her agent in such a matter,

and in making the appointment acts of her own free

will and without coercion from him," said the court

in Massachusetts, "we see no reason for regarding her

as incapable of authorizing any act to be done by him

in her name, and on her behalf, or for shielding her

from responsibility. It must be held that whatever is

done within the scope of the agency is done by her

authority."

See Shane v. Lyons (1898) 172 Mass. 199, 51 N. E. 976, 70 Am.

St. Rep. 261.

Her husband, however, has no authority as her agent

merely because he is her husband, but his authority

must be conferred a s in the case of any other agent.

And it is said that even clearer evidence of her appoint-

ment ought to be required, when he assumes to act as
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her agent, than would be required if a stranger were

the agent.

See McLaren v. Hall, 26 Iowa, 297, Cas. Ag. 77; Rowell v. Klein,

44 Ind. 290; Rankin v. West, 25 Mich. 195; Rust-Owen Lumber Co.

v. Holt, 60 Neb. 80, 82 N. W. Rep. 112, 83 Am. St. Rep. 512.

§ 49. Corporations as agents. — A corporation may

act as agent either for individuals, partnerships, or

other corporations, if the act is within the scope of its

corporaTe powers and not forbidden. Corporations are

often organized for this express purpose, as in the case

of trust companies, and the like.

See Killingsworth v. Trust Co., 18 Ore., 351, 17 Am. St. Rep. 787,

Cas. on Ag. 40; McWilliams v. Detroit Mills, 31 Mich. 275.

§ 50. Partnerships as agents. — The same rule ap-

plies to partnerships. They may act as agent within

the scope of their partnership powers, or may be ex-

§f 50-51.J WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. 31

pressly organized for that purpose. Authority con-

ferred upon a firm is supposed to be conferred upon

each member of it, unless the contrary is expressed,

and therefore the authority may be exercised by any

one of the partners.

See Deakin v. Underwood, 37 Minn. 98. 5 Am. St. Rep. 827, Cas.

Ag. 68.

§51. Incapacity arising from adverse interest —

Incapacity to act as agent in certain eases arises from

adverse interest. The law does not permit a person to

assume to act as agent where he already has such an

interest in the same matter as may prevent his acting

fairly toward his principal. Thus the agent of one

party cannot, without the intelligent consent of both

principals, undertake to act in the same transaction as

the agent of the other party. Neither can a person,

without the full and intelligent consent of the other

party, undertake to be both a party to a transaction

and the agent of the other party.
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This subject will be more fully considered hereafter.

See Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, Cas. Ag. 12;

Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohio St. 396, 41 Am. Rep. 528, Cas. Ag. 538;

Byrd v. Hughes, 84 111. 174. 25 Am. Rep. 442, Cas. Ag. 23; Davis v.

Hamlin, 108 111. 39, 48 Am. Rep. 541, Cas. Ag. 461.

It is not necessary in this class of cases that the interest shall

be such as will or must prevent his acting fairly towards his prin-

cipal. Here, as before, the lav; judges of the whole class by the

tendency of any particular specimen in that class. It does not make

any difference in this particular case whether the agent might have

been able to sink entirely his own interest and act with the utmost

fidelity. It makes no difference that he is acting and has acted with

the utmost fidelity.

See Carr v. National Bank & Loan Co. 167 N. Y. 375, 60 N. E.

Rep. 649, 82 Am. St. Rep. 725.

If the principal at the time he employs the agent knows that the

latter has this interest, there Is no reason why he cannot employ him.

If he is willing to trust him in view of the facts he may do so. The

case spoken of Is where the interest is not disclosed. Without that

full and intelligent consent on the part of the principal the law

32 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. [§§ 51-R3.

absolutely forbids the agent from assuming to act where he haa an

adverse interest.

See Wildberger v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 72 Miss. 338, 17 !3o.

Rep. 282, 48 Am. St. Rep. 558; Ramspeck v. Pattillo, 104 Ga. 772,

30 S. E. Rep. 962, 69 Am. St. Rep. 197.

3. Joint Principals.

§ 52. Agent may represent several joint princi-

pals. — An agent may be appointed to represent a num-

ber of joint principals. The interest which the asso-

ciates have may be that of partners, or of joint-tenants,

or tenants in common of property, or merely that of

persons who have united to form a club, society or asso-

ciation in order to accomplish some social, political,

religious or other similar purpose. What their interest

is, becomes material in determining the extent of their

powers and liabilities as joint principals.

Where a number of co-tenants execute several and separate pow-

ers of attorney to the same agent to dispose of the several interest

of each, the agent will have no authority to bind them all jointly.
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Harris v. Johnston (1893), 54 Minn. 177, 55 N. W. Rep. 970, 40 Am.

St. Rep. 312. So where two principals unite in giving a joint power

to bind both jointly, there will be no authority to bind one only,

Gilbert v. How (1890), 45 Minn. 121, 47 N. W. Rep. 643, 22 Am. St.

Rep. 724, Cas. Ag. 380.

§ 53. Partners, co-tenants, etc., as principals. —

In the case of a partnership, each partner has usually

the power to appoint an agent whose acts, in reference

to the partnership affairs, will bind all of the part-

ners. But in the case of joint tenants, tenants in com-

mon, and other similar relations, one party is not, from

the mere fact of the relation, impliedly authorized to

act for all, and an agent appointed by one will bind

that one only and not all, unless all authorized his

appointment.

See Mussey v. Holt, 24 N. H. 248, 55 Am. Dec. 234; Tuttle v. Camp-

bell, 74 Mich. 652, 16 Am. St. Rep. 652; Morrison v. Clark, 89 Me.

103, 56 Am. St. Rep. 395.

55 54-55.1 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. '■>>'■>>

§51. Clubs, societies, etc., a3 principals. — Clubs,

societies, and unincorporated associations are not part-

nerships, and no power in one member to bind the

others will be implied from the mere fact of member-

ship. A person, therefore, who assumes to act as agent

of such a body can bind those only who have in so

way, previously authorized his appointment, expressly

or impliedly, or have subsequently ratified it

As in other cases, no particular method of conferring

the authority is necessary, unless made so by some i

press rule of the association. Such an appointment

may be authorized by the rules or regulations of the

association to which the member assents on joining, or

it may be made by those who vote for it at a meeting,

or it may be ratified by the members who subse-

quently take the benefit of the acts with knowledge of

the facts.

See Ash v. Guie, 97 Penn. St. 493, 39 Am. Rep. 818, Cas. Ag. 45;

Davison v. Holden, 55 Conn. 103, 3 Am. St. Rep. 40, Cas. Ag. 47;
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Lewis v. Tilton, 64 Iowa, 220, 52 Am. Rep. 436, Cas. Ag. 510; Bennet

v. Lathrop, 71 Conn. 613, 42 Atl. 634, 71 Am. St. Rep. 222.

Of course, to bind any one as principal in these cases, it must

appear that dealings upon credit were contemplated, for if it be

evident that the authority went no further than to pledge funds pro-

vided and supposed to be sufficient, no personal liability would

attach. McCabe v. Goodfellow (1892), 133 N. Y. 89, 30 N. E. Rep.

728, 17 L. R. A. 204.

i**""* 4. Joint Agents.

§ 55. Several agents may jointly represent the

same principal. — There may also be a number of

agents jointly representing the same principal. Where

they are appointed by a private principal, the law pre-

sumes that the principal relied upon their joint judg-

ment and discretion, and they must therefore all act

together in the execution of their authority, and a less

number than the whole can not execute it, unless there

34 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. [§§55-57.

be some provision in the instrument appointing them

or something in the circumstances, such as waiver, ac-

quiescence and the like, which indicates the consent of

the principal that less than the whole may act.

See Hawley v. Keeler, 53 N. Y. 114, Cas. on Ag. 50.

§ 56. If the power is joint and several, then

all or one only must act and not an intermediate num-

ber. If a partnership is the agent, the authority may,

as has been seen, be executed by any one of the part-

ners, in the absence of stipulations to the contrary.

The death or disability of one of two or more joint

agents will terminate the authority unless it is coupled

with an interest in the survivors.

See Deakin v. Underwood, 37 Minn. 98, 5 Am. St. Rep. 827, Cas.

Ag. 68.

§ 57. But where the agency is one created

by law, or is public in its nature, the rule is different.

In such cases all of the agents or officers must be pres-

ent to deliberate, or must have notice and an oppor-
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tunity to be present and deliberate with the others, but

a majority of the whole number, if present, may then

lawfully meet. A majority of this meeting may then

exercise the power.

This rule applies to the directors of corporations.

Thus after due notice, a majority constitute a quorum,

and a majority of that quorum may act.

See First Nat. Bank v. Mt. Tabor, 52 Vt. 87, 36 Am. Rep. 734, Cas.

on Ag. 52; McNeil v. Chamber of Commerce, 154 Mass. 277, Cas.

Ag. 63.

5§ G8 60]

APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS.

35

ER Q,

CHAPTER

OF THE APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS AND THE EVIDENCE

THEREOF.

5 58. In general.

1. How the Agent May

Be Appointed.

59. Usually, only by act of

principal.

60. The method to be pursued.

61. 1. Authority to execute in-

struments under seal.

62. How when instrument

executed in presence of

Need not be express.

67.

Doctrine of estoppel
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applied.

CS.

General rule.

69.

Limitations.

2.

Evidence of the Appoint-

ment.

70.

Authority not to be proved

by agent's admissions.

71.

But agent may be

called as a witness.

What constitutes the best

evidence.

How question deter-

mined.

principal.

63. How corporation may

appoint.

64. 2. Authority required by

statute to be in writing.

65. In other cases, authority

may be conferred by pa-

rol.

§ 58. In general. — The questions next to be consid-

ered will be, 1, How the agent may be appointed, and

2, By *what evidence the fact of his appointment may

be established.

.f 1. How the [gent may be Appointed.

§ 59. Usually, only by act of principal. — Except

in those cases in which the law creates the authoritv,

it is the invariable rule, that an agent can only be ap-

pointed at the will and by the act of the principal,

though that will may find expression in many different

ways.

See Pole v. Leask, 33 L. J. Rep. Eq. 155, Agency Cases. 81.

§60. The method to be pursued. — The law usu-

ally prescribes no particular method of conferring the

36 APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. [§§ 60-S1 .

authority. The material question is as to the fact of

the appointment rather than as to the method adopted..

There are, however, two classes of cases — one arising

under the rules of the common law and one under

statutes — in which the authority must be conferred in

a particular way, and they are : 1. Cases wherein an

instrument under seal is to be executed ; and, 2, Cases

wherein some statute, usually designed to prevent

fraud or perjury, expressly requires the authority to

be conferred by writing. These two classes of cases

will be considered first.

§ 61. 1. Authority to execute instruments under

sea l f — it was the settled rule at common law — and this

rule still generally prevails — that authority to execute

an instrument necessarily under seal could be con-

ferred only by a written power under seal.

See Humphreys v. Finch, 97 N. Car. 303, 1 S. E. Rep. 870, 2 Am.

St. Rep. 293.

So authority to fill blanks in deeds or other sealed in-
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struments can generally be conferred only by sealed

instrument, though there are cases wherein a principal,

who has confided to an agent a bond or deed containing

blanks to be filled and then delivered, will be held

bound to innocent parties, although the agent has filled

the blanks in an unauthorized manner.

See Phelps v. Sullivan, 140 Mass. 36, 54 Am. Rep. 442, Cas. Ag.

101; White v. Duggan, 140 Mass. 18, 54 Am. Rep. 437; Humphreys v.

Finch, supra; Cribben v. Deal, 21 Oreg. 211, 28 Am. St. Rep. 746.

But much less significance is now attached to seals

than formerly, and there is a marked tendency in many

States either to abolish the old distinctions by statute,

or to disregard them as no longer suited to the times.

And even at common law, if the instrument to be exe-

cuted was unnecessarily under seal, and the authority

x

§§ 61-63.] APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. 37

was sufficient for an unsealed instrument, the superflu-

ous seal would be disregarded and the authority held

sufficient.

See Heath v. Nutter, CO Me. 378, Agency Cases 91; Long v. Hart-

well, 34 N. J. L. 116, Cas. Ag. 92; Nichols v. Haines, 98 Fed. Rep.

692, 39 C. C. A. 235. Compare, in passing, Thomas r. Joslin, 30

Minn. 388, Cas. Ag. 427; Drury v. Foster. 2 Wall. 24, Cas. Ag. 120.

§ 62. How when instrument executed in

presence of principal. — So even though the instrument

to be executed were necessarily under seal, yet if the

instrument were executed in the presence of the prin-

cipal and by his express direction mere verbal author-

ity was sufficient. This rule still prevails.

See Gardner v. Gardner, 5 Cush. 483, 52 Am. Dec. 741, Cas. Ag.

100; Bigler v. Baker, (1894) 40 Neb. 325, 58 N. W. Rep. 1026, 24

L. R. A. 255.

The reason given for this rule is that "if the grantor's name is

written by the hand of another, in his presence and by his direc-

tion, it is his act, and the signature, in point of principle, is as
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actually his as though he had performed the physical act of making

it." Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 30 N. J. Eq. 193.

§ G3. Kcw corporation may appoint. — It was

also the rule of the common law that a corporation

could contract only by deed under its corporate seal,

and that its appointment of an agent could be made

only in the same manner, but this rule has been quite

generally abandoned, and a corporation may now ap-

point agents in substantially the same manner that an

individual may employ them.

"A great deal of the difficulty," it is said in one case, "originally

felt in holding corporations liable for the acts of their agents within

the scope of their authority, arose from the supposition that it was

necessary that their appointment should be under the seal of their

principals. The decisions, both in England and America, have satis-

factorily disposed of this technical doubt, and it is now clearly the

law, particularly with regard to what are called trading corpora-

tions, that no such evidence of authority is required. A private

corporation is liable for the acts of its agents within the scope of

/

7
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their authority, in the same way, and it would appear in the same

form, as any individual person is." Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.

Vandiver (1862), 42 Pa. St. 365.

See Burrill v. Bank, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 163, 35 Am. Dec. 395; Noble-

boro v. Clark, 68 Me. 87, 28 Am. Rep. 22; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v.

South, etc., R. Co., 84 Ala. 570, 5 Am. St. Rep. 401; Williams v.

Fresno Canal Co., 96 Cal. 14, 31 Am. St. Rep. 172; Scofield v. Parlln

& Orendorff Co., 61 Fed. Rep. 804, 18 U. S. App. 692, 10 C. C. A. 83.

§ 64. 2. Authority required by statute to be in

writing. — In very many of the States, by statute (the

.statute of frauds or its equivalent) an agent to sell,

mortgage or lease lands or any interest therein (other,

usually, than leases for not more than one year), can

be authorized only by an instrument in writing.

Thus the statute in Michigan (Comp. L. 1897, §§9509, 9511) de-

clares that "No estate or interest in lands, other than leases for a

term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or con-

cerning lands, or in any manner relating thereto, shall hereafter be

created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared, unless by act
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or operation of lav;, or by deed or conveyance in writing, sub-

scribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or

declaring the same, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully

authorized by writing." And "Every contract for the leasing for a

longer period than one year, or for the sale of any lands, or any in-

terest in lands, shall be void, unless the contract, or seme note or

memorandum thereof, be in writing, and signed by the party by

whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by some person thereunto

by him lawfully authorized by writing." Statutes substantially sim-

ilar are found in Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, Ohio, and

other States.

Not all of the States, however, have such statutes. Thus, Wis-

consin, for example, while it has a statute identical with the first

sei ion quoted above from Michigan, omits the words "by writing"

at the close of the second one. Indiana and Iowa do the same, and

there are various distinctions in other States which it is not prac-

ticable to reproduce here. The statute in each State must be con-

sulted whenever this general question arises. See, for example,

Lccg t. Hartwell, 34 N. J. L. 116, Agency Cases, 92; Malone v. Mc-

Cullough, 15 Colo. 460; Kozei v. Dearlove, 144 111. 23, 36 Am. St.

Rep. 416; White v. Breen, 106 Ala. 159, 19 So. Rep. 59, 32 L. R. A.

127; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. South, etc., R. Co., 84 Ala. 570, 5 Am.

St Rep. 401.

§§ 64-67.] APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. .".0

The policy of the law may extend this rule to other

cases. Thus, in Kentucky it is enacted thai "No per-

son shall be bound as the surety of another by the art

of an agent unless the authority of the agent is in writ-

ing, signed by the principal."

See Kentucky Statutes, 1899, §482; Simpson v. Commonwealth,

89 Ky. 412, 12 S. W. Rep. 630.

§ 65. In other cases, authority may be conferred

by parol. — Except in these cases, of instruments ond< r

seal, and statutes expressly requiring written author-

ity, it is the general rule that authority for the doing of

any act lawful to be done, including the execution of all

written instruments other than those mentioned above,

may be conferred without writing.

See Worrall v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229, 55 Am. Dec. 330.

There seems to be an impression, easily acquired, but with diffi-

culty removed, that, because authority for the execution of instru-

ments under seal must be conferred by an instrument under seal,

authority for the execution of instruments in writing must be con-
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ferred by writing. This, however, is not true. Except in the cases

already referred to, authority for the execution of written instru-

ments may be conferred without writing. Authority for the execu-

tion of negotiable instruments is no exception, though such an

authority is not easily implied. (See Jackson v. National Bank.

Agency Cases, 415; New York Iron Mine v. National Bank, Agency

Cases, 423.)

§G6. Need not be express. — The authority,

moreover, need not be expressly conferred. In tie 1

great majority of the cases it is informally conferred,

or is presumed from the acts and conduct of the prin-

cipal.

§ 67. Doctrine of estoppel applied. — The doc-

trine of estoppel is constantly applied, and the prin-

cipal will not be permitted to deny that which by his

words or conduct he has asserted, if such denial would

prejudice an innocent third person who has reasonably

relied upon such words or conduct.

40 APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. [§§67-69.

See Breckeuridge v. Lewis, 84 Me. 349, Ag. Cas. 103; Phelps v.

Sullivan, 140 Mass. 36, 54 Am. Rep. 442, Cas. Ag. 101.

Estoppel, as here used, has been defined to be: "An impediment

or bar by which a man is precluded from alleging or denying a fact,

in consequence of his own previous act. allegations or denial to the

contrary." Jacob's Law Diet.

§ 68. General rule. — It may therefore be stated

as a general rule that whenever a person has held out

another as his agent authorized to act for him in a

given capacity; or has knowingly and without dissent

permitted such other to act as his agent in that ca-

pacity; or where his habits and course of dealing have

been such as to reasonably warrant the presumption

that such other was his agent authorized to act in that

capacity; whether it be in a single transaction or in a

series of transactions — his authority to such other to so

;■<•{ for him in that capacity will be conclusively pre-

sumed, so far as it may be necessary to protect the

rights of third persons who have relied thereon in good
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faith and in the exercise of reasonable prudencej and

he will not be permitted to deny that such other was

his agent authorized to dp the act he assumed to do,

provided that such act was within the real or apparent

scope of the presumed authority.

See Savings Society v. Savings Bank, 36 Penn. St. 498, 78 Am.

Dec. 390, Cas. Ag. 371; Johnson v. Hurley, 115 Mo. 513, Cas. Ag. 84.

See also Pursley v. Morrison, 7 Ind. 356, 63 Am. Dec. 424; Hooe v.

Oxley, 1 Wash. (Va.) 19, 1 Am. Dec. 425; Tier v. Lampson, 35 Vt.

179, 82 Am. Dec. 634; Hubbard v. Tenbrook (1889). 124 Pa. St. 291,

16 Atl. Rep. 817, 2 L. R. A. 823, Cas. Ag. 367; Union Stock Yard Co.

v. Mallory, 157 III. 554, 41 N. E. Rep. 888, 48 Am. St. Rep. 341.

§ 69. -Limitations. — But authority will not

arise from mere presumption. _It must he based on

facts, for which the principal is responsible, and wiW

not arise from any mere argument as to the conven-

ience, utility or propriety of its existence.

The facts, moreover, from which it is implied must

be given their ordinary and natural effect, and where

§2 69-71.] APPOINTMENT OP AGENTS. 11

the authority is inferred from the adoption of arts of

a certain kind, its scope will be limited to the perfor m-

ance of a<is of the same kind.

See Bickford v. Menier, 107 N. Y. 490, Cas. Ag. 93; Graves v.

Horton, 38 Minn. 66, Cas. Ag. 82.

2. Evidence of the Appoint men I.

§ 70. Authority not to be proved by agent's ad-

missions. — The authority of the agent must in all cases

he traced to the principal, and must be established by

evidence of his acts or statements. As against the prin-

cipal, therefore, the agent's admissions or declarations

(as distinguished from his testimony, as a witness i;i

court), are not admissible for the purpose of establish-

ing, enlarging or renewing the agent's authority; nor

can his authority be established by showing that he

acted as agent, assumed to be agent or was generally

reputed to be agent. The agent's acts and statements

cannot be made use of against the principal until the

fact of his agency has first been shown by other evi-
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dence.

See Hatch v. Squires, 11 Mich. 185, Cas. Ag. 106; Mitchum v.

Dunlap, 98 Mo. 418; Kornemann v. Monaghan, 24 Mich. 36; Graven

v. Korton, 38 Minn. 66, Cas. Ag. 82; Kane v. Barstow, 42 Kan. 465,

16 Am. St. Rep. 490; Mullanphy Savings Bank v. Schott, 135 111.

655, 26 N. E. Rep. 640, 25 Am. St. Rep. 401; Pepper v. Cairns, 133

Pa. St. 114, 19 Atl. Rep. 336, 19 Am. St. Rep. 625; Baltimore, etc..

Relief Ass'n v. Post, 122 Pa. St. 579, 9 Am. St. Rep. 147.

When it is said that the agent's statements, admissions and dec-

larations cannot be made use of until the fact of his agency has

been shown by other evidence, it is not meant that there must first

be a separate verdict found establishing that fact; what is meant

is, that there must first be some competent testimony offered tending

to prove that fact.

§ 71. But agent may be called as a witness.

— If the agent's evidence as to his authority is desired,

he must be called as a witness; his testimony as to the

42 APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. [§§71-73.

nature and extent of his authority, where it rests in

parol, being as competent as that of any other witness.

It is necessary to distinguish between what the alleged agent

may admit, represent or declare, out of court, when he is not under

oath or subject to cross-examination, and his testimony as to the

facts concerning his authority when he is called as a witness.

See Howe Machine Co. v. Clark, 15 Kan., 492, Cas. Ag. 107;

Thayer v. Meeker, 86 111. 470.

His testimony, moreover, "cannot be restricted to the

more words used by the principal, but is admissible

generally on the whole subject."

Zze Lawall v. Groman. ISO Pa. 532, 37 Atl. Rep. 98, 57 Am. St.

Rep. 662.

The agent's testimony, further, like that of any other

witness, is not necessarily conclusive. It has such

weight as its credibility entitles it to receive. Thus it

might be found from other evidence that he was agent,

though he testified that he was not, or that he was the

agent of one party, though he testified that he was
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agent of another.

See State v. Bristol Savings Bank, 108 Ala. 3, 18 So. Rep. 533,

54 Am. St. Rep. 141.

§ 72. What constitutes the best evidence. —

^Yhere the authority is conferred by written instru-

ment, the writing is the best evidence of the existence

and nature and extent of the authority, and must be

produced, or its absence accounted for, in any case in

which the question of the existence of the authority is

directly involved; but where the question is only col-

laterally involved, that is, where it arises incidentally

in some other controversy, parol evidence may be ad-

mitted, even though the authority was in writing.

See Neal v. Patten, 40 Ga. 363; Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 38 N. J. L. 39.

§ 73. How question determined. — Where the

authority is in writing and the writing is produced, the

|7X.] APPOINTMENT OF AGENTS. 43

question whether aii agency has been created by it, and

if so, what is its scope and effect, are questions of law

for the court.

So if there be no writing but the facts are not dis-

puted, the question whether under the undisputed f.

an agency exists, and if so, what is its nature and ex-

tent, is likewise for the court.

But where the authority is not in writing and the

facts are in dispute, it is for the jury to determine, un-

der proper instructions from the court, not only the

existence of the agency, but also its nature and effect.

See Savings Society v. Savings Bank, 36 Penn. 498, 78 Ata. Dec.

390, Cas. Ag. 371; Railroad Co. v. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606; Wilicox v.

Hines, 100 Tenn. 524, 45 S. W. Rep. 781, 66 Am. St. Rep. 701; See-
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horn v. Hall, 130 Mo. 257, 32 S. W. Rep. 643, 51 Am. St. Rep. 56.'.

44

OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION.

[§ 74.

CHAPTER V.

OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION.

§ 74. How question arises.

1. What is Ratification.

75. Ratification defined.

2. What Acts May Be Ratified.

76. In general, any act which

might previously have

been authorized.

77. Not void or illegal

acts.

78. Forgery.

3. Who May Ratify.

79. In general, any person

who might authorize.

80. State, corporation, etc.

81. Infants — Married women.
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82. Agent.

4. Conditions of Ratification.

83. What conditions must ex-

ist.

5. What Amounts to a Rati-

fication.

84. General rule.

85. Ratification by instrument

under seal.

86. Ratification by authority

subsequently conferred.

87. Ratification by conduct.

88. By accepting benefits.

89. By bringing suit.

90-91. By acquiescence.

, The Effect of Ratification.

92. In general.

93. Revocability.

94. Effect as between princi-

pal and agent.

95. Effect as to rights of third

party against principal.

96. Effect as to rights of prin-

cipal against third party.

97. Effect between agent and

other party.

98. In tort.

§ 74. How question arises. — The matters thus far

dealt with have been those which relate to the creation

of authority before an act is done. Cases, however, not

infrequently arise in which a person ha,s done an act

as agent for another which proves to be unauthorized

either because the authority was not broad enough to

include it, or because though it once existed it had ex-

pired, or because, perhaps, there was no semblance at

any time of authority and the act was based upon a

mere gratuitous assumption of authority. In all of

these cases, of course, the supposed principal is not

5§ 74-76.] OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. 45

bound and may repudiate the act when brought to his

attention.

Suppose, however, on the other hand, that, when the

act is brought to his attention, he approves of it, and

would be glad to have it regarded as an act done on his

account; or su ppose that when the act La brought to

his attention, he is so indifferent towards it that he

simpl y does nothing, leaving th e matter in such con-

dition tha t, an infcrPTW of approval is just as legiti -

mate as the inference of disapproval, or, perhaps, is

stronger. What is now the legal situation? May an

una uthorized act be subsequently either e vprpssly or

impliedly approved; and if so what are the nature and

effect of such approval?

To the first question, the answer of the law is cer-

tain : .There may be a subseq uent approval of unau -

thorized acts. The law terms that subsequent

approval Ratification. As to the second question,

AVhat is the effect of such an approval or ratification,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t7dr2xb9s
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

and in what cases will it be operative? it is the purpose

of the present chapter to supply the answer.

1. What is Ratification .

§ 75. Ratification defined. — Rati fication is , the

adoption and affirmance by one person of an act which

another, without authority, has assumed to do as his

agent.

See McCracken v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 591, Cas. Ag. 109; Zott-

ruan v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96, 81 Am. Dec. 96.

2. What Art* may he Ifatifirf.

§ 76. In general, any act which might previously

have been authorized. — As a gen eral, rul e, a P e rson

may ratify the previous unauthorized doing by another

in, his behalf, of any act which he might then and cay

46 OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. [§§ 76-79.

still lawfully do himself, and which he might then and

can still lawfully delegate to such other to be done.

The act so ratified may be either the making of a

contract, or, within the limits referred to in the follow-

ing section, the commission of a tort.

§ 77. Not void or illegal acts. — Rat ification

can not render valid acts which were void when done,

or acts which were then so far illegal in themselves

that they could not then be lawfully authorized; but

an act which is a trespass, singly because it was not

authorized, may be ratified by the subsequent approval

of the person whose authority was needed; and so a

person may assume liability by the adoption of an act

which another has done in his behalf and as his agent,

and which proves to be a trespass or other tort because,

while it might lawfully be done under some circum-

stances, it w r as not lawfully done in the case in

question .

See Brewer v. Sparrow, 7 Barn. & Cres. 310; Wilson v. Tumman,
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6 Man. & Gr. 236; Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124.

§ 78. Forgery. — Whether a forgery can be rati-

fied has been much disputed, but the weight of

authority is to the effect that responsibility for the act

may be assumed by ratification, though not so as to

affect the forger's liability for his crime.

See Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen 447, Cas. Ag. 110; Henry

v. Heeb, 114 Ind. 275, 5 Am. St. Rep. 613, Cas. Ag. 115. See also

Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 8 So. Rep. 498, 12 L. R.

A. 140.

3. Who may Ratify.

§ 79. In general, any person who might authorize.

— As a general rule any person who was competent to

do an act when it was done and who is still compe-

§§79-82.] OP- AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. 47

tent to do it, may ratify its unauthorized doing b\

another as his agent.

$80. State, corporation, etc. — Thus the State,

municipal and private corporations, partnerships, and

partners, may ratify what it or they could and can still

authorize. And of course, e cuitccrsu, neither can do

by ratification what it would be powerless to authorize

directly.

See State v. Torinus, 26 Minn. 1, 37 Am. Rep. 395; Forbes v.

Hagman, 76 Va. 168, Agency Cases, 122; School District v. Insurance

Co., 62 Me. 330, Caa. Ag. 194; Melledge v. Iron Co., 5 Cush. (Mass.)

158. 51 Am. Dec. 59; North Point, etc., Co. v. Utah Canal Co., 16

Utah 246, 40 L. R. A. 851; Union School Furniture Co. v. School

District, 50 Kans. 727, 20 L. R. A. 136; Commercial Electric L. & P.

Co. v. Tacoma, 20 Wash. 288, 72 Am. St. Rep. 103.

§ 81. Infants— Married women.— It^has been

said that an infant can not ratify, but t h e true rule

is that both infants, and married women under the mod-

ern statutes, may ratify such acts and, of course, surh
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only as they are competent to authorize.

See Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124; Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall, 24,

Agency Cases, 120; Rowell v. Klein, 44 Ind. 290; McLaren v. Hall,

26 Iowa, 297, Cas. Ag. 77; Reed v. Morton, 24 Neb. 760, 40 N. W.

Rep. 282, 1 L. R. A. 736; MacFarland v. Heim, 127 Mo. 327, 29 S. W.

Rep. 1030, 48 Am. St. Rep. 629.

§82. Agent.— An agent cannot ratify his own

act^ nor caflj™ "' +™ jflflt T PTlfa ra titT„tte apt nfl ""

fellow agent: but pne afient may ratify ffrg fl^ftf *"•

other agent of the same uriminal, where the agent who

ratifies has himself general authority to do the act rat-

ified.

See Ironwood Store Co. v. Harrison, 75 Mich. 197, Cas. Ag. 124.

The same rule is expressed in a different way when It is saii

"An agent can in some cases ratify an act done by a sub-agent by

adopting it as his own, but such ratification will not bind the prin-

cipal unless it is an act which was within the agent's authority to

do." Wright on Principal and Agent (2d ed.), 54.

48 OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. [§ 8S.

4. Conditions of Ratification-.

§ S3. What conditions must exist. — In order to

effect a ratification, the following conditions must

exist :

a. The person ratifying must have the present abil-

ity to do the act himself or to authorize it to be done.

b. The person for whom the act was done must have

been identified or capable of being identified. In other

words, the person who did the act must have acted for

the particular person ratifying or, if he did net know

who the particular person was, then for persons of his

description. *

See Foster v. Bates, 12 M. & W. 225, Agency Cases, 127.

c. The act must have been done, by the person act-

ing, as agent and not on his own account. That is, the

person who did the act must at the time not only have

intended to act on behalf of the person ratifying, but

it seems also to be necessary that he should then have

professed to act for a principal, though it is not neces-

was.
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sary that he should have disclosed who the principal

See the very late case of Keighley v. Durant [1901] App. Cas.

240, overruling Durant v. Roberts [1900], 1 Q. B. 629; Mitchell v.

Minnesota Fire Ass'n, 48 Minn. 278, 51 N. W. Rep. 608; Ferris v.

Snow, — Mich. — , 90 N. W. Rep. 850, wherein it is held that it is

necessary that he should have professed to act as agent. It seems,

moreover, to be sufficient that he professed to act as agent, though

he had a fraudulent purpose to really take the benefit on his own

account. In re Tiedeman [1899], 2 Q. B. Div. 66. See also Ham-

lin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327, Agency Cases, 136.

On the other hand, in Hayward v. Langmaid [1902], — Mass. — ,

63 N. E. Rep. 912, it is held not to be necessary that he should have

been understood to De dn agent by the person with whom he dealt.

d. The person ratifying must have been in existence

at the time the act was done.

This question arises more frequently in the case of contracts

§83.] OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. 10

made or acts done by the promoters of a proposed corporation than

in any other class of cases. The question is, may the corporation

when organized ratify these acts done or contracts made before it

had any existence? There is real difficulty in saying that there may

be rati;! ration by a body which had no existence and therefore no

power to do or authorize the act when done. Some courts, realizing

the difficulty, have held that there may be adoption but not. ratifi-

cation. One difference in result is that in the case of adoption the

contract is not deemed to be made until the date of the adoption,

while in case of ratification the contract is deemed to be made from

the beginning. Some courts seem to regard it merely as a difference

in names.

See McArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn. 319, Agency Cases,

128; Bell's Gap R. R. Co. v. Christy, 79 Penn. St. 54, Agency Cases,

131; Schreyer v. Turner Flouring Co., 29 Oreg. 1, 43 Pac. Rep. 719.

e. The person alleged to have ratified must, at the

time of the alleged ratification, have either had full

knowledge of all of the material facts relating to the

art ratified or he must have deliberately assumed
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responsibility for the act, having all the knowledge of

the facts which he cared to have. Knowledge of the

material facts is essential, but knowledge of the legal

effect of those facts is not essential.

See Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen (Mass.) 493, Cas. Ag. 146; Scott v.

Railroad Co., 86 N. Y. 200, Agency Cases, 148; Wheeler v. Sleigh

Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 347, Cas. Ag. 138; Thacher v. Pray, 113 Mass. 291,

Cas. Ag. 204; Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 5 So. Rep. 190, 2

L. R. A. 808; Cram v. Sickel, 51 Neb. 828, 71 N. W. Rep. 724, 66 Am.

St. Rep. 478; American Exchange Bank v. Loretta Mining Co., 165

111. 103, 46 N.-E. Rep. 202, 56 Am. St Rep. 233; Bierman v. City

Mills, 151 N. Y. 4S2, 15 N. E. Rep. 856, 56 Am. St. Rep. 635; Brown v.

Wright, 58 Ark. 20, 22 S. W. Rep. 1022, 21 L. R. A. 467.

/. The principal cannot ratify the act so far as it is

favorable to him, and reject it as to the residue; but he

musi ratify all or none. If he takes the benefits he

mast also assume the burdens. But where the principal

has authorized the doing of a certain act, he does not

by accepting the benefits of that act assume responsi-

bility for an additional unauthorized act of whose

performance be was ignorant

i —J

50 OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. [§§ 83-84.

See Eberts v. Selover, 44 Mich. 519, 38 Am. Rep. 278, Cas. Ag.

150: Wheeler v. Sleigh Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 347, Cas. Ag. 13S; Baldwin

v. Burrows, 47 N. Y. 199, Cas. Ag. 196; Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y.

79, Cas. Ag. 154; Roberts v. Rumley, 58 Iowa, 301, Cas. Ag. 143;

Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Aughey, 144 Pa. St. 398, 22 Atl. Rep.

667, 27 Am. St. Rep. 638; Eastman v. Relief Ass'n, 65 N. H. 176, 18

Atl. 745, 23 Am. St. Rep. 29; Daniels v. Brodie, 54 Ark. 216, 15 S. W.

Rep. 467, 11 L. R. A. 81; Busch v. Wilcox, 82 Mich. 336, 47 N. W.

Rep. 328, 21 Am. St. Rep. 563.

g. The facts alleged to show the ratification must

be such, and there must be such reliance upon them,

that the party relying upon them will be prejudiced if

the ratification is not established.

See Doughaday v. Crowell, 11 N. J. Eq. 201.

/;. The ratification can not be made to so operate as

to cut off the intervening rights of third persons who

have acted in good faith and without notice of the acts

sought to be ratified.

See Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332, Agency Cases, 160.
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i. The party alleging that ratification has taken

place must establish it by a preponderance of the evi-

dence.

See Reese v. Medlock, 27 Tex. 120, 84 Am. Dec. 611.

No new consideration is necessary. The original con-

sideration suffices.

See Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 8 So. Rep. 498, 12

L. R. A. 140.

5. What Amounts to a Ratification.

§ 84. General rule.— Ratification may be either ex-

press or implied. There are cases in which it must be

express or formal. It is a general rule that the act of

ratification must be of the same nature as that which

would be required to confer authority to do the ratified

act in the first instance. Thus if authjonty^ujoto: seal

85 84-87.] OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. 51

would have been required, ratification by an instrument

under seal is access ary ; if written authority vvas requi-

site, r atification by writing is necc s sary.

See Hawkins v. McGroarty, 110 Mo. 516, Cas. Ag. L67; Ko:

Dearlove, 114 111. 23, 32 N. E. Rep. 542, 30 Am. St. Rop. H6; Worrall

v. Munn, 5 N. Y. 229, 55 Am. Dec. 330; Zottman v. Sau Francisco. 20

Cal. 96, 81 Am. Dec. 96.

§ 85. Ratification by instrument under seal.

— The tendency, however, is strong to abolish the rule

which requires ratification under seal.

See Mclntyre v. Park, 11 Gray (Mass.) 102, 71 Am. Dec. 690, Cas.

Ag. 170.

And here, as in other eases, if the instrument to be

ratified was unnecessarily under seal, the ratification

may be made without seal.

See Adams v. Power, 52 Miss. 828; Worrall v. Munn, supra; Zott

man v. San Francisco, supra.

§ 80. Ratification by authority subsequently con-

ferred.— Ratification may be effected by subsequently
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conferring authority to do the act to be ratified.

See Rice v. McLarren, 42 Me. 157, Cas. Ag. 190.

§ 87. Ratification by conduct. — Inasmuch as au-

thority for the doing of most acts may be conferred by

parol, the ratification of most acts may be eff< cted by

parol. This is the rule wherever some technical

requirement like that of writing or sealing does not

intervene. In the great majority of cases, ratification

is inferred from conduct, and this is often done where

the party had no express intention to ratify or even in-

tended not to ratify. The principle of estoppel applies

here and where a party by his words or conduct has led

another to believe that tlu k act was done by his author-

ity. he will not afterward be permitted to deny it to the

52 OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. [§§ 87-89.

, ; ejudice of the other who has in good faith relied

'ii it.

See ante §§ G7, 68; Dixon v. Bristol Sav. Bank, 102 Ga. 461, 31 S.

E. Rep. 96, 66 Am. St. Rep. 193; Brown v. Wilson, 45 S. Car. 519, 23

S. E. Rep. 630, 55 Am. St. Rep. 779; Ward v. W'illiams, 26 111. 447,

79 Am. Dec. 385, and note: Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Cowell, 28 Pa.

St. 329, 70 Am. Dec. 128; Gillett v. Whiting, 141 N. Y. 71, 35 N. E.

Rep. 939, 38 Am. St. Rep. 762.

§ 88. By accepting benefits.— One of the most

common methods of ratifying an act. is by accepting the

benefits of it; and it is the general rule that a person

who, with knowledge of the facts, accepts the benefits

of the act must accept also its responsibilities.

See Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N. Y. 563, Cas. Ag. 177; .Tones v. Atkin-

son, 68 Ala. 167, Cas. Ag. 192; Thacher v. Pray, 113 Mass. 291, 18

Am. Rep. 480, Cas. Ag. 204; Mayer v. Dean, 115 N. Y. 556, 22 N. E.

Rep. 261, 5 L. R. A. 540; Mining Co. v. Bank, 95 Fed. Rep. 23, 36

C. C. A. 633; Thomas v. City Nat Bank, 40 Neb. 501, 58 N. W. Rep.

943, 24 L. R. A. 263; Reed v. Morton, 24 Neb. 760, 40 N. W. Rep.
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282, 1 L. R. A. 736; Savings Bank v. Butchers' Bank, 107 Mo. 133,

17 S. W. Rep. 644, 28 Am. St. Rep. 405; Gunther v. Ullrich, 82 Wis.

222, 52 N. W. Rep. 88, 33 Am. St. Rep. 32; Sherman Center Town Co.

v. Morris, 43 Kan. 282, 19 Am. St. Rep. 134; Hitchcock v. Griffin Co.,

99 Mich. 447, 58 N. W. Rep. 373, 41 Am. St. Rep. 624.

§ 89. By bringing suit. — Another common

method is by bringing suit based upon, and for the en-

forcement of the act, This, when done with a knowl-

edge of the facts, shows an intention to take the bene-

fits of the act, and the burdens must be taken with the

benefits.

This rule, however, would not apply to suits brought

for the purpose of avoiding or repudiating the unau-

thorized act, or to suits brought to prevent loss by it.

See Shoninger v. Peabody, 57 Conn. 42, Cas. Ag. 172; Roberts v.

Rumley, 58 Iowa, 301, Cas. Ag. 143; Park Bros. & Co. v. Kelly Axe

Mfg. Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 618, 6 U. S. App. 26, 1 C. C. A. 395; Pickle v.

Muse, 88 Tenn. 380, 12 S. W. Rep. 919, 17 Am. St. Rep. 900; Wheeler

& Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Aughey, 144 Pa. St. 398, 22 Atl. Rep. 667, 27

Am. St. Rep. 638.

§§90-92.]

OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION.

§90. By acquiescence. — When a person learns

that anot her has assumed, without authority, to do

some act for him as his agent, he has the option to

repudiate or ratify the act, but he must do one thing

or the other, lie has a reasonable time within who h

to decide, but if,., with knowledge of the facts, he fails

to repudiate the act within a reasonable time, he will

Ik' deemed to have affirmed it.

See Heyn v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 150, Cas. Ag. 1S6; Hazard v.

Spears, 4 Keyes, 469, Cas. Ag. 182; Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327,

Cas. Ag. 136; Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen (Mass.) 447, Cas.

Ag. 110; Scott v. Railway Co., 86 N. Y. 200, Cas. Ag. 148; Central

R. & B. Co. v. Cheatham, 85 Ala. 292, 4 So. Rep. 828, 7 Am. St. Rep.

48; Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Cowell, 28 Pa. St. 329, 70 Am. Dec.

128; Augusta, etc., R. Co. v. Kittel, 52 Fed. Rep. 63, 2 C. C. A. 615;

Central Trust Co. v. Ashville Land Co., 72 Fed. Rep. 361, 18 C. C. A.

590; Union Switch Co. v. Johnson Co., 61 Fed. Rep. 940, 10 C. C. A.;

Raymond v. Palmer, 41 La. Ann. 425, 6 So. Rep. 692, 17 Am.
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St. Rep. 398; Quinn v. Dresbach, 75 Cal. 159, 7 Am. St. Rep. 138.

This rule, according to the weight of au-

§ 91. -

thority, applies whether the person who did the unau-

thorized act was an agent for other purposes or a mere

stranger who had volunteered to act as agent; though

ratification is less readily presumed where the person

was such a stranger.

See Heyn v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 150, Cas. Ag. 186; Ladd v. Hilde-

brant, 27 Wis. 135, 9 Am. Rep. 445; Terry v. Provident Fund Society,

13 Ind. App. 1, 41 N. E. Rep. 18, 55 Am. St. Rep. 217.

6. The Effect of Ratification.

§ 92. In general. — The general effect of ratification

under the conditions named, is as stated in the familiar

maxim Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur ct vmndat

■priori aequiparatur, that the act becomes the act of

the principal, with its benefits and burdens, from the

beginning, as though he had previously authorized it

to be done; except, that if the rights of third persons

■ I.. I ■ IN ,1 , I ' ' l—^fc— ■»>■

54 OP AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. ["§92-95.

have intervened between the act and its ratiiication,

such rights cannot be cut off by the ratification.

See Cook v. Tullis, L8 Wall. (U. S.) 332, Cas. Ay. 160; Mccracken

v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 5S1, Cas. Ag. 109.

§93. Itevocability. — Ratification, once intelli-

gently made, is irrevocable, so far as the rights of third

persons arc concerned; but, on the other hand, repudi-

ation unless it lias led some one interested to change

his situation to his detriment may ordinarily be subse-

quently changed to ratification.

See Jones v. Atkinson, 68 Ala. 167, Cas. Ag. 192; Neely v. Jones,

16 W. Va. 625, 37 Am. Rep. 794; Sanders v. Peck, 87 Fed. Rep. 61.

59 U. S. App. 248, 30 C. C. A. 530.

§ 94. Effect as between principal and agent. — As _

between the principal and the agent, the effect of the

ratification is to release the agent from all liability to

the principal for acting without authority; and to give

the agent Uiesa in< ' lights against the principal, — as for

compensation, reimbursement, etc., — which he would

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t7dr2xb9s
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

have had if the act had been previously~alithorized.

The principal must ratify the whole act, and his con-

duct, it is held, will be liberally construed in favor of a

ratification.

See Wilson v. Dame, 58 N. H. 392, Cas. Ag. 526; Bank v. Bank,

13 Bush (Ky.), 526, 26 Am. Rep. 211, Cas. Ag. 206; Hazard v. Spears,

4 Keyes (N. Y.), 469, Cas. Ag. 182; Szymanski v. Plassan, 20 La.

Ann. 90, 96 Am. Dec. 382; Risbourg v. Bruckner, 3 Com. B. N. S.

812, 91 Eng. Com. L. 810; Brewer v. Sparrow, 7 B. & C, 310, 14 Eng.

Com. L. 144; Frixione v. Tagliaferro, 10 Moore's Pr. Coun. Cas. 175;

Smith v. Cologan, 2 Term Rep. 188n.

§ 95. Effect as to rights of third party against

principal. — As between the principal and the party with

whom the agent dealt, the effect of the ratification is to

give the other party the same rights against the princi-

pal which he would have had if the act had been pre-

5§ 95-97.] OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. 55

viously authorized. This is the aspect of the question

most frequently arising, and the rule is declared in the

familiar ma:-:!;n Omiiis ratihubitio retrotrahitur et

rnandato priori aeguiparatur.

See Ileyn v. O'llagen. 60 Mich. 150, Cas. Ag. 186; Hyatt v. Clark,

118 N. Y. 5G3, Cas. Ag. 177.

§ 96. Effect as to rights of principal against

third party. — The ratification of the act by the princi-

pal being equivalent to prior authority, will operate to

cut off any remedies which he might otherwise have

had against the third party based upon the want of

authority, a.s, for example, the right to recover property

or money received by the other party from the agent.

Whether the principal by ratifying it can acquire the

same right to enforce against the other party a con-

tract made on his behalf which he would have had if it

had been previously authorized, is a question upon

which the cases are in some conflict. The rule sus-

tained by the weight of authority seems to be that the
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principal mav ratifv the unauthorized contract and

then enforce it against the other party, if he does so

within a reasonable time and before the other party has

withdrawn from it.

See Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 686, Cas. Ag. 215; McClintock v.

Oil Co., 146 Penn. 144, 28 Am. St. Rep. 785, Cas. Ag. 219; Bolton v.

Lambert, L. R. 41 Ch. Div. 295, Cas. Ag. 222; In re Tiedeman [1899],

2 Q. B. 66; Atlee v. Bartholomew, 69 Wis. 43, 5 Am. St. Rep. 103,

and note; 25 Am. L. Rev. 74.

The Wisconsin cases and the English cases represent extreme

views. The rule of the Pennsylvania case is more likely to be fol-

lowed. The question is one of real difficulty. In addition to the

discussions referred to in the notes to the* cases, see 9 Harv. L.

Review, 60; 5 Law Quar. Rev. 440; Fry on Specific Performance

(3d Eng. ed.), 711.

§ 97. Effect between agent and other party. — In

contract. — A person who assumes to deal as agent

with third parties in matters concerning which he has

5G OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. [§§ 97-98.

no authority incurs, in many instances, as will be seen

hereafter, an individual liability to the person so dealt

with. As between such another party and the agent

of a disclosed principal, the effect of the ratification

in contract cases is to release the agent from liability

to the other party for having made a contract without

authority; and it gives the agent the same rights

against the other party which he would have had if the

contract had been previously authorized.

See Spittle v. Lavender, 2 Brod. & Bing. 452, 6 Eng. Com. L. 224.

If the principal were undisclosed, ratification will

not pro tect the agent from liability to the other party,

but it will charge the principal and give the other party

an option to hold the principal or the agent as he

choo ses.^

See post, § 243.

§ 98. In tort. — But in cases of tort, the rule

is different: The ratification by the principal makes

him liable also for the tort to the third person, but it
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does not release the agent from his liability to the third

person for his participation in the tort. Both princi-

pal and agent are thereafter liable. It is no defense

to the agent when sued for a tort that he acted as the

agent of another in committing it.

See Stephens t. Elwall, 4 Maule & Sel. 259, Cas. Ag. 226; Delaney

v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123, 44 Am. Rep. 456, Cas. Ag. 514; Os-

borne t. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437, Cas. Ag. 518; Miller

v. Wilson, 98 Ga. 567, 58 Am. St. Rep. 319.

§99.]

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY.

57

CHAPTER VI.

OF DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE AGENT.

99. In general.

100-2. Agent generally cannot

delegate authority to

sub-agent.

§ 103 Under what circumstances

justified.

104-5. Effect of appointment of

sub-agent.

§99. In general. — Thus far there has been consid-

ered the (question of the appointment of agents by the

principal himself, either before the act was done — by

authorization, or after it was done — by ratification.

Some consideration is required of the question whether

authority can be conferred not by the principal him-

self but by some one else to whom that power has been
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confided.

There can be no doubt, of course, that the principal

may authorize an agent to employ other agents, as

where the manager of a business is clothed with the

power of employing all such servants and agents as the

conduct of the business may require. In such eas< -.

employment of agents by the agent authorized to em-

ploy them, within the scope of the employment, is an

appointment by the principal under the general maxim

Qui facit per alium, farit per se } and the agents so ap-

pointed are the agents of the principal as fully as

though appointed by him in person.

Another and a different question is, not whether an

agent may thus be authorized to appoint agents who

will derive authority directly from the principal, but

whether an agent who has been given certain authority

may himself hand that authority over in whole or in

part to another, who is to exercise it either for ^v under

58 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY. [§§99-101.

him. It is the question, not whether an agent may be

authorized to appoint other agents, but whether he may

appoint sub-agents. The difference may be seen by

inquiring whether an agent appointed by an agent is

the agent of the principal or the agent of the agent.

The act of handing down authority conferred is fre-

quently spoken of as delegation of the authority, and

the question arises in other departments of the law than

agency.

§ 100. Agent generally cannot delegate authority

to sub-agent. — It is the general rule, finding expres-

sion in the familiar maxim, Delegatus non potest dele-

gari, that an agent cannot delegate his authority to a

sub-agent, without the expressed or implied consent of

his principal. This is always the rule where the act

to be performed requires the exercise of judgment or

discretion, or where the principal evidently trusted to

a personal performance by the agent.

The rule is based upon the presumption that the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t7dr2xb9s
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

principal has selected the particular agent because he

relied upon, or desired the benefit of, that particular

person's judgment, discretion, experience, skill or abil-

ity, and it would be a manifest injustice, as well as

a disappointment of expectations, if the person so

selected could turn the matter over to another of whom

the principal may be ignorant and to whom he might

not be willing to entrust the authority.

See Appleton Bank v. McGilvray, 4 Gray (Mass.) 518, 64 Am.

Dec. 92, Cas. Ag. 229; Birdsall v. Clark, 73 N. Y. 73, 29 Am. Rep.

105, Cas. Ag. 231; McKinnon v. Vollmar, 75 Wis. 82, 43 N. W. 800,

17 Am. St. Rep. 178, 6 L. R. A. 121; Davis v. King, 66 Conn. 465,

50 Am. St. Rep. 104 and exhaustive note; Central, etc., Ry. Co. v.

Price, 106 Ga. 176, 71 Am. St. Rep. 246.

§ 101. These are the considerations also which

forbid the agent's doing what is really the same thing

§§ 101-103.] DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY. 5S

under another name, that is, assigning his contract of

agency. "In the case of sue!) a contract," it is said in

a recent case, "it is a presumption of law that the trust

is exclusively personal, and that it cannot be trans-

ferred or delegated by the agent without his principal's

consent."

See Bancroft v. Scribner, 72 Fed. Rep. 988, 44 U. S. App. 480, 21

C. C. A. 352; Peterson v. Christensen, 26 Minn. 377, Cas. Ag. 234.

§ 102. The rule, however, is not inflexible. It

is based upon the presumed intention of the principal

and is intended for his protection. There are cast-,

moreover, wherein the reason is not present, and the

rule should not then prevail. Ifjhe c ase doe s not in-

volve the exercise of any special skill, judgment or dis-

cretion, or, though it does, if it appears that the prin-

cipal is willing that the authority may be delegated,

then exceptions should be recognized, and the law

admits them. Hence —

§ 103. Under what circumstances justified. — Unless
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the contrary is expressed, authority to appoint a sub-

agent will be implied — (1) where the act to be done

is mechanical or ministerial only; (2) where the au-

thority can not be executed without the employment

of sub-agents; (3) where their employment is in accord-

ance with a known and well established usa<re; and

(4) where the circumstances were such that it was evi-

dently contemplated, when the agent was appointed,

that sub-agents would be employed.

See Harralson v. Stein, 50 Ala. 347, Cas. Ag. 23G; Grady v.

Insurance Co., 60 Mo. 116. Cas. Ag. 23S; Exchange Nat. Ban!. 7.

National Bank, 112 U. S. 276, Cas. Ag. 239; Cummins v. Heald, 24

Kan. COO, 36 Am. Rep. 264, Cas. Ag. 247; Bailie v. Augusta Say.

Bank, 95 Ga. 277, 21 S. E. Rep. 717, 51 Am. St. Rep. 71; McKlnnon

v. Vollmar, 75 Wis. 82, 43 N. W. 800, 17 Am. St. Rep. ITS 6 L. R.

A. 121.

60 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY. [§§ 103-105.

An appointment of a sub-agent, though not originally

authorized, may be ratified by the principal in the

same manner and with like effect, as in other cases.

See Saveland v. Green, 40 Wis. 431. See also Barret v. Rhern, 6

Bush (Ky.) 466; Montagu v. Forwood [1893], 2 Q. B. Div. 350.

§ 104. Effect of appointment of sub-agent. — If the

sub-agent is employed with the express or implied con-

sent of the principal, then the sub-agent is to be

regarded as the agent of the principal. He is liable to

the principal directly, and the original agent is not

responsible to the principal for the acts of the sub-

agent, unless lie failed to exercise good faith and due

care in his appointment.

See Davis v. King, 66 Conn. 465, 50 Am. St. Rep. 104, and note;

Bradford v. Hanover Ins. Co., 102 Fed. Rep. 48, 43 C. C. A. 310, 49

L. R. A. 530; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Bradford, 201 Pa. St. 32, 50

Atl. Rep. 286, 55 L. R. A. 408, 1 Michigan Law Review, 140.

§ 105. If the employment of the sub-agent was

not so authorized by the principal, then the sub-agent
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is to be deemed the agent of the original agent only,

and the latter is responsible to the principal for the

acts of the sub-agent.

See Barnard v. Coffin, 141 Mass. 37, 55 Am. Rep. 443, Cas. Ag.

249; Hoag v. Graves, 81 Mich. 628, 46 N. W. Rep. 109.

§§ 1CKJ-107.] TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY.
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CHAPTER VII.

OF THE TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY.

9 106. In general.

I. Termination by Act of

Parties.

107. What methods fall under

this head.

108. Termination by original

agreement.

109. Termination by subse-

quent act of parties.

1. Termination By Mutual

Consent.

110. Agency may be termi-

nated at any time by

mutual consent.

2. Revocation By Principal.

111-112. Power of principal to
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revoke.

113-115. Not when coupled

with an interest.

116. How revoke.

117. Notice of revocation.

3. Renunciation By Agent.

118. Power of agent to re-

nounce authority.

§ 119. Enforcement of contract

of agency.

120. Agency at will.

121. Discharge of agent justi-

fied when.

122. Renunciation by agent

justified when.

II. Termination by Opera-

\ UK Law.

123. In general.

124. Death of principal.

125. Death of agent.

126. Insanity of principal or

agent.

127. Bankruptcy of principal

or agent.

128. Marriage of principal.

129. War.

130. Destruction of subject

matter.

131. Termination of power

over subject matter—

Sub-agents.

§ 100. In general. — Ilaving now given some atten-

tion to the question of how agency may be created, it

may be well to consider next the question of how it may

be terminated. The agency may be terminated in one

of two general ways: —

1. By the act of the parties.

2. By operation of law.

I. TERMINATION BY ACT OF PARTIES.

§ 107. What methods fall under this head. — The

agency may be terminated by the act of the parti

either —

62 TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. [§§ 107-110.

(a) By force of their original agreement; or

(6) By the subsequent act of one or both of them.

§108. Termination by original agreement, — The

authority will be terminated by force of the original

agreement where it comes to an end because of some

limitation either expressly or impliedly impressed upon

it at the time of its creation.

By force of the original agreement, therefore, the

agency is terminated —

(1) When the object for which it was created has

been accomplished; and

(2) When the time originally fixed for its continu-

ance has expired.

§ 109. Termination by subsequent act of parties.

— The authority will be terminated by the subsequent

act of the parties —

(1) Where it is terminated by their mutual con-

sent.

(2) Where the principal revokes it.
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(3) Where the agent renounces it.

1. Termination by Mutual Consent.

§ 110. Agency may be terminated at any time

by mutual consent. — The agency may be terminated

by mutual consent of the principal and agent at any

time. Notwithstanding any limitation or condition

originally imposed, the same power that made the ar-

rangement in the first instance can subsequently waive

the condition or remove the limitation. So far as any

authority depends upon the act of the parties (as dis-

tinguished from authority created by law) the law has

no purpose to subserve which will require the continu-

ance of the relation, when both parties desire and agree

that it shall be terminated.

§§111-113.] TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. (IH

2. Revocation by Principal.

§ 111. Power of principal to revoke.— Usually at

any time. — In the ordinary case, agency is (rented to

subserve some purpose which the principal has in mind.

It is the principal's will that is to be executed, his

interest that is to be promoted. The agent usually has

no other interest than to carry the principal's purpose

into effect and earn the promised compensation. If,

therefore, the principal's circumstances are altered, if

his purpose change, if his inter- 1 will be better served

by discontinuing the enterprise than by prosecuting it,

he certainly ought to have it in his power to withdraw

the authority; and the agent can ordinarily have no

interest in the matter which will justify him in insist-

ing upon going on, if his claim to such damages as he

may legally have sustained by the termination of the

authority be recognized. It is, therefore, the general

rule that the principal may revoke the agent's author-

ity at any time before 1 its execution and for any reason
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deemed sufiicient to himself.

See Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317, 43 Am. Dec. 670; State

v. Walker, 88 Mo. 279; Owen v. Frink, 24 Cal. 171, 178; Lord v.

Thomas, 64 N. Y. 107.

§112. Of course, if the authority has been

executed, or the agent has entered into a legally bind-

ing contract, the authority, though otherwise revocable,

cannot be revoked so as to affect these acts already

done. If the authority has been executed in pari only,

and the residue be severable, the authority as to such

residue may be revoked as in other cases.

§ 1 13. Not when coupled with an interest. —

"While revocability is thus the rule in the ordinary c.

there may be cases wherein there is something more

than a mere authority — cases wherein the agent is also

64 TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. [§§113-114

something more than a mere agent — cases wherein he

has, in the property or thing concerning which the au-

thority exists, some proprietary interest of his own

which the continuance of the authority is necessary to

protect — cases wherein, in the language of the law,

the authority is "coupled with an interest." In such

cases the rule of revocability does not apply so far as

to permit the principal to cut off the authority neces-

sary ior the protection of the agent's interest.

See Smyth v. Craig, 3 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 14; De Forest v.

Bates, 1 Edw. (N. Y.) Ch. 394; Raymond v. Squire, 11 Johns. (N.

Y.) 47; Jackson v. Burtis, 14 id. 391.

§ 114. Precisely what shall be deemed to be

an authority "coupled with an interest" is not easy to

define, but it is everywhere agreed that it must be an

interest or estate in the subject matter of the agency,

and not merely an interest in the results which are to

flow from the execution of the authority.

An interest in the subject matter, concerning which
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the authority was given, in order to render it available

as a security for some claim or demand, would be an

interest which would prevent revocation; but an inter-

est merely in the form of a right to commissions or

profits out of the proceeds of the execution of the

authority would not be sufficient.

In the former case there is something existing in

which the agent has a present interest before the au-

thority is executed; in the latter case the thing in which

he has an interest, namely, the proceeds of the execu-'

tion of the authority, obviously cannot come into exist-

ence until after the authority is executed. The former

interest is sufficient to prevent revocation ; the latter is

not.

See Alworth v. Seymour, 42 Minn. 526, Cas. Ag. 314; Mansfield

v. Mansfield, 6 Conn. 559, 16 Am. Dec. 76; Chambers y. Seay, 12,

Ala. 373, Cas. Ag. 252.

C

§§115-116.] i ELIMINATION OF THE AGENi 65

§ 115. The mere fact that the authority w£U

called "irrevocable" or "exclusive" will not prevent its

revocation.

See Chambers v. Seay, 73 Ala. 373, Cas. Ag. 252; Blackstone y.

Buttermore, 53 Penn. 266, Cas. Ag. 255.

And even the fact that the principal may have ex-

pressly agreed that the agency shall continue for a cer-

tain period will not prevent his revoking the authority

before that time, if not coupled with an interest; but

he will be liable to the agent for the damages which

the agent sustains on account of the revocation con-

trary to the agreement.

See Standard Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 84 Ga. 714, 8 L. R. A. 410, Cas.

Ag. 273; Missouri v. Walker, 125 U. S. 339, Cas. Ag. 277; Wilcox &

G. Sew. Mach. Co. v. Ewing, 141 U. S. 627, Cas. Ag. 283; Durkee v.

Gunn, 41 Kan. 496, 13 Am. St. Rep. 300, Cas. Ag. 312.

Distinction is sometimes made in these cases between

the power to revoke and the right to revoke; the prin-

cipal always having the power to revoke but not hav!
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the rig lit to do so in those cases wherein he has agreed

not to exercise his power during a certain period. If,

in the latter case, he does exercise his power he must

respond in damages.

See Alworth v. Seymour, 42 Minn. 526, Cas. Ag. 314.

The same conclusion is reached by distinguishing

between the authority and the contract of employment.

The authority may be withdrawn at any moment, bur

the contract of employment can not be terminated in

violation of its terms without the principal's becoming

liable in damages.

See Turner v. Sawdon [1901], 2 K. B. 653.

§116. How revoke. — The revocation need not be

express. It may be implied from circumstances, as

where the principal disposes of the subject matter of

i

66 TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. [§§116-118.

the agency, or appoints another agent to perform the

undertaking, or himself intervenes to perform it in per-

son. It will also in general result from the dissolution

of a partnership or of a corporation which was the prin-

cipal; and from the severance of the joint interest of

joint principals.

See Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206, Cas. Ag. 257; Ahern v. Baker, 34

Minn. 98, Cas. Ag. 288; Salton v. Cycle Co. '[1900] 1 Ch. Div. 43.

§ 117. Notice of revocation. — Upon revoking the

authority of a general agent, the principal must give

notice of the revocation to persons who have previously

dealt with the agent as such, or he will continue to be

bound by the agent's acts. The notice required is simi-

lar to that required upon the dissolution of a partner-

ship, namely, actual notice to those who have extended

credit in reliance upon the authority and general public-

notice to others.

See Claflin v. Lenheim, 66 N. Y. 301, Cas. Ag. 294; Wheeler v.

McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, Cas. Ag. 362; Maxcy Mfg. Co. v. Burnham, 89
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Me. 538, 36 Atl. 1003, 56 Am. St. Rep. 436.

Where a power of attorney has been recorded, the instrument re-

voking it should be likewise recorded. Gratz v. Improvement Co.,

82 Fed. Rep. 381, 53 U. S. App. 499, 27 C. C. A. 305, 40 L. R. A. 393.

Notice is not necessarv of the revocation of the au-

thority of a special agent, unless he has entered upon

the execution of the authority.

Notice must also be given to the agent of the revoca-

tion of his authority.

See Salton v. Cycle Co. [1900] 1 Ch. Div. 43.

3. Renunciation by Apent.

§ 118. Power of agent to renounce authority.

— The agent may also renounce his authority at any

time, but if he does so in violation of an agreement to

act for a particular time or if he fails to give reasonable

§5118-121.] TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. 67

notice, he will be liable to the principal for the damages

sustained.

§ 119 Enforcement of contract of agency.- Courts

will not undertake to enforce specific performance of a

contract of agency, nor will they interfere to prevenl

by injunction a violation of the contract, except in

cases involving services of such a peculiar and personal

character that damages would be inadequate cod pen-

sation.

See Alworth v. Seymour, 42 Minn. 52C, Cas. Ag. 314; Cort v.

Lassard, 18 Oreg. 221, 17 Am. St. Rep. 726, Cas. Ag. 31G; Rogers

Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58 Conn. 356, 18 Am. St. Rep. 278; Bishop v.

American Preservers' Co., 157 111. 284, 41 N. E. Rep. 765, 48 Am. St.

Rep. 317.

§ 120. Agency at will.— Where no period is fixed

for the continuance of the agency, and no stipulation

is made respecting its termination, it is presumed to

be at will, and either party may terminate it without

liability at any time by giving reasonable notice.
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See Sheahan v. Steamship Co., 87 Fed. Rep. 167, 57 U. S. App.

254, 30 C. C. A. 593; Rees v. Pellow, 97 Fed. Rep. 167, 38 C. C. A. 94.

But contracts for a definite time may in some cases

be presumed from the circumstances, even though no

express understanding to that effect was had.

See Rhodes v. Forwood, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 256, Cas. Ag. 259;

Turner v. Goldsmith [1891], 1 Q. B. Div. 544, Cas. Ag. 266; Lewis

v. Insurance Co., 61 Mo. 534, Cas. Ag. 269; Glover v. Henderson, 120

Mo. 367, 25 S. W. Rep. 175, 41 Am. St. Rep. 695; Warren Chemical

Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N. Y. 586, 23 N. E. Rep. 908, 16 Am. St.

Rep. 788.

§121. Discharge of agent justified when.— And

even though employed for a definite time, the agent

may lawfully be discharged, if he proves incompetent

for the task assumed, or if he is guilty of wilful dis-

obedience to lawful orders or of such disorderly or

68 TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. [§§ 121-124.

immoral conduct as amounts to a breach of his implied

undertaking to conduct himself with fidelity and pro-

priety.

See Dieringer v. Meyer, 42 Wis. 311, 24 Am. Rep. 415, Cas. Ag.

289; Bass Furnace Co. v. Glasscock, 82 Ala. 452, 60 Am. Rep. 748,

Cas. Ag. 291.

§ 122. Renunciation by agent justified when.—

The agent may also lawfully terminate the relation if

he is required to do dishonest or unlawful acts.

II. TERMINATION BY OPERATION OF LAW.

§ 123. In general. — The authority may also be ter-

minated in many cases by mere operation of law upon

the happening of some event which makes the further

continuance of the agency incompatible, impracticable

or impossible. The most important of these events

are:

§ 124. Death of principal. — The death of the prin-

cipal operates to instantly terminate au authority, not

coupled with an interest. "The interest which can
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protect a power after the death of the person by whom

it was created must be an interest in the thing itself.

The power must be ingrafted upon some estate or in-

terest in the thing to which it relates." A mere interest

in commissions or profits to result from the execution

of the power is not enough.

See Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174, Cas. Ag. 322; Knapp v.

Alvord, 10 Paige, 205, 40 Am. Dec. 241, Cas. Ag. 328; Farmers' Loan

& Trust Co. v. Wilson, 139 N. Y. 284, 34 N. E. Rep. 784, 36 Am. St.

Rep. 696; Pacific Bank v. Hannah, 90 Fed. Rep. 72, 59 U. S. App.

457, 32 C. C. A. 322; Gardner v. First Nat. Bank, 10 Mont. 149, 10

L. R. A. 45.

By the weight of authority the rule applies even

though the fact of the death may not be known to the

agent or to the third person with whom he deals;

$8 124-128.] TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. 69

though the harshness of this rule has caused it in some

cases to be changed by statute, and some courts deny

it so far as it would operate to defeat interests acquired

in ignorance of the death.

See Weber v. Bridgman, 113 N. Y. 600, Cas. Ag. 331. Contra. See

Cassiday v. McKenzie, 4 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 282, 39 Am. Dec. 76;

Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. 520, 13 id. 574; Dick v. Page, 17 Mo. 2:^4;

Deweese v. Muff, 57 Neb. 17, 73 Am. St. Rep. 488.

§125. Death of agent. — The same result must also

ensue from (he death of the agent, except in those casts

in which the agent had an authority coupled with an

interest.

S 12G. Insanity of principal or agent. — The in-

finity of the principal or the agent must also ordi-

narily operate to terminate an authority not coupled

with an interest; saving, usually, the rights of third

persons who, in ignorance of the insanity, have parted

with things of value to which they can not be restored.

See Matthiessen, etc., Co. v. McMahon, 38 N. J. L. 536, Cas. Ag.
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335; Sands v. Potter, 165 111. 397, 46 N. E. Rep. 2S2 ; Drew v. Nunn,

4 Q. B. Div. 661.

§ 127. Bankruptcy of principal or agent. — The

bankruptcy — not the mere insolvency — of (lie principal

will also ordinarily terminate an authority not coupled

with an interest. The bankruptcy of a business agent

would ordinarily have the same effect.

S128. Marriage of principal. — The marriage of

a woman at common law would revoke a power of at-

torney previously given by her, but this result would

not ensue under many of the modern statutes. But in

any event the marriage of the principal will terminate

an authority, not coupled with an interest, where the

execution of the authority would operate to defeat

rights acquired by the marriage.

See Henderson v. Ford. 46 Tex. 627; Wambole v. Foot«, 2 Dak. 1.

70 TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. [§§ 129-131.

§ 129. War. — War between the country of the prin-

cipal and that of the agent will suspend, if not abro-

gate, many kinds of authority.

See Insurance Co. v. Davis, 95 U. S. 425, Cas. Ag. 336; Williams

v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55; Sands v. Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 626, 10 Am.

Rep. 535.

§ 130. Destruction of subject matter. — The de-

struction of the subject matter of the agency, or of the

principal's interest therein, must usually terminate

the agency.

§ 131. Termination of power over subject-mat-

ter— Sub-agents.— And finally the termination of the

principal's power over the subject-matter must operate

to terminate any authority derived from him. For like

reasons, the termination of the authority of the agent

must also operate ordinarily to terminate the author-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t7dr2xb9s
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ity of any sub-agents appointed by him.

§ 132.]

NATURE AND EXTENT OF AUTHORITY.
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CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE AUTHORITY.

§ 132. Distinctions.

133. Express authority.

134. Implied authority.

135. General authority.

136. Special authority.

137. Appearance given to au-

thority by principal

controls.

§ 138. Distinction between au-

thority and instructions.

139. Extent of general author-

ity.

140. Known limitations.

141. Extent of special author-

ity.
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142. Incidental powers.

§132. Distinctions. — It has been seen in preced-

ing sections that the authority of the agent may be

conferred expressly, but that it is also and p

more frequently left to be inferred from the words and

conduct of the principal. While the authority may

thus be conferred in either way, some important conse-

quences depend upon whether one method or the other

was adopted. If the authority is express, we shall

naturally expect to find that its extent, and the time,

place and conditions of its exercise, will be fully set

forth and clearly defined; and if that be the case both

the agent and third persons will have little occasion

for uncertainty or doubt as to its extent. If, on the

other hand, the authority is to be implied, the questions

whether any authority is properly to be implied, and, if

so, what kind and how much, must necessarily be mat-

ters upon which opinions may differ and which must

often remain undetermined until some competent

authority has passed upon them.

It has been seen also that authority whether express

or implied may be of a general character or may be

confined within narrow and particular limits. As it

72 NATURE AND EXTENT OF AUTHORITY. [§§ 132-134.

is the one or the other, important consequences may or

may not attach.

These distinctions, then, are to be kept in mind : As

respects the manner of conferring it, the authority may

be either express or implied. As respects its extent,

it may be either general or special.

§ 133. Express authority. — Where the authority is

express, it is, as has been stated, natural to expect that

its extent and the conditions of its exercise will be clear-

ly denned. To the degree to which this is true, the limits

fixed will be conclusive upon all persons charged with

notice of them. No other main power can be deemed to

be conferred than that expressly mentioned. Persons

dealing with an agent known to be acting under such

an express power, are bound to take notice of its limita-

tions; and where they are dealing with reference to a

matter concerning which the law requires written au-

thority or authority under seal, they are bound to take

notice of that fact and will be charged with restrictions
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contained in the instrument conferring such authority,

though they may have had no actual knowledge of them.

See Hurley v. Watson, 68 Mich. 531; Stainback v. Read, 11 Gratt.

(Va.) 281, 62 Am. Dec. 648; Reese v. Medlock, 27 Tex. 120, 84 Am.

Dec. €11; Peabody v. Hoard, 46 111. 242; Busch v. Wilcox, 82 Mich.

336, 47 N. W. Rep. 328, 21 Am. St. Rep. 563.

§ 134 . Implied authority. — As has been seen in

earlier sections, authority may often be implied from

the words or conduct of the principal or from the cir-

cumstances of the case. Authority, however, which is

so implied cannot exceed the natural and legitimate

effects of the facts from which it is inferred, and must

be confined to the performance of similar acts under

similar circumstances. It must, moreover, be inferred

from facts for which the principal is responsible, and

S8 134-137.] NATURE AND EXTENT OF AUTHORITY. 73

can not arise from mere presumption or from tbe mere

propriety or convenience of its existence.

See Graves v. Horton, 38 Minn. 66, Cas. Ag. 82; Bickford v.

Menier, 107 N. Y. 490, Cas. Ag. 93; Atkins v. Lewis, 108 Mass. 534.

§ 135. General authority. — Distinction has been

made, in earlier sections, between the general and the

special agent, and the same general distinction is made

in the character of the authority conferred. The

authority is general where the principal has, either

pressly or impliedly, held the agent out as authorized

to act generally in relation to some subject or class of

subjects.

See Butler v. Maples, 9 Wall. 766, Cas. Ag. 340; Hatch v. Taylor,

10 N. H. 538, Cas. Ag. 345.

§ 136. Special authority. — The authority is special

where the principal has expressly or impliedly held the

agent out as authorized to act only in a particular

manner, or in accordance with specific instructions.

See Butler v. Maples, supra; Hatch v. Taylor, supra; Bryant v.
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Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec % 96, Cas. Ag. 355.

§ 137. Appearance given to authority by princi-

pal controls. — In every case, persons dealing with the

agent as such, are bound to ascertain the extent of his

authority; but, whether the agency be general or spe-

cial, the principal will be bound to third persons by the

authority as he has caused it to appear. He is not

bound by appearances which the agent alone has given

to the authority, without the principal's express or

implied consent.

See Law v. Stokes, 32 N. J. L. 249, 90 Am. Dec. 655; Walsh v.

Hartford F. Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 5; Kingsley v. Fitts, 51 Vt. 414; Han-

over Nat. Bank v. American, etc., Co., 148 N. Y. 612, 51 Am. St. Rep.

721; Wheeler v. McGulre, 86 Ala. 398, 2 L. R. A. 808, Cas. Ag. 862.

7-1 NATURE AND EXTENT OF AUTHORITY. [§§ 138-139.

§ 138. Distinction between authority and in-

structions. — It is essential to keep in mind that author-

ity and the instructions of the principal are not neces-

sarily identical. There may, of course, be cases wherein

the instructions constitute the authority — where they

are contemporaneous and coextensive with its creation.

But this is not necessarily or even ordinarily true. The

authority of the agent is the aggregate of the powers

which, in contemplation of law, the principal has con-

ferred upon the agent. It may consist not only of what

the principal said but of what he did or failed to do.

Actions often speak louder than words, and certainly

the effect which the law attributes to the words or con-

duct of the principal cannot be changed by his declara-

tions or instructions.

Usage, or what is customary in similar cases, may

contribute to determine the authority; estoppel may

affect it ; subsequent ratification may enter into it ; ex-

press rules of law may modify or enlarge it; and, so
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far as innocent third persons are concerned, it is vain

for the principal to give his agent instructions not to

do what the law, as the result of all of these forces, de-

termines that he is authorized to do.

Instructions, moreover, are often intended to be se-

cret. To disclose them would not infrequently defeat

their purpose. However proper they may be, therefore,

as between the principal and the agent, in determining

their relations, they cannot be expected to affect third

persons who are ignorant of them.

See Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96, Cas. Ag. 355;

Little Pittsburg, etc., Co. v. Little Chief, etc., Co., 11 Colo. 223, 7

Am. St. Rep. 226.

§ 139. Extent of general authority. — Where au-

thority has been conferred to act generally in reference

to a subject or class of subjects, third persons, who

§§ 139-141.] NATURE AND EXTENT OF AUTHORITV. 75

have no notice to i he contrary, have the right to pre-

sume that the agent has authority to do whatevi r is

usual and 'proper in such cases; and their rights i

not be affected by the fact that the principal had giv< ;i

the agent secret instructions which would limit this

usual authority.

See Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96, Cas. Ag. 355;

Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360, 55 Am. Dec. 195, Cas. Ag. 358;

Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 2 L. R. A. 808, Cas. Ag. 362; Hub-

bard v. Tenbrook, 124 Pa. St. 291, 10 Am. St. Rep. 585, 2 L. R. A.

823, Cas. Ag. 367; Watteau v. Fenwick, L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 346, Cas.

Ag. 369; Austrian v. Springer, 94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W. Rep. 50, 34

Am. St. Rep. 350; Wilson v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 51 S.

Car. 540, 29 S. E. Rep. 245, 64 Am. St. Rep. 700; Ruggles v. Am.

Central Ins. Co., 114 N. Y. 415, 21 N. E. 1000, 11 Am. St. Rep. 674.

§140. Known limitations. — What has thus

been said about secret instructions can, of course, have

no application to known limitations. ''No principle

is better settled in law, nor is there any founded on
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more obvious justice, than that if a person dealing

with an agent knows that he is acting under a circum-

scribed and limited authority, and that his act is out-

side of and transcends the authority conferred, the

principal is not bound; and it is immaterial whether

the agent is a general or a special one, because a prin-

cipal may limit the authority of the one as well as that

of the other."

See Quinlan v. Providence Ins. Co., 133 N. Y. 356, 31 N. E. Rep.

31, 28 Am. St. Rep. 645.

§141. Extent of special authority. — Where the

authority is special, the agent's power may be as lim-

ited as the principal sees fit to make it, and these limi-

tations will be effective unless the principal has, by

conduct or otherwise, held the agent out as having an

authority greater than that actually conferred.

See Cleveland v. Pearl. 63 Vt. 127. 25 Am. St. Rep. 748, Cas. Ag.

76 NATURE AND EXTENT OF AUTHORITY. [§§ 141-142.

?56; Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84, 45 Am. Dec. 96, Cas. Ag. 355; Towle

v. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360, 55 Am. Dec. 195, Cas. Ag. 358; Wheeler v.

McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 2 L. R. A. 808, Cas. Ag. 362; Dyer v. Duffy, 39

W. Va. 14S, 19 S. E. Rep. 540, 24 L. R. A. 339.

§142. Incidental powers. — Every delegation of

power, whether it be general or special, carries with it,

by implication, unless the contrary is expressed, inci-

dental authority to do all those things which are rea-

sonably necessary and proper to carry into effect the

power granted. This implied power can not, as to third

persons, be cut off by secret limitations.

See Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 2 L. R. A. 808, Cas. Ag.

362; Austrian v. Springer, 94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W. Rep. 50, 34 Am.
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St. Rep. 350.

§5143-144.] CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY.
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CHArTEK IX.

OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY.

§ 143. What here considered.

1. Of Construction in General.

144. Necessity for construc-

tion.

145. Necessity for evidence.

146. By whom construed —

court — jury.

147-148. How construed.

2. Of the Construction of

Particular Powers.

149. What here included.

150. Authority to sell land-

when exists.

§ 151.

152.

What included.

154.

155.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t7dr2xb9s
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

153.

Authority to sell personal

property.

What included.

Authority to buy.

Authority to collect or re-

ceive payment.

156. Authority to make nego-

tiable paper.

157. Authority to manage busi-

ness.

§ 143. What here considered. — Having ascer-

tained how authority may be conferred and seen some-

thing of the rules which determine its nature and

extent, it becomes material now to discover what acts

may be authorized under it, and especially what inci-

dental powers may be deduced from more general pow-

ers expressly conferred. Attention will, therefore, next

be given to the question of the construction or interpre-

tation of the authority. — 1. In general, and 2. As ap-

plied to particular powers.

§144.

1. Of Construction in General.

Necessity for construction. — Every person

who proposes to deal with an agent, as such, must, as

has been seen, ascertain not only that authority exists,

but also that it is adequate to authorize the proposed

act. It thus becomes necessary to examine into it, and

ascertain what is ite scope and effect — in other words.

78 CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. [§§144-146.

to construe it, to determine whether it is broad enough

to meet the present need.

§ 145. Necessity for evidence. — It is also true that

the person who has dealt with an agent, as such, and

who desires to enforce the results against the principal,

must be prepared to prove, if it be denied, not only that

there was some authority, but also that there was such

authority as justified the act relied upon. If it becomes

necessary, therefore, to have recourse to the courts, the

plaintiff must be prepared to prove the authority, and

to show that when properly construed it justified the

act doue.

Something as to the evidence required has already

been seen in an earlier section.

§ 146. By whom construed — Court — Jury, — While

the party who deals with the agent must usually, in the

first instance, put his own construction upon the au-

thority, he must, when he comes into court, abide by

the construction which the law puts upon it.
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It is the general rule that the construction of writ-

ten instruments, and the determination of the legal ef-

fect of undisputed facts, are matters for the court. If,

therefore, the authority is created by written instru-

ment, the writing must in general be produced, and

the nature and extent of the authority thereby con-

ferred will be determined by the court. So, though not

in writing, if the facts are not disputed, the court will

determine their effect; but if the facts are in dispute

it must usually be left to the jury to determine, under

proper instructions from the court, whether there was

any authority, and, if so, what was its extent.

See Loudon Savings Fund Society v. Hagerstown Savings Bank,

36 Penn. St. 498, 78 Am. Dec. 300, Cas. Ag. 371; Willcox v. Hines,

100 Tenn. 524, 45 S. W. Rep. 781, 66 Am. St. Rep. 761.

§§ 147-148.] CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. 70

§147. How construed. — In determining the sco]

and extent of the authority, the construction adopted

must be a fair and reasonable one and not a strain* -1 or

unnatural one. The authority is to be construed in

the light of the surrounding circumstances and with

the situation of the parties and thek evidenl purposes

in view. Thus, for example, though the language used

may be general, it must be limited in its application

by the specific purpose to be accomplished, and must

be confined in its operation to the principal's own pur-

poses and business.

See Camden Safe Deposit Co. v. Abbott, 44 N. J. L. 257, Cas. Ag.

376.

So a power from several jointly will not authorize

acts binding one only, nor will separate powers from

several authorize a contract binding them all jointly.

See Gilbert v. How, 45 Mian. 121, 47 N. W. Rep. 643, 22 Am. St.

Rep. 724, Cas. Ag. 380; Harris v. Johnston, 54 Minn. 177, 55 N. W.

Rep. 970,' 40 Am. St. Rep. 312.
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§ 148. Where the authority is conferred by

an express and formal instrument, the presumption

is that the parties have put into it all the powers in-

tended to be conferred. "A formal instrument dele-

gating powers is ordinarily subjected to strict interpre-

tation, and the authority is not extended beyond that

which is given in terms, or which is necessary to carry

into effect that which is expressly given. They are

not subject to that liberal interpretation which is given

to less formal instruments, as letters of instruction,

etc., in commercial transactions, which are interpreted

most strongly against the writer, especially when they

are susceptible of two interpretations, and the agent

has acted in good faith upon one of such interpreta-

tions."

80 CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. [§§148-151.

See Craighead v. Peterson, 72 N. Y. 279, 2S Am. Rep. 150, Cas.

Ag. 373. Powers of attorney are strictly construed: Hotchkiss v.

Middlekauf, 96 Va. 649, 32 S. E. Rep. 36, 43 L. R. A. 806; Campbell

v. Foster Home Ass'n, 163 Pa. St. 609, 30 Atl. Rep. 222, 43 Am. St.

Rep. 818; Frost v. Erath Cattle Co., 81 Tex. 505, 17 S. W. Rep. 52,

26 Am. St. Rep. 831; Gilbert v. How, 45 Minn. 121, 47 N. W. Rep.

643, 22 Am. St. Rep. 724, Cas. Ag. 380; Harris v. Johnston, 54 Minn.

177, 55 N. W. Rep. 970, 40 Am. St. Rep. 312.

2. Of the Construction of Particular Poicers.

§149. What here included. — It is obviously im-

possible to consider every kind of authority which may

be conferred upon an agent All that will be attempted

will be to refer to the common forms most frequently

presenting themselves.

§ 150. Authority to sell land— "When exists. — Au-

thority to sell land must be clearly conferred, and

usually, as has been seen (§64) by written instru-

ment. The power is not lightly inferred or easily de-

duced from general expressions, such as a power to
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attend to "all business" or to do "all things concern-

ing" the principal's business, and the like.

See Coquillard v. French, 19 Ind. 274; Billings v. Morrow, 7 Cal.

171, 68 Am. Dec. 235; Ashley v. Bird, 1 Mo. 640, 14 Am. Dec. 313;

Hotchkiss v. Middlekauf, 96 Va. 649, 32 S. E. Rep. 36, 43 L. R. A. 806.

Merely placing the property in the hands of a broker

for sale, or listing it with a real estate agent, in the

ordinary way, does not amount to an authority to sell

or even to make a binding contract to sell. The only

authority ordinarily deduced in such cases is simply

to find a purchaser to whom the principal may sell.

See Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240, 6 Am. Rep. 617; Armstrong v.

Lowe, 76 Cal. 616; Stewart v. Pickering, 73 Iowa, 652, 35 N. W. Rep.

690; Stillman v. Fitzgerald, 37 Minn. 186, 33 N. W. Rep. 564; Delano

v. Jacoby, 96 Cal. 275, 31 Am. St. Rep. 201.

§ 151. What included. — Authority to actually

sell the principal's land carries with it, unless the con-

§§ 151-152.] CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. 81

trary is expressed, implied power to make the convex

ance; to insert the usual covenants of warranty; and to

receive so much of the purchase price as is to be paid

('own; but it does not authorize a sale upon credit, or

a mortgage, or an exchange, or a dedication to public

use, or a conveyance in payment of the agent's own

debt.

See Lyon v. Pollock, 99 U. S. 668, Cas. Ag. 378; Gilbert v. How,

45 Minn. 121, 22 Am. St. Rep. 724, Cas. Ag. 380; Leroy v. Beard, 8

How. (U. S.) 451, Cas. Ag. 382; Peters v. Farnsworth, 15 Vt. 155, 40

Am. Dec. 671, Cas. Ag. 387; Lumpkin v. Wilson, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 555,

Cas. Ag. 390; Campbell v. Foster Home Ass'n, 163 Pa. 609, 30 Atl.

Rep. 222, 43 Am. St. Rep. 818; Hawxhurst v. Rathgeb, 119 Cal. 531,

63 Am. St. Rep. 142; Frost v. Cattle Co., 81 Tex. 505, 17 S. W. Rep.

52, 26 Am. St. Rep. 831.

Whether it will apply to land not then owned by the

principal, but subsequently acquired by him, is in dis-

pute.

See Penfield v. Warner, 96 Mich. 179, 35 Am. St Rep. 591, and
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note.

§ 152. Authority to sell personal property. — Un-

like the case of real estate, authority to sell personal

property is not ordinarily required to be conferred by

written instrument. It may be created by words or

conduct, and may be express or implied. It is the gen-

eral rule in regard to chattels, not including negotia-

ble paper, that no person can transfer a better title

than he himself has. Authority to sell is not to be

inferred from the mere fact of possession; but where

the true owner has clothed another not only with pos-

session but with the ordinary evidence of ownership,

as where he delivers to him securities endorsed in blank

or permits the title to stand in his name, he will be

estopped from asserting his title as against a bona fide

purchaser from the person so in possession.

See Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 42 Am. Rep. 332, Cas. Af. Ill;

I
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Smith v. Clews, 105 N. Y. 283, 59 Am. Rep. 502, Cas. Ag. 396; McNeil

v. Tenth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 325, 7 Am. Rep. 341; Nixon v.

Brown, 57 N. H. 34.

§ 153. "What included. — Authority to sell

personal property carries with it, unless the contrary is

declared, implied power to agree upon the terms and

conditions of the sale; to warrant the principal's title;

to give warranties of quality if such property is usually

sold with such a warranty; and to receive so much of

the price as is to be paid at the time of the sale.

See Daylight Burner Co. v. Odlin, 51 N. H. 56, 12 Am. Rep. 45;

Putnam v. French, 53 Vt. 402, 38 Am. Rep. 682; Pickert v. Marston,

68 Wis. 465, 60 A. Rep. 876, Cas. Ag. 411; Bierman v. City Mills Co.,

151 N. Y. 482, 45 N. E. Rep. 856, 56 Am. St. Rep. 635; Court v.

Snyder, 2 Ind. App. 440, 28 N. E. Rep. 718, 50 Am. St. Rep. 247.

But no implied power exists to afterwards collect

the remainder of the price; or to give credit unless that

is usual; or to exchange the property for other prop-

erty, or to mortgage or pledge the property; or to apply
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it to the agent's own use; or to make any other unusual

contract.

See McKindly v. Dunham, 55 Wis. 515, 42 A. Rep. 740, Cas. Ag.

399; Hibbard v. Peek, 75 Wis. 619, Cas. Ag. 403; Billings v. Mason,

SO Me. 496, Cas. Ag. 406; Huntley v. Mathias, 90 N. C. 101, 47 Am.

Rep. 516, Cas. Ag. 408; Kane v. Barstow, 42 Kan. 465, 16 Am. St.

Rep. 400; Edwards v. Dillon, 147 111. 14, 35 N. E. Rep. 135, 37 Am.

St. Rep. 199.

An agent authorized to sell goods and who has made

a sale has thereby ordinarily no authority to after-

wards rescind the sale or agree to take back the goods.

See Diversy v. Kellogg, 44 111. 114, 92 Am. Dec. 154; Adrian v.

Lane, 13 S. C. 183. As to power of agent for sale of agricultural

implements to alter the contract made by him, see Bannon v. Ault-

man, 80 Wis. 307, 49 N. W. Rep. 967, 27 Am. St. Rep. 37; Peterson

v. Wood, M. & R. Co., 97 Iowa 148, 66 N. W. Rep. 96, 59 Am. St. Rep.

399.

§154. Authority to buy. — An agent authorized I o

buy goods for his principal has implied power to buy on

§§154-155.] CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. S3

credit if not Bupplied with funds, and may make repre-

sentations as to his principal's credit for that purpc

Unless the contrary is declared lie may agree upon I

price and terms of sale within the limit of what is

usual or reasonable. He must not exceed limits openly

fixed as to the kind or amount, and he has no implied

power to make negotiable paper for the price

See Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398, 2 L. R. A. 808, Cas. Ag. 362;

Komorowski v. Krumdick, 56 Wis. 23, Cas. Ag. 413; Hubbard v.

Tenbrook, 124 Penn. 291, 10 Am. St. Rep. 585, 2 L. R. A. 823, Cas. Ag.

367; White v. Cooper, 3 Penn. St. 130.

§ 155. Authority to collect or receive payment.—

An agent authorized to collect can receive nothing but

money in payment. He has no implied authority to re-

lease or compromise the debt, or to extend the time, or

to receive payment before it is due.

See Cram v. Sickel, 51 Neb. 828, 66 Am. St. Rep. 478; Herring

v. Hottendorf, 74 N. C. 588; McHany v. Schenck, 88 111. 357; Law-

rence v. Johnson, 64 111. 351; Smith v. Kidd, 68 N. Y. 130, 23 Am.
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Rep. 157.

Authority to receive payment is not implied merely

from the fact that the agent sold the goods for which

the money is due, or negotiated the contract or loan

upon which it is payable. In the latter case the fact

that the securities, as for example the bond and mort-

gage, are left in the possession of the agent who nego-

tiated the loan, will justify an inference of authority

to receive payments upon them, but the party paying

must see at his peril that the securities are in the pos-

session of the agent on each occasion when he pays.

Thus a traveling salesman, or "drummer," authorized to solicit

orders for goods to be sent by his principal, and who takes such an

order for goods which are so supplied, has thereby no implied power

to subsequently collect payment for them. McKindly v. Dunham,

55 Wis. 515, 42 Am. Rep. 740, Cas. Ag. 399; Janney v. Boyd, 30 Minn.

319; Butler v. Donnan, 68 Mo. 298. 30 Am. Rep. 795; Simon v. John-

S4 CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUTHORITY. [§§ 155-157.

son, 105 Ala. 344, 16 So. Rep. 884, 53 Am. St. Rep. 125; Kornemann

v. Monaghan, 24 Mich. 36. As to the implied authority of a loan

agent to receive payment, see Crane v. Gruenewald, 120 N. Y. 274,

Cas. Ag. 87; Smith v. Kidd, 68 N. Y. 130, 23 Am. Rep. 157; Double-

day v. Kress, 50 N. Y. 410, 10 Am. Rep. 502; Security Co. v. Graybeal,

85 Iowa 543, 52 N. W. Rep. 497, 39 Am. St. Rep. 311.

§ 156. Authority to make negotiable paper. — Au-

thority to make or endorse negotiable paper is not to be

lightly inferred. It can be implied only when abso-

lutely necessary to the execution of the main power.

And when expressly conferred it is subject to a very

strict construction, and the agent can bind the princi-

pal only when he has acted within the precise limits of

his authority.

See Jackson v. Bank, 92 Tenn. 154, 18 L. R. A. 663, Cas. Ag. 415;

Pickle v. Muse, 88 Tenn. 380, 17 Am. St. Rep. 900; King v. Sparks,

17 Ca. 285, 4 Am. St. Rep. 85, Cas. Ag. 418; Helena Nat'l Bank v.

Rocky Mt. Tel. Co., 20 Mont. 379, 63 Am. St. Rep. 628.

§ 157. Authority to manage business. — Authority
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to manage the principal's business does not imply power

to make negotiable paper; or to sell the business; or to

borrow money unless absolutely necessary; or to pledge

or mortgage the principal's property; or to make any

contract not within the usual scope of the business.

See Brockway v. Mullin, 46 N. J. L. 448, 50 Am. Rep. 442, Cas. Ag.

419; Vescelius v. Martin, 11 Colo. 391, Cas. Ag. 422; New York Mine

v. Bank, 39 Mich. 644, Cas. Ag. 423; Helena Nat. Bank v. Rocky Mt.

Tel Co. supra; Glidden & Joy Co. v. Nat. Bank, 16 C. C. A., 534, 32

U. S. App. 654, 69 Fed. Rep. 912.

.

fY/sff

§8158-159.] EXECUTION OF THE AUTHORITY.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE EXECUTION OF THE AUTHORITY.

i 158. In general.

159. Excessive or defective ex-

ecution.

160. Execution of written in-

struments.

161. Execution of sealed in-

struments.

§ 1C2. Execution of negotiable

instruments.

163. Execution of simple con-

tracts.

1G4. Parol evidence to explain.

§ 158. In general. — It is the general duty of the

agent to execute the authority in the name, and for the

benefit of the principal, and to confine his acts within

the scope of the authority conferred upon him.

It is also especially to the interest of the agent to so
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execute the authority as to bind the principal and not

himself.

§ 159. Excessive or defective execution. — The exe-

cution of the authority in a given case may fail either

because the agent has neglected to fully exercise his

authority, or because he has exceeded it. A deficient

execution will ordinarily not bind the principal, though

it may so operate as to bind the agent personally. An

excessive execution will not necessarily be defective.

If there has been a complete execution of the power

and the excess can be distinguished and disregarded,

the authorized portion may be given effect.

See Thomas v. Joslin, 30 Minn. 388, Cas. Ag. 427.

The execution of the authority may also fail because

the agent has attempted something wholly beyond the

power conferred, or has undertaken to do that which

a proper construction of his authority will not justify.

86 EXECUTION OF THE AUTHORITY. [§§ 159-160.

Thus a power from two jointly to deal with their

joint interests will not justify dealing with the sep-

arate interests of one only; and, conversely, a power

from several to deal with their separate interests will

not justify a contract which assumes to bind them

jointly.

See Gilbert v. How, 45 Minn. 121, 47 N. W. Rep. 643, 22 Am. St.

Rep. 724, Cas. Ag. 380; Harris v. Johnston, 54 Minn. 177, 40 Am. St.

Rep. 312.

§ 160. Execution of written instruments.— It is in

the execution of written instruments that question is

most likely to arise, because they show on their face

precisely what was done and are less open to explana-

tion by the surrounding circumstances. It may often

happen, therefore, that the agent may, through inad-

vertence, ignorance or mistake, so execute as to bind

his principal, or himself, or no one, even when his desire

and intention were to bind the principal.

To bind the principal, the instrument should be made
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in the name of the principal and not in the name of the

agent ; the promises or undertakings should be made in

the name of the principal ; and the signature should be

that of the principal, though affixed by the hand of the

agent.

If William White is principal and Benjamin Black

is the agent, the proper signature would be: William

White, by Benjamin Black, his agent, (or, his attorney

in fact). The words his agent or his attorney in fact,

though proper and desirable, might be omitted without

destroying the effect.

On the other hand, to sign thus: Benjamin Black,

Agent, is clearly insufficient to bind the principal, but

would ordinarily bind the agent. So of a signature

thus: Benjamin Black, Agent of William White. Here

the word agent, or Agent of William White, simply

serves to show who Benjamin Black is ; they are simply

§§160-162.] EXECUTION OF THE AUTHORITY 87

descriptio personae. To sign Benjamin Black, Agent

for William White , is also usually regarded as insuffi-

cient to bind William While, and for the same reason.

See Hobson v. Hassett, 76 Cal. 203, 9 Am. St. Rep. 103, Cas. Ag.

442; Stinson v. Lee, GS Miss. 113, 8 So. Rep. 272, 9 L. R. A. 830,

Western Publishing House v. Murdick, 4 S. Dak. 207, 56 N. W. Rep.

120, 21 L. R. A. 671.

§ 101. Execution of sealed instruments. — The same

general considerations apply with added force to in-

struments under seal, because, of all kinds of contracts

in writing, those under seal are most inflexible and

least open to explanation by outside circumstances.

To bind the principal upon instruments under seal, the

instrument must be so executed as to show upon its face

that it is the deed of the principal ; that the covenants

are his; that he makes the grants; and that the signa-

ture and seal are his, though affixed by the agent. If

the grants and covenants are those of the agent, the

mere fact that he describes himself as "agent" will not
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relieve him from personal liability, or make the act

the principal's.

See McClure v. Herring, 70 Mo. 18, 35 Am. Dec. 404, Cas. Ag. 429;

Elwell v. Shaw, 16 Mass. 42, 8 Am. Dec. 126; Shanks v. Lancaster, 5

Gratt. (Va.) 110, 50 Am. Dec. 108; Knight v. Clark, 48 N. J. L. 22,

57 Am. Rep. 534, Cas. Ag. 434.

§ 162. Execution of negotiable instruments. — Ne-

gotiable instruments, such as promissory notes and bills

of exchange, occupy a peculiar place in our law. They

are instruments of commerce and are designed to cir-

culate freely in the transaction of business. It is highly

important that they shall be clear, definite and unam-

biguous, and shall show upon their face who are the

parties upon whose responsibility they rely. In the

execution of negotiable paper, therefore, the rule is

very strict that in order to bind the principal the paper

9
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shall show upon its face who the principal is, that it is

his promise, and that the signature is his, though made

by the hand of his agent. It is not sufficient that the

principal be named in the body of the instrument only

unless it also appears that the promise is his and that

the agent signs for him. Where no principal is thus

named, the agent will be personally liable although he

signs as "agent.''

See Hobson v. Hassett, 76 Gal. 203, 9 Am. St. Rep. 193, Cas. Ag.

442; Reeve v. Bank, 54 N. J. L. 208, 16 L. R. A. 143, Cas. Ag. 446;

Liebscher v. Kraus, 74 Wis. 387, 17 Am. St. Rep. 171, 5 L. R. A. 496,

Cas. Ag. 448; Stinson v. Lee, 68 Miss. 113, 8 So. Rep. 272, 9 L. R. A.

830; Miller v. Roach, 150 Mass. 140, 22 N. E. Rep. 634, 6 L. R. A. 71;

Mathews v. Dubuque Mattress Co., 87 Iowa 246, 54 N. W. Rep., 225,

19 L. R. A. 676; McKensey v. Edwards, 88 Ky. 272, 10 S. W. Rep.

815, 3 L. R. A. 397; McCandless v. Belle Plaine Canning Co., 78 Iowa

161, 42 N. W. Rep. 635, 16 Am. St. Rep. 429, 4 L. R. A. 396.

§ 163. Execution of other simple contracts. — In

the case of other written contracts, the peculiar rules
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applicable to sealed instruments and negotiable paper

do not apply; and while it is true that parol evidence

can not be admitted to contradict or alter the writing,

more regard is paid to the intention of the parties, and

if that is clear, and can be given effect consistently

with the terms of the instrument, it will usually con-

trol.

See Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392, 2 Myer's Fed. Dec. 170, Cas.

Ag. 452; Brown v. Bradlee, 156 Mass. 28, 32 Am. St. Rep. 430,* 15

L. R. A. 509, Cas. Ag. 454.

§164. Parol evidence to explain. — In attempting

to determine the liability of the parties to an instru-

ment in writing executed by an agent, the question

constantly arises whether parol evidence may be re-

ceived to show who was intended to be the party bound.

Upon tli is question the cases seem to be in hopeless con-

flict. Something depends upon the nature of the con-

§ 164. j EXECUTION OF THE AUTHORITY. SO

tract. In the case of instruments under seal, the rule

is that only those appearing on the face of the instru-

ment as the parties to it can be bound, or can enforce

the contract.

See Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357, 21 Am. Rep. 617, Cas. Ag.

436.

In the case of negotiable instruments also strict rules

are usually applied. If the promise is clearly the prom-

ise of the principal or of the agent, it cannot be altered.

Parol evidence is admissible only when the paper is

ambiguous — when, for example, some portions of it look

like the promise of the principal and other portions of

it look like the promise of the agent — and when the

action, is between the original parties, or those who,

from the ambiguity or otherwise, are charged with

actual or constructive notice of the true intention.

See Liebscher v. Kraus, 74 Wis. 387, 17 Am. St. Rep. 171, 5 L. R.

A. 496; Keidan v. Winegar, 95 Mich. 430, 54 N. W. Rep. 901, 20 L. R.

A. 705; Sparks v. Despatch Transfer Co., 104 Mo. 531, 15 S. W. Rep.
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417, 12 L. R. A. 714; Society of Shakers v. Watson, 68 Fed. Rep. 730,

15 C. C. A. 632; McCandless v. Belle Plaine Canning Co., 78 Iowa

161, 42 N. W. Rep. 635, 16 Am. St. Rep. 429, 4 L. R. A. 396; Peterson

v. Homan, 44 Minn. 166, 46 N. W. Rep. 303, 20 Am. St. Rep. 564;

Heffron v. Pollard, 73 Tex. 96, 15 Am. St. Rep. 764.

In the case of other written contracts, the rule goes

further and it may not only be shown in a doubtful cas,'

who was the person intended to be bound; but even

where the promise on its face is clearly that of the

agent, parol evidence is admissible to charge an un-

named principal — that is, to show that he also is liable

— though, not to discharge the agent. In such a case

the other party may hold either the principal or the

agent at his option.

See Higgins v. Senior, 8 Mees. & Wels. 834, Cas. Ag. 456; Hunt-

ington v. Knox, 7 Cush. 371, Cas. Ag. 587; Jones v. Williams, 139

Mo. 1, 39 S. W. Rep. 486, 61 Am. St. Rep. 436; Bulwinkle v. Cramer,

27 S. Car. 376, 13 Am. St. Rep. 645.

90
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CHAPTEK XI.

OF THE DUTIES OF THE AGENT TO THE PRINCIPAL,

5. In general.

1. To Be Loyal to His

Trust.

166. In general.

167.* Incapacity resulting — Can-

not be agent of both,

parties.

168. — Cannot deal with him-

self.

169. Voidability of transac-

tions.

170. Further limitations.

171. Usage does not alter rule.

2. To Obey Instructions.

172. Agent must obey instruc-

tions.

cuse.
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173. Good faith, etc.— no ex-

174. In what form of action

liable.

175. Sudden emergency as ex-

cuse.

176. Ambiguous instructions.

177. Effect of custom.

3. To Exercise Care.

§ 178. Duty to exercise care.

179. Special skill required in

some cases.

180. How when services gratu-

itous.

181. Negligence in loaning

money.

182. Negligence in insuring.

183. Negligence in collecting.

184. Liability for defaults of

cprrespondents.

4. To Account for Money

and Property.

185. Duty to accounts.

186. Cannot deny principal's

title, etc.

187. Duty to give notice of col-

lection.

188. Agent must not mix prin-

cipal's funds with his

own.

5. To Give Notice to His

Principal.

189. Duty to give notice.

§ 165. In general. — It is not possible to consider

here every possible duty which the agent may owe to his

principal, but the most important duties may be briefly

dealt with, and the principles given will suggest the

rules which will govern other cases.

1. To he Loyal to his Trust.

§ 1G6. In general. — It is the duty of the agent to

conduct himself with the utmost loyalty and fidelity to

the interests of his principal, and not to place himself

■_

§5166-167.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. 01

or permit himself to be placed in a position where hii

own interests may conflict with the interests of his

principal.

When the principal employs an agent, the law pre-

sumes that he does so in order to secure to himself the

benefits of the agent's skill, experience or discretion and

to reap the fruits of the performance of the undertak-

ing. The law presumes that he expects — and it gives

him the right to expect — that the agent so employed

will endeavor to further the principal's interests and

will use his powers for the principal's benefit. If, then,

instead of serving the principal, the agent is seeking

to serve himself, or some other person — if, instead

of promoting his principal's interests, the agent is en-

deavoring to promote his own or some other person's

interest at the expense of the principal's — the funda-

mental considerations underlying the existence of the

relation will be defeated. This the law constantly aims

to prevent
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The rule, however, is one based upon the presumed

intention of the principal and is designed to protect

his interests. The principal may therefore waive the

benefit of the rule if he does so with full knowledge of

the facts. In the absence of such a waiver, the rule is

absolute.

See Levy v. Spencer, 18 Colo. 532, 36 Am. St. Rep. 303; Hofflin v.

Moss, 67 Fed. Rep. 440, 32 U. S. App. 200, 14 C. C. A. 459; Ramspeck

v. Pattillo, 104 Ga. 772, 30 S. E. Rep. 962. 69 Am. St. Rep. 197; Wild-

berger v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 72 Mias. 338, 17 So. Rep. 282, 48

Am. St. Rep. 558.

§167. Incapacity resulting — Cannot be agent

of both parties. — In order to secure the perform-

ance of this duty of the agent and to remove as far as

possible all temptation and opportunity to violate it,

the law positively forbids the agent's doing many act*
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which might otherwise he harmless. Thus, as has been

already seen, the law does not ordinarily permit a per-

son to assume to become an agent where he already

has in the same transaction such an interest, either of

his own or as agent for some other person, as may pre-

vent his acting fairly toward his principal. The law

recognizes that "no man can serve two masters" and

give to each of them his undivided allegiance and sup-

port.

Where, however, the principal is fully advised of the

adverse interest, and is given an opportunity to protect

himself and to refuse to be represented by an agent

who can not give him undivided attention, and he still

is willing to employ the agent, he may do so ; and if he

does, the law holds that he has waived the benefit of the

rule.

Except with the full knowledge and consent of both

principals, therefore, a person who is already agent

of one party cannot undertake to act as agent of the
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other also. If he does do so, it is not only a breach of

his duty, for which he is liable, but any transactions

entered into by the agent may be repudiated by the

principal who was ignorant of his dual agency. As has

been already seen, it is not necessary to prove actual

fraud: the undertaking to represent both parties is in

itself a fraud upon the principal's rights.

See Carr v. National Bank and Loan Co., 167 N. Y. 375, 60 N. E.

Rep. 649, 82 Am. St. Rep. 725; New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. National

Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 85; Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Hope Ins. Co., 8 Mo.

App. 408; Herman v. Martineau, 1 Wis. 151, 60 Am. Dec. 368.

No compensation can be recovered by an agent who

has thus been secretly in the employment of the other

party.

See Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, Cas. Ag. 12;

Atlee v. Fink, 75 Mo. 100, 42 Am. Rep. 385, Cas. Ag. 14; Rice v.

V
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Davis, 136 Pa. 439, 20 Atl. Rep. 513, 20 Am. St Rep. 931; Barry v.

Schmidt, 57 "Wis. 172, 46 Am. Rep. 35.

§ 108. Cannot deal with himself. — The saine

considerations apply where the agent is also secretly

acting in the same transaction on his own account.

Except with the full knowledge and consent of his

principal, an agent authorized to buy for his principal

cannot buy of himself; an agent authorized to sell can-

not sell to himself; an agent authorized to buy or sell

for his principal cannot buy or sell for himself; nor can

an agent take advantage of the knowledge acquired of

his principal's business to make profit for himself at

his principal's expense.

The same rule applies to leases, and other similar

transactions.

See People v. Township Board, 11 Mich. 222, Cas. Ag. 459; Davis

v. Hamlin, 108 111. 39, 48 Am. Rep. 541, Cas. Ag. 461; Vallette v.

Tedens, 122 111. 607, 3 Am. St. Rep. 502; Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo.

444, 100 Am. Dec. 304.
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And what the agent cannot do directly, he cannot do

indirectly, as by buying, selling, or dealing in the name

of another, but really for himself.

See Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327, 78 Am. Dec. 192, Cas. Ag.

465; Hull v. Chaffin, 54 Fed. Rep. 437, 12 U. S. App. 206, 4 C. C. A.

414.

§ 169. Voidability of transactions. — In all these

cases, the transaction is voidable at the election of the

principal. It makes no difference that the principal

has not been injured, or that the agent has given him as

good terms as anybody would, or even better terms, or

that the sale or purchase has been at the price fixed by

the principal; or that there was no bad faith or inten-

tion to defraud ; it is still voidable at the option of the

principal.

See Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327, 78 Am. Dec. 192, Cas. Ag.

Ouu^djJ. £-^.-o<--^^C— .

•
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466; Greenfield Savinga Bank v. Simons, 133 Mass. 415, Cas. Ag.

476; Rochester v. Leyering, 104 Ind. 562, Cas. Ag. 478

§ 170. Further limitations. — For like reasons, an

agent authorized to settle or compromise a claim

against his principal cannot buy it and enforce it him-

self; nor will an agent charged, for example, with the

duty of paying taxes, removing incumbrances, and the

like, be permitted, by neglecting his duty, to allow liens

or claims against his principal to accumulate, and then

buy or acquire the liens or claims for himself. The

agent in such a case will be deemed to hold in trust for

the principal.

See Noyes v. Landon, 59 Vt. 569; Bowman v. Officer, 53 Iowa,

640.

If the agent in discharging his duty gets a good bar-

gain or makes profits, the profit belongs to the princi-

pal, who can compel a transfer to himself.

See Hegenmyer v. Marks, 37 Minn. 6, 5 Am. St. Rep. 808; Leach
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v. Railroad Co., 86 Mo. 27, 56 Am. Rep. 408, Cas. Ag. 480; Kramer

v. Winslow, 130 Pa. 484, 18 Atl. Rep. 923, 17 Am. St. Rep. 782;

Simons v. Vulcan Oil Co., 61 Pa. 202, 100 Am. Dec. 628.

§ 171. Usage does not alter rule. — The rule which

forbids the agent's dealing with himself or taking ad-

vantage of his position to make profit for himself at

the expense of his principal, cannot be defeated by any

local or temporary usage, nor does it make any differ-

ence that the agent was acting without pay.

Se« Robinson v. Mollett, L. R. 7 H. of L. 802, 14 Moak's Eng. Rep.

177; Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Prince, 50 Minn. 53, 52 N. W. Rep. 131,

36 Am. St. Rep. 626; Hunsaker v. Sturgia, 29 Cal. 142.

2. To Obey Instructions.

§ 172. Agent must obey instructions. — It is the

duty.of the agent to obey the lawful instructions of his

principal; and if he disobeys them, without sufficient

§§172-175.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. 96

excuse, he is liable to the principal for any loss which

he may thereby proximately sustain.

See Whitney v. Express Co., 104 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Rep. 207, Car

Ag. 484; Galigher t. Jones, 129 U. S. 193, 32 L. ed. 658.

§ 173. Good faith, etc., no excuse. — The fact that

{lie agent, in disobeying the instructions, acted in good

faith, or intended to benefit the principal, is no de-

fense; nor is the fact that he was not to be paid for his

services, if he has actually entered upon the perform-

ance of his undertaking. If he has not so entered

upon its performance, then a want of consideration

would be a good defense for not undertaking the per-

formance.

See Passano v. Acosta, 4 La. 26, 23 Am. Dec. 470, Cas. Ag. 490;

Nixon t. Bogin, 26 S. C. 611, Cas. Ag. 492; Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns.

(N. Y.) 84.

§ 174. In what form of action liable. — If the

agent's breach of instructions relates merely to the

manner of doing the act, that is, if he does not do it
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when or as he was directed, then the principal's action

against him will be an action on the ease for damages;

but if the agent's default has consisted in the disposi-

tion of property in a way or for a purpose not author-

ized, he is liable to the principal in an action of trover

for a conversion.

See Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522, 23 Am. Rep. 184, Cas. Ag.

486.

§ 175. Sudden emergency as excuse. — A departure

from instructions may be justified by a sudden emer-

gency not caused by the agent's fault, where there is no

time to communicate with the principal and a strict

compliance with the instructions would be detrimerj

to him.

90 DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. [§§175-178.

See Foster v. Smith, 2 Cold. (Tenn.) 474, 88 Am. Dec. 604;

Greenleaf v. Moody, 13 Allen (Mass.) 363; Bartlett v. Sparkman, 95

Mo. 136, 6 Am. St. Rep. 35.

§ 176. Ambiguous instructions.— And if the instruc-

tions are ambiguous, and the agent in good faith adopts

one reasonable construction, he will not be liable be-

cause the principal may have intended another. Usage

will not justify a breach of positive instructions to the

contrary.

See Leroy v. Beard, 8 How. (U. S.) 451, Cas. Ag. 382.

§ 177. Effect of custom. — It is ordinarily not only

the right but the duty of the agent to observe and com-

ply with such valid and established customs and usages

as apply to the subject matter or the performance of

his agency. Such customs and usages, however, cannot

as between the principal and the agent, overrule posi-

tive instructions to the contrary.

See Wanless v. McCandless, 38 Iowa 20; Osborne v. Rider, 62

Wis. 235.
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3. To Exercise Care.

§ 178. Duty to exercise care. — It is also the duty

of the agent not to be negligent in the performance of

his duty. Negligence is the failure to exercise that

— ' r Hi r —

degree of care reasonably to be expected under the cir-

oimistances of the case — suchja degree of care as the

ordinarily prudent man would exercise under like cir-

cumstances. By accepting the employment, without

stipulating otherwise, the ageni impliedly warrants

that he possesses a competent degree of skill for the

duty, and that in performing the duty he will exercise

a reasonable degree of care, skill and diligence. He

does not agree that he will make no mistakes whatever,

or that he will exercise the highest skill or diligence,

§§178-180.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL. 97

but he does agree that he will exercise reasonable skill,

and that he will take the usual precautions.

See Page v. Wells, 37 Mich. 415, Cas. Ag. 493; Johnson v. Martin,

11 La. Ann. 27, 66 Am. Dec. 193, Cas. Ag. 495; Nixon v. Bogin, 26

S. Car. 611, Cas. Ag. 492; Bowerman v. Rogers, 125 U. S. 585, 31

L. ed. 815; Paul v. Grimm, 165 Pa. 139, 30 Atl. Rep. 721, 44 Am. St.

Rep. 648.

§ 171). Special skill required in some cases. — There

arc many cases, however, wherein more than the skill

possessed by the ordinary man may reasonably be re-

quired. Thus, where the agent is employed in a

capacity which implies the possession and exercise of

special skill, as, for example, when an attorney at law,

a broker, etc., undertakes to do some act in the line of

his special calling, then the skill ordinarily possessed

and exercised by persons pursuing that calling may rea-

sonably be required.

See Pennoyer v. Willis, 26 Oreg. 1, 46 Am. St. Rep. 594; Craig v.

Chambers, 17 Ohio St. 253; Howard v. Grover, 28 Me. 97; McNevins
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v. Lowe, 40 111. 209.

More than the ordinary skill may also be reasonably

required where the agent, though perhaps not belong-

ing to any of the specially skilled classes, has in the

particular case specially undertaken to exercise ex-

traordinary skill.

See Isham v. Post, 141 N. Y. 100, 35 N. E. Rep. 1084, 38 Am. St.

Rep. 766.

§ 180. How when services gratuitous. — When an

agent professiug special skill is employed in the line of

his calling, the fact that he was not to be paid for his

services is no excuse for not exercising such skill ; but

one serving gratuitously in other cases would not be

liable in the absence of gross negligence or bad faith.

See Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479, 9 Am. Dec. 168; Shiells

v. Blackburne, 1 H. Blackstone, 158: Williams v. McKay, 40 N. J.

7
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Eq. 189, 53 Am. Rep. 775; First National Bank t. Ocean National

Bank, 60 N. Y. 295, 19 Am. Rep. 181; Isham r. Post, 141 N. Y. 100,

35 N. E. Rep. 1084, 28 Am. St. Rep. 766.

§ 181. Negligence in loaning money. — An agent

employed to make loans does not impliedly warrant the

safety of his loans or the solvency of the borrower, but

he will be liable for losses occurring from negligence

in loaning to irresponsible parties, or from a neglect to

obtain suitable security, or to secure and perfect the

proper evidences of the loan.

See Bank of Owensboro v. Western Bank, 13 Bush (Ky.), 526, 26

Am. Rep. 211, Cas. Ag. 206.

§ 182. Negligence in effecting insurance. — In the

same way, an agent employed to effect insurance does

not impliedly guaranty the soundness of the company

or the collection of the insurance money, but he would

be liable for a loss proximately resulting from his neg-

lect in insuring in a company not in good standing, or

in taking defective policies, or in procuring insufficient

cipal.
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amounts, or in ignoring the instructions of his prin-

See Storer v. Eaton, 50 Me. 219, 79 Am. Dec. 611; Strong v. High.

2 Rob. (La.) 103, 38 Am. Dec. 195; Shoenfeld v. Fleisher, 73 111.

404; Sawyer t. Mayhew, 51 Me. 398; Brant t. Gallup, 111 111. 487, 53

Am. Rep. 638; Milburn Wagon Co. v. Evans, 30 Minn. 89.

§ 183. Negligence in collecting. — So an agent em-

ployed to make collections does not impliedly guaranty

that he will collect the money or, unless charged with

the duty of special diligence, that he will drop all other

business and attend solely to that; but he is liable for a

loss of the debt which results from his failure to exer-

cise reasonable care, skill and diligence in collecting

the money, or for a loss of the proceeds caused by

negligence or disregard of instructions in remitting it.

Ere Butts v. Phelps, 79 Mo. 302; Walker v. Walker. 5 Heisk.

§§ 183-187.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL.

!n

(Term.) 425; Wilson v. Wilson. 26 Penn. Su 3J3; Foster v. Pre*.

8 Cowen (N. Y.) 108; Kerr v. Cotton, 23 Tex. 411.

§ 184. Liability for defaults of correspond-

ents. —An attorney who hikes a claim "for collection"

is liable for the defaults of his own clerks and agents,

and if he sends the claim to another attorney for col-

lection, he is liable for his defaults. Whether a bank

which undertakes to collect is liable for the default of

its correspondent banks, is disputed, but the weight of

authority is that it is so liable.

See Cummins v. Heald, 24 Kan. 600, 36 Am. Rep. 264, Cas. Ag.

247; Exchange Nat. Bank v. Third Nat Bank, 112 U. S. 276, Cas. Ag.

239; First National Bank v. Sprague, 34 Neb. 318, 51 N. W. Rep.

846, 15 L. A. R. 498; Streissguth v. National Bank, 43 Minn. 50, 44

N. W. Rep. 797, 7 L. R. A. 363; Givan v. Bank of Alexandria, —

Tenn, — , 52 S. W. Rep. 923, 47 L. R. A. 270; Minneapolis Sash and

Door Co. v. Metropolitan Bank, 76 Minn. 136, 78 N. W. Rep. 980, 44

L. R. A. 504; Kershaw v. Ladd, 34 Oreg. 375, 44 L. R. A. 236.
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l/ 4. To account for Monet; and Property.

§ 185. Duty to account. — It is the duty of the agent

to keep correct accounts of his transactions, and to ac-

count to his principal for all money or properly which

comes to his hands belonging to the principal.

See Jett v. Hempstead, 25 Ark. 462, Cas. Ag. 496; Baldwin v.

Potter. 46 Vt. 402; Taul t. Edmondson, 37 Tex. 556.

§ 186. Cannot deny principal's title, etc. — lie can-

not deny his principal's title, nor can he set up the ille-

gality of the transaction in which he received the prop-

erty or money as an excuse for not accounting for it.

See Kiewert v. Rindskopf, 46 Wis. 4S1. 32 Am. Rep. 731, Cas. Ag.

497; Pittsburg Mining Co. v. Spooner, 74 Wis. 307, 42 N. W. Rep.

259, 17 Am. St. Rep. 149; Peters v. Grim, 149 Pa. 163, 24 Atl. Rep.

192, 34 Am. St Rep. 599; Smith v. Blachley, 188 Pa. 550, 41 Atl. Rep.

619, 68 Am. St. Rep. 887; Floyd v. Patterson, 72 Tex. 202, 10 S. W.

Rep. 526, 13 Am. St. Rep. 787.

§ 187. Duty to give notice of collection. — Upon

collecting money for his principal, the agent, unless he
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already has instructions as to remitting it, should give

the principal notice of that fact within a reasonable

time, and if he has done so, the agent cannot be sued for

the money until the principal has made a demand for it

which has been refused. The agent will be liable for

interest if he fails to pay over on demand or if he fails

to give notice of the collection. The statute of limita-

tions will usually not begin to run in the agent's favor

until he has given notice of the collection, or until a de-

mand has been made upon him.

See Jett v. Hempstead, 25 Ark. 462, Cas. Ag. 496.

§ 1S8. Agent must not mix principal's funds with

his own. — The agent must not mix his principal's funds

with his own, and if he does so he will be liable for

their loss. The principal may follow and recover his

money or property, so long as he can identify it, until

it comes into the hands of a bona fide holder.

See Naltner v. Dolan, 108 Ind. 500, 58 Am. Rep. 61, Cas. Ag. 623;

Farmer's Bank v. King, 57 Penn. 202, 98 Am. Dec. 215, Cas. Ag. 590;
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Roca v. Byrne, 145 N. Y. 182, 39 N. E. Rep. 812, 45 Am. St. Rep. 599.

\/ 5. To give Notice to his Principal.

§ 189. Duty to give notice. — It is th e duty of the

agent to give the principal timely notice of all facts

coming to the agent's knowledge and relating to the

subject matter of the agency which it is material for

the principal to know for the protection of his interests.

This duty is not only important in itself, but it fur-

nishes the foundation for the rule, hereafter to be con-

sidered (§ 21(5), that notice to the agent is notice to

the principal.

See Devall v. Burbridge, 4 Watts & S. (Pa.) 305, Cas. Ag. 499;

ITenry v. Allen, 151 N. Y. 1, 45 N. E. Rep. 355, 36 L. R. A. 658; Amer-

ican Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133, 42 L. ed. 977; Enos v. St.

Paul, etc., Ins. Co., 4 S. Dak. 639, 57 N. W. Rep. 919, 46 Am. St. Rep.

-796.

§ 190.]
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CHAPTER XII.

OF THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE AGENT TO THIRD

PERSONS.

§ 190. In general.

I. LIABILITY IN CONTRACT.

191. What cases may occur.

1. Where he makes a con-

tract without authority.

192. Basis of liability.

193. How want of authority

may arise.

194. What forms present them-

selves.

195. Liability of agent.

196. In what form of action

liable.

197. When liable on the con-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t7dr2xb9s
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

tract itself.

198. Limitations.

2. Where there was no re-

sponsible principal.

199. Agent liable if no princi-

pal in existence.

200. Principal dead.

3. Where agent pledges

his personal responsi-

bility.

201. Agent may bind himself.

202-203. Effect of not disclos-

ing existence or name

of principal.

§ 190. In general. — The ordinary purpose of the

agent is to bring his principal into relations and obliga-

tions to third persons, but not to bind or obligate him-

self. He may, however, so conduct himself — usually

unintentionally but sometimes by design— as to incur

§ 204. Agent of foreign principal.

205. Presumption that princi-

pal was to be bound.

206. Presumption stronger in

case of public agent.

4. Where Agent Has Obtained

Money From Third Per-

son.

207. When money voluntarily

paid by mistake may be

recovered.

208. Money obtained illegally.

5. Where Agent Has Received

Money For Third Person.

209. Money delivered to agent

by principal for third

person.

II. IN TOBT.

210. Agent not liable in tort

for breach of duty ow-

ing to principal alone.

211. Non-feasance — Mis-feas-

ance.

212. Trespass — Conversion.

213. How sued.
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such a liability. This liability, under varying circum-

stances, may be either (1) in contract or (2) in tort

I. LIABILITY IN CONTRACT.

§ 191. What cases may occur. — The agent may

make himself liable to third persons in contract,

either —

(1) Where he makes a contract without authority;

(2) Where he contracts in the name of a principal

having no legal existence;

(3) Where, though authorized to bind his principal

he expressly pledges his personal responsibility;

(4) Where he has obtained money for his principal

from the third person;

- (5) Where he has received money from his prin-

cipal for the third person.

Each of these cases will be separately considered.

1. Where he makes a Contract icithout Authority.

§ 192. Basis of liability. — A person who assumes as

agent for another to make a contract with a third per-
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son, impliedly if not expressly represents that he is au-

thorized by his principal to make the contract as he

does; and if it proves to be unauthorized the assumed

agent will be liable to the third person for the loss sus-

tained by the latter from the failure of the contract.

See Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. 311, 47 Am. Rep. 718, Cas. Ag.

501; Farmers' Co-operative Trust Co. v. Floyd, 47 Ohio St. 525, 26

N. E. Rep. 110, 21 Am. St. Rep. 846; Wallace v. Bentley, 77 Cal. 19,

18 Pac. Rep. 788, 11 Am. St Rep. 231; Adams v. Fraser, 82 Fed. Rep.

211, 27 C. C. A. 108.

§ 193. How want of authority may arise. — His

want of authority may result either, first, because he

never possessed it ; second, because once having had it,

it has since expired; or, third, because, while having

some authority, or authority to perform the given act

§§ 193-196.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. 1 08

in a certain way, he has exceeded his authority, or

failed to observe the manner prescribed.

§ 194. What forms present themselves. — His liabil-

ity for acting without authority may arise in one of

four classes of cases:

1. Where an agent erroneously believing himself

authorized, makes an express representation as to his

authority.

2. Where an agent, knowing that he is not author-

ized, makes an express representation as to his au-

thority.

3. Where an agent, erroneously believing himself

authorized, makes no express representation, but as-

sumes to act as one having authority.

4. Where an agent, knowing that he has no author-

ity, makes no express representation, but assumes to

act as one authorized.

§ 195. Liability of agent. — In all of these cases the

agent will be liable to the third person with whom he
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deals for injury which such person naturally and proxi-

mately sustains by reason of the act's being unauthor-

ized.

See Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa. 311, 47 Am. Rep. 718, Cas. Ag.

501; Simmons v. More, 100 N. Y. 140, Cas. Ag. 505; Farmers' Co-

operatire Trust Co. v. Floyd, 47 Ohio St. 525, 26 N. E. Rep. 110, 21

Am. St. Rep. 847; Bank of Hamburg v. Wray, 4 Strob. (S. Car.) L.

87. 51 Am. Dec. 659; Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411. 37 L. ed. 790.

It is not at all necessary to the liability of the agent

that he should have acted in bad faith, although that

fact may affect the form or the extent of his liability.

Even where in good faith he believes he has authority

to make the contract, but has not, he is nevertheless

liable. WTiere a loss must fall upon one of two inno-

cent persons he must bear it by whose act, however

innocent, it was made possible.

104 DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. [§§ 195-198.

See Bank of Hamburg v. Wray, supra; Farmers' Co-operative

Trust Co. v. Floyd, supra; Dale v. Donaldson Lumber Co., 48 Ark.

188, 3 Am. St. Rep. 224.

§ 196. In what form of action liable. — The liabil-

ity of the agent may, according to the facts, be enforced

either in an action of tort or of contract.

Where the agent, knowing that he is unauthorized,

has made express representations as to his authority;

and also where he has assumed to act, knowing that he

is unauthorized, an action on the ease for the deceit

is an appropriate remedy.

Where, however, the agent acted in good faith, an

action based upon the express or implied warranty of

authority would be the appropriate remedy.

And even in the former cases where the action for

deceit might be maintained, the party injured may, at

his option, ignore or waive the element of deceit and

base his action upon the express or implied warranty.

§ 197. When liable on the contract itself. — It has
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sometimes been held that an agent who makes a con-

tract without authority is liable upon the contract it-

self, as though originally made by him as principal; but

the better rule is that the agent is liable on the contract

itself only in those cases in which the contract contains

apt words to bind him personally, or in which he has

pledged his personal responsibility. In other cases the

action should be, not on the contract, but on the express

or implied warranty of authority.

See Patterson v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. L. 457, 54 Am. Rep. 178, Cas.

Ag. 507; Ogden v. Raymond, 22 Conn. 379, 58 Am. Dec. 429; McCurdy

v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 197, 91 Am. Dec. 468; Thilmany v. Iowa Paper Bag

Co., 108 Iowa, 357, 75 Am. St. Rep. 259.

§ 198. Limitations.— But to make the agent liable in

any case, the contract must be one which would have

§§ 198-199.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. 1 05

been enforceable against the principal if the agent had

been authorized to make it.

See Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467.

There is no implied warranty by the agent that the

principal has authority to make the contract. "He

simply covenants that he has authority to act for his

principal, not that the act of the principal is legal and

binding."

See Thilmany v. Iowa Paper Bag Co., 108 Iowa 357, 75 Am. St.

Rep. 259.

If the agent makes no express representation as to

his authority, and fully and fairly discloses to the other

party all the circumstances connected with it, so that

the other party can judge for himself whether the agent

is authorized, the agent will not be liable.

See Thilmany v. Iowa Paper Bag Co., supra.

2. Where there was no responsible Principal.

§ 199. Agent liable if no principal in existence. —

For reasons analogous to those referred to in the pre-
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ceding sections, one who assumes to act as agent for a

principal having no legal existence — as, for example, a

committee, a voluntary society, an alleged corporation

whose corporate existence has failed or expired, and

the like — must usually be personally liable. There is

no principal to be held, it was clearly the intention that

some one should be bound, and the responsibility for

the contract must ordinarily fall upon the pretended

agent.

This liability, as in the preceding cases, may be upon

the contract itself where it contains apt words to create

such a liability, or upon the express or implied war-

ranty of the existence of a principal.

As in the preceding cases also, it is immaterial that

106 DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. [§§ 199-201.

the pretended agent acted in good faith : even if he were

entirely innocent the responsibility must still fall upon

him.

See Lewis v. Tilton, 61 Iowa 220, 52 Am. Rep. 436, Cas. Ag. 510;

Clark r. O'Rourke, 111 Mich. 108, 66 Am. St. Rep. 389; Fredenhall v.

Taylor, 26 Wis. 286; Winona Lumber Co. v. Church, 6 S. Dak. 498;

Lawler t. Murphy, 58 Conn. 294, 20 Atl. Rep. 457, 8 L. R. A. 113;

Codding v. Munson. 52 Neb. 580, 72 N. W. Rep. 846, 66 Am. St. Rep.

524.

§ 200. Principal dead. — This rule, however, does

not, it is held, apply in a case wherein, while there has

been a responsible principal, he has, without the knowl-

edge of the agent or the other party, died before the

contract in question was made. The death of the prin-

cipal is usually a fact equally within the knowledge of

both parties, and, if so, the agent cannot be deemed

guilty of a wrong or omission in failing to know of it.

See Smout v. Ilbery, 10 Mees. & Wels. 1.

3. Where Agent pledges his personal Responsibility.
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§ 201. Agent may bind himself. — The agent may

also make himself liable in many cases where, though

authorized to make the particular contract in question,

he makes it in such a manner as not to bind the princi-

pal. Thus, though he intended to bind the principal, he

may inadvertently or intentionally use such words as to

bind himself personally, and if he does so, he may be

held personally responsible. The very common cases,

already referred to, wherein an agent, though intend-

ing to bind his principal, has signed a contract in hi«

own name with the word "agent," "trustee," and the

like added, are excellent illustrations of this rule.

See ante § 161; Hobson v. Hassett, 76 Cal. 203, 9 Am. St. Rep.

193, Cas. Ag. 442; Tilden v. Barnard, 43 Mich. 376, 38 Am. Rep. 197;

§§ 201-203.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. 107

Knickerbocker v. Wilcox, 83 Mich. 200, 47 N. W. Rep. 123, 21 Am.

St. Rep. 595.

§ 202. Effect of not disclosing existence or name

of principal. — So, for the obvious reason that he din-

closes no one else to be bound and must be presumed to

intend to bind some one, the agent who conceals the

fact of his agency or the name of his principal, and con-

tracts as the ostensible principal, will be personally

liable.

See Amans t. Campbell, 70 Minn. 493, 68 Am. St. Rep. 547; Bald-

win r. Leonard, 39 Vt. 260, 94 Am. Dec. 324; Cobb v. Knapp, 71 N. Y.

348, 27 Am. Rep. 51; Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411, 37 L. ed. TV

xVn agent who would escape personal responsil

must disclose both the fact of his agency and the nan:,

of his principal at the time of making the contract, and

the subsequent disclosure of the principal J$J|j Hot be

sufficient to relieve the agent.

See Cobb r. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 34S, 27 Am. Rep. $$,

In many of these cases wherein the principal is un-
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disclosed, the principal himself, as will be seen her

after, may be so held liable when discovered; but the

fact that he may be held responsible doesi not relieve

the agent; it simply gives the other party an option to

pursue the one or the other as he pleases.

i

See post § 243.

§ 203. The converse of the rule laid down in the

preceding section is, of course, true. If the agent

makes a full disclosure of the fact of his agency and of

the name of his principal, and contracts only as agent

and for the principal so disclosed, he incurs no personal

responsibility.

See Huffman v. Newman, 55 Neb. 713, 76 N. W. Rep. 409.

108 DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. [§§204-206.

§ 204. Agent of foreign principal. — It was former-

ly the rule that an agent who acted for a foreign prin-

cipal was himself personally liable, because it must be

presumed that credit was given to the agent rather

than to the foreign and inaccessible principal ; but this

rule no longer prevails in this country, and the agent

of a foreign principal stands upon the same ground as

the agent of a domestic principal.

See Maury v. Ranger, 38 La. Ann. 485, 58 Am. Rep. 197; Oelrieks

v. Ford. 64 U. S. (23 How.) 49.

§ 205. Presumption that principal was to be bound.

— Where dealings are had with the agent of a known

principal," the presumption will be that credit was given

to the principal, and that the principal, rather than the

agent, was to be bound; but this presumption may be

rebutted by evidence of an intention to bind the agent

personally.

See Moline Malleable Iron Co. v. York Iron Co., 27 C. C. A. 442,

53 U. S. App. 580, 83 Fed. Rep. 66.
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§206. Presumption stronger in case of public

agent. — In the case of a public agent, the presumption

that the agent was not to be personally bound is

stronger than in the case of a private agent ; and a

known public agent will only be held personally bound

where the evidence is very clear of an intention so to

bind him ; and a public agent who discloses the source

of his authority, and is guilty of no fraud or misrepre-

sentation, is not liable upon an implied warranty of

authority; because his authority is a matter of public

law or record, which the other party must examine for

himself.

See McCurdy v. Rogers, 21 Wis. 197, 91 Am. Dec. 468; Knight v.

Clark, 48 N. J. L. 22, 57 Am. Rep. 534, Cas. Ag. 434.

85 207-209.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. 109

4. Where Agent has obtained Money from third

Person.

§ 207. When money voluntarily paid by mistake

may be recovered. — Where money has, by mistake, been

voluntarily paid to an agent for the use of his prin-

cipal, the agent will not be liable to the person paying

it, if, before notice of the mistake, he has paid it over

to his principal, but he will be liable if he pays it over

after notice.

So an agent who receives money by mistake on ac-

count of his principal, will not be liable where, before

notice of the mistake, his situation has so changed that

he will be prejudiced if the payment is held invalid.

See Herrick v. Gallagher, 60 Barb. 566, Cas. on Ag. 512; Smith

v. Binder, 75 111. 492.

If, however, the agency were not known, the agent

will be liable even though he has paid the money to his

principal.

See Smith v. Kelly, 43 Mich. 390.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t7dr2xb9s
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

§ 208. Money obtained illegally.— An agent who has

obtained money from third persons illegally, as by com-

pulsion or extortion, will be liable to the person paying

it, although he has paid it over to his principal.

See Ripley v. Gelston, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 201. 6 Am. Dec. 2T1;

Grover v. Morris, 73 N. Y. 473.

5. Where Agent has rewired Money for third Person.

§ 209. Money delivered to agent by principal for

third person. — Where money has been delivered to an

agent by the principal to be paid to a third person, the

principal may countermand the order to pay, and re-

cover the money from the agent, at any time before the

110 DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. [§§209-211.

agent has either paid it over to the third person, or

assumed an obligation to such third person to pay it.

See Williams t. Everett, 14 East 582.

Whether the third person may sue for and recover it

from the agent is not certain. It is held in many cases

that a person for whose benefit a contract was made

but who was not a party to it, cannot maintain an

action at law upon it. Other cases recognize the right

of the beneficiary under a contract, though not a

party to it, to sue upon and enforce it.

See the exhaustive note upon thiB subject in 71 Am. St. Rep.

176. Also 25 L. R. A. 257; 39 Am. St. Rep. 531; 9 Am. Dec. 155;

3 Am. Dec. 305.

II. IN TORT.

5 210. Agent not liable in tort for breach of

duty owing to principal alone. — An agent is not lia-

ble in tort to third persons who have received injury

because of the agent's failure to perform some duty

which he owed to his principal alone. Thus, one who
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purchases real estate in reliance upon an opinion as to

its title given to the vendor by the latter's attorney, or

who purchases a mortgage upon the strength of a

search made by the attorney of the original mortgagee,

cannot recover of the attorney if the title proves de-

fective or the search incomplete.

See Savings Bank v. 'Ward, 100 U. S. 195; Dundee Mortg. Co. v.

Hughes, 20 Fed. Rep. 39; Houseman v. Girard Ass'n, 81 Penn. St.

256; Fish t. Kelly, 17 Com. B. (N. S.) 194.

§ 211. Non-feasance — Mis-feasance. — While it is

thus true that the agent is not liable to third persons for

the breach of a duty owing solely to his principal, there

are many cases wherein he will at the same time incur

a liability to third persons. Thus an agent charged

§211.] DUTIES OF AGENT TO THIRD PERSONS. 11]

with the custody and control of property, while he may

owe duties respecting it to his principal, is at the same

time under an obligation not to permit the property so

controlled by him to cause injury to third persons. An

agent given possession and control of a horse may be

under a duty to his principal not to injure the horse by

overdriving, but he is also under a duty to third per-

sons not to injure them while overdriving the horse.

So an agent given the charge and control of real estate

and charged with the duty of keeping it in repair, owes

a duty to his principal that the latter shall not suffer

from his neglect in making repairs, but he may also owe

a duty to third persons to see that they do not suffer

loss by reason of his failure to keep the property in

suitable repair. Where the agent thus owes a duty

to third persons, he will be liable to them for injuries

caused by his failure to perform the duty owing to

them, even though he may also be liable to his principal

for the neglect of the duty which he owed to him. The
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breach of the duty owing to the principal, where it con-

sists in not doing something which he ought to do, is

often termed non-feasance; the breach of the duty ow-

ing to third persons not to injure them by the same act

or omission which causes injury to his principal, is

sometimes termed tnis-feasancr.

The fact that the agent may thus owe a duty to third

persons as well as to his principal seems sometimes to

have been overlooked.

See Delaney v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123, 44 Am. Rep. 436,

Cas. Ag. 514; Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437,

Cas. Ag. 518; Baird v. Shipman, 132 111. 16, 22 Am. St. Rep. 504;

Campbell t. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552, 16 Am. Rep. 503; Ellis

v. McNaughton, 76 Mich. 237, 42 N. W. Rep. 1113, 15 Am. St. Rep.

308; Mayer r. Building Co., 104 Ala. 611, 16 So. Rep. 620, 28 L.

R. A. 433; Greenberg v. Whiteonib Lumber Co. 90 Wis. 225, 63 N.

W. Rep. 93, 48 Am. St. Rep. 911, 28 L. R. A. 439; Cameron v. Ken-
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yon-Connell Com. Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. Rep. 358, 44 L. R. A.

508.

Compare notes in 22 Am. St. Rep. 512; 48 Am. St. Rep. 923 et

seq.; 28 L. R. A. 433.

§ 212. Trespass — Conversion. —An agent who

wrongfully enters upon another's land, or wrongfully

takes or detains or sells the goods of another, is liable

to the owner for the trespass or the conversion, even

though he acted in good faith, supposing the property

to be that of his principal, or although he did so by the

direction of his principal supposing that the principal

was authorized to give the directions. The fact that he

has delivered to his principal the property taken, or has

paid over to his principal the proceeds of property

wrongfully sold by his direction, is immaterial. No

one can escape the consequences of his wrongful act by

alleging that he did it as the agent of another.

See Spraights v. Hawley, 39 N. Y. 441, 100 Am. Dec. 452; Miller

v. Wilson, 98 Ga. 567, 58 Am. St Rep. 319; Kimball v. Billings, 55
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Me. 147, 92 Am. Dec. 581; Wing v. Milliken, 91 Me. 387, 40 Atl. Rep.

138, 64 Am. St. Rep. 238; Nunnelly v. Southern Iron Co., 94 Tenn.

397, 29 S. W. Rep. 361, 28 L. R. A. 421; Swim v. Wilson. 90 Cal. 126,

27 Pac. Rep. 33, 25 Am. St Rep. 110; Robinson v. Bird, 158 Mass.

357, 33 N. E. Rep. 391, 35 Am. St. Rep. 495.

§ 213. How sued. — The agent may be sued alone,

or, in some cases, jointly with his principal.

See Wright v. Compton, 53 Ind. 337; Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78;

Schaefer v. Osterbrink, 67 Wis. 495; Campbell v. Portland Sugar

Co., 62 Me. 552, 16 Am. Rep. 503; Mulchey v. Methodist Society, 12b

Mass. 487; Hewett v. Swift, 3 Allen (Mass.) 420; Shearer v. Evans,

89 Ind. 400.

{§214-215.] DUTIES OF rRINCIPAL TO AGENT.
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CHAPTER XIII.

OF THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE PRINCIPAL TO

THE AGENT.

§ 214. In general.

1. The Payment of Com-

pensation.

215. The right to have com-

pensation.

216. The amount of compensa-

tion.

217. When compensation

deemed to be earned.

— Where authority ter-

minated by the princi-

pal.

— Where authority

wrongfully revoked.

— Agent's duty to miti-

219.

220.
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218.

gate his damages.

221. Where authority right-

fully revoked.

222. Where authority termi-

nated by operation of

law.

§ 223. Where agent abandons

his. undertaking.

224. Where agent acted for

two principals.

225. Where agent violated his

trust.

Where agency unlawful.

Where extra duties re-

quired.

Where agent holds over.

Recoupment by principal.

2. Re-imbursement and

Indemnity of Agent.

230. Agent's right to re-im-

bursement.

231. Agent's right to indem-

nity.

232. None where act un-

lawful.

226.

227.

228.

229.

§214. In general. — The chief duties of the princi-

pal to the agent are (1) to pay him his compensation,

and (2) to indemnify him against loss or injury sus-

tained in the performance of his duty.

1. The Pay men t of Compensation.

§ 215. The right to have compensation. — The

agent's right to compensation may be determined by

the contract of the parties, or be implied by law. Where

the parties have expressly agreed that the agent shall

or shall not be entitled to compensation, their agree-

ment is usually conclusive.

114 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [§§ 215-216.

An express agreement to pay is not usually neces-

sary. As a rule, wherever services have been rendered

by one person at the express request of another, the law

will imply a promise by the latter to pay for them.

See Bradford v. Kimberly, 3 Johns. Ch. 431, 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 866,

Cas. Ag. 523.

But no promise to pay will be implied where the

parties are near relatives or others who are members

of the same family;

See Harris v. Smith, 79 Mich. 54, 6 L. R. A. 702; Murphy v. Mui

phy, 1 S. Dak. 316, 9 L. R. A. 820.

or where the services were rendered as a mere act ol

kindness, or upon the hope or expectation, merely, that

they would be paid for.

See Chadwick v. Knox, 31 N. H. 226, 64 Am. Dec. 329; Wood v.

Ayres, 39 Mich. 345, 33 Am. Rep. 396.

Though the act when done was unauthorized, its sub-

sequent ratification will give the agent the same right

to compensation as though it had been previously au-
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thorized.

See Wilson v. Dame, 58 N. H. 392, Cas. Ag. 526.

§216. The amount of compensation. — Where the

parties have agreed upon the amount of compensation

to be paid, the agreement will usually be conclusive.

See Wallace v. Floyd, 29 Pa. St. 184, 72 Am. Dec. 620, Cas. Ag.

525; Hamilton v. Frothingham, 59 Mich. 253; Jefferson v. Burhans,

29 C. C. A. 481, 58 U. S. App. 586, 85 Fed. Rep. 949.

Where no amount is agreed upon, the law will imply

a promise to pay the usual sum, if there be one, and if

not then to pay what the services are reasonably worth.

See McCrary v. Ruddlck, 33 Iowa 521; Millar v. Cuddy, 43 Mich.

273, 38 Am. Rep. 181.

For the purpose of determining what they are reason-

5§ 216-217.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. 115

ably worth, the opinions of witnesses who arc familiar

with the subject may be received.

See Eggleaton v. Boardman, 37 Mich. Ji; Bowen v. Bowen, 74

Ind. 470; Johnson y. Thompson, 72 Ind. 167, 07 Am. Rep. 152.

§ 217. When compensation deemed to be earned.

— The parties may agree upon the time when the com-

pensation shall be due, and if they so fix the time, th

agreement will be conclusive. In the absence of such

an agreement, however, the agent's compensation will

not usually be considered to be earned until he has

fully completed his undertaking.

If the agent has done all that he undertook to do, he

is entitled to his compensation even though the prin-

cipal received no benefit, or failed or refused to avail

himself of the advantages secured. Thus a broker em-

ployed to effect a sale of property is entitled to his com-

mission when he has found a purchaser ready, willing

and able to buy on the proposed terms, even though I

principal does not, or cannot, through defective title or
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otherwise, complete the sale.

See post § ; Gelatt v. Ridge, 117 Mo. 553, 23 S. W. Rep. 8S2,

38 Am. St. Rep. 683; Barthell t. Peter, 88 Wis. 316, 60 N. W. Rep.

429, 43 Am. St. Rep. 906; Wray v. Carpenter, 16 Colo. 271, 27 Pac. Rep.

248, 25 Am. St. Rep. 265; Wilson v. Mason, 158 111. 304, 42 N. E. Rep.

134, 49 Am. St Rep. 162.

It is entirely competent for the parties to agree that

the agent shall be paid only in case he accomplishes a

certain result; and if, without the fault of the princi-

pal, he fails to accomplish that result, he will not be

entitled to any compensation.

See Hale r. Kumler, 29 C. C. A. 67, 54 U. S. App. 685, 85 Fed.

Rep. 161; Idler v. Borgmeyer, 13 C. C. A. 198, 65 Fed. Rep. 910;

Mattingly v. Pennie. 105 Cal. 514, 39 Pac. Rep. 200, 45 Am. St. Rep.

87; Butler v. Baker. 17 R. I. 582, 23 Atl. Rep. 1019, 33 Am. St Rep.

897.
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§ 218. Where authority terminated by princi-

pal. — Where the employment was merely at will, and

not for a definite time, the principal may terminate it

at any time; in which case the agent will be entitled to

compensation for any services which he has already per-

formed, and which the principal has accepted. The

principal cannot, however, revoke the authority to es-

cape payment of compensation where the undertaking

has been substantially performed, and the agent is upon

the very point of completing it.

See Sibbald v. The Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378, 38 Am. Rep. 441, Cas.

Ag. 301; Warren Chemical Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N. Y. 586, 23 N. E.

Rep. 908, 16 Am. St. Rep. 788.

§ 219. Where authority wrongfully revoked.

— Where the agent has been employed for a definite

time, and his authority is wrongfully revoked before

that time has expired, he has usually his choice of three

remedies:

1. He may treat the contract as rescinded, and
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bring an action at once to recover without reference to

the contract, the reasonable value of the services al-

ready rendered, less any amount already paid him.

2. He mav treat the contract as in force but

broken, and bring an action at once to recover damages

for the probable loss which he has sustained by its vio-

lation — i. e., the damages based upon the reasonable

expectation of his finding other employment.

3. He mav treat the contract as in force but broken

and wait until the expiration of the term, and then re-

cover damages for the actual loss which he has sus-

tained by its violation.

He cannot pursue all of these remedies, and a recov-

ery upon one will bar a recovery upon another.

See Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 285, Cas. Ag. 526;

Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64, Mechem's Cas. Damages, 458; Olm-

§§219-221.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. 117

stead v. Bach, 78 Md. 132, 27 Atl. Rep. 501, 44 Am. St. Rep. 273, Cas.

Damages, 464; Boland v. Glendale Quarry Co., 127 Mo. 520, 30 S. W.

Rep. 151, Cas. Damages, 468; Hamilton v. Love, 152 Ind. 641, 71 Am.

St. Rep. 384; James v. Allen Co., 44 Ohio St. 226, 58 Am. Rep. 821.

In Alabama and a few other States, there may be a recovery of

wages on the theory of constructive service. Liddell v. Chidester,

84 Ala. 508, 4 So. Rep. 426, 5 Am. St. Rep. 387, Cas. Ag. 535, Mechem's

Cases on Damages, 460. In Minnesota a peculiar ruling is made

permitting much the same result as that reached in Alabama, though

upon a different theory. McMullan v. Dickinson Co., 60 Minn. 156,

51 Am. St. Rep. 511, 62 N. W. Rep. 120, Mechem's Cas. on Damages,

462. But the weight of authority is opposed to these views, and

permits a recovery of damages for breach of contract only. See

cases cited above.

§ 220. Agent's duty to mitigate his damage.

— It is the duty of an agent wrongfully discharged be-

fore the expiration of his term, to use reasonable dili-

gence to obtain other employment of a like kind, and

thus reduce his damage as far as possible; but he is
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not obliged to take employment of a different kind, or

go to a different place to find it.

See Harrington v. Gies, 45 Mich. 374; Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala.

299, 38 Am. Rep. 8; Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64, Cas. Damages

458.

The burden of proof is upon the employer to show

that the agent might have found such other employ-

ment and failed to do so.

See Farrell v. School District, 98 Mich. 43; Allen v. Whitlark, 99

Mich. 492.

§221. "Where authority rightfully revoked —

Where, though employed for a definite term, the agent's

authority has been rightfully revoked before the expira-

tion of that term, as because of his misconduct or

breach of duty, it is held, in many cases, that he cannot

recover anything. Where his misconduct was treach-

erous, wilful or malicious, this holding is doubtl

right, but the true rule in other casi-s seems to be that

118 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. [§§ 221-223.

if, notwithstanding his misconduct, his services have

been of some substantial value to the principal, over

aud above the damage sustained by the principal from

his misconduct, the agent may recover such excess.

See Wadsworth v. Adams, 138 U. S. 380, 34 L. ed. 984; Sea v.

Carpenter, 16 Ohio 412; Vennum v. Gregory, 21 Iowa 326; Branuan

v. Strauss, 75 111. 234; Sumner v. Reicheniker, 9 Kan. 320. See

also Massey v. Taylor, 5 Coldw. (Tenn.) 447; Lawrence r. Gullifer,

38 Me. 532; Carroll v. Welch, 26 Tex. 147.

§ 222. Where authority terminated by operation

of law. — Where the authority is terminated by opera-

tion of law — as by reason of the death or insanity of

one of the parties — no damages for the revocation can

ordinarily be recovered.

See Griggs v. Swift, 82 Ga. 392, 14 Am. St. Rep. 176, 5 L. R. A.

405, Cas. Ag. 537. But compare Hughes v. Gross, 166 Mass. 61, 55

Am. St. Rep. 375.

§ 223. Where agent abandons his undertaking. —

— Where the agent abandons his undertaking, and the
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employment was at will, merely, he may recover for the

services already rendered. If, however, having agreed

to serve for a definite time, the agent abandons his un-

dertaking without cause, before the expiration of that

time, it is held, in many cases, that he can recover

nothing. But a more liberal rule prevails in many

States, which enables the agent, in such cases, to recover

the reasonable value of the services rendered, not ex-

ceeding the contract price, after deducting damages for

whatever loss the principal may have sustained by

reason of the abandonment.

See Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267, 13 Am. Dec. 425, Mechem'a Cas.

Damages, 470; Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. 462, 43 Am. Rep. 719;

Timberlake v. Thayer, 71 Miss. 279, 24 L. R. A. 231 and note; Brit-

ton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713, Mechem's Cas. Dam-

ages, 473; Allen v. McKibbin, 5 Mich. 449; McClay v. Hedge, 18

§§ 223 226.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. 119

Iowa 6G; Pan ell v. McComber, 11 Neb. 209; Duncan v. Baker, 21

Kan. 99; Carroll v. Welch, 26 Tex. 147; Coe v. Smith, 4 Ind. 79, 58

Am. Dec. 618; Downey v. Burke, 23 Mo. 228; Steeples v. Newton, 7

Orug. 110. UIJ Am. Rep. 705.

§ 224. Where agent acted for two principals. —

— Where an agent, without the full knowledge and con-

sent of both principals, has assumed to act as agent for

both parties in the same transaction, the law docs not

permit him to recover compensation from either party;

but he may have compensation from both parties if his

double employment was known and assented to by both

principals.

See Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohio St. 396, 41 Am. Rep. 528, Cas. Ag.

538; Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, Cas. Ag. 12; Mc-

Donald v. Maltz, 94 Mich. 172, 53 N. W. Rep. 1058, 34 Am. St. Rep.

331; Rice v. Davis, 136 Pa. 439, 20 Atl. Rep. 513, 20 Am. St. Rep. 931.

If the commissions have been paid in ignorance of the double

agency, they may be recovered. Cannell v. Smith, 142 Pa. 25, 21

Atl. Rep. 793, 12 L. R. A. 395; Jansen v. Williams, 36 Neb. 869, 55
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N. W. Rep. 279, 20 L. R. A. 207.

The case in which the agent, e. g., a broker, was acting as a mere

"middle-man," is also an exception to the rule forbidding compensa-

tion from both principals. See post § 259.

§ 225. Where agent violated his trust. — An agent

who is guilty of fraud or betrays his trust or violates

his duty by allowing his own interests to interfere with

those of his principal, cannot recover compensation.

See ante § 167; McKinley v. Williams, 20 C. C. A. 312, 36 U. S.

App. 749, 74 Fed. Rep. 94; Hofflin v. Moss, 14 C. C. A. 450. 32 U. S. App.

200, 67 Fed. Rep. 440; Shaeffer v. Blair, 149 U. S. 218, 37 L. ed. 721;

Hall v. Grambill, 34 C. C. A. 190, 92 Fed. Rep. 32.

§ 220. Where agency unlawful.— The agent cannot

recover compensation for the doing of that which was

unlawful to be done. Thus a broker unlawfullv doing

business without a license cannot recover commissions.

And a broker who has been employed in furthering

11
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gambling transactions or unlawful dealings in "fu-

tures," cannot recover commissions.

See ante § 33; Buckley v. Huruason, 50 Minn. 195, 52 N. W. Rep.

385, 36 Am. St. Rep. 637, 16 L. R. A. 423; Venning v. Yount, 62 Kan.

217, 61 Pac. Rep. 803, 50 L. R. A. 103; Harvey v. Merrill, 150 Mass.

1, 22 N. E. Rep. 49, 5 L. R. A. 200; Pope v Hanke, 155 111. 617, 40

N. E. Rep. 839, 28 L. R. A. 568; Jemison v. Citizens' Sav. Bank,

122 N. Y. 135, 25 N. E. Rep. 264, 9 L. R. A. 708.

§227. "Where extra duties required. — An agent

employed at a regular salary cannot recover extra com-

pensation because additional duties of the same kind

are required of him, unless there was an express prom-

ise to pay such extra compensation.

See Ross v. Hardin, 79 N. Y. 84; Pew v. Gloucester Bank, 130

Mass. 391.

§ 22S. Where agent holds over. — Where an agent

has been serving at a fixed compensation for a definite

period, and continues after the expiration of that pe-

riod without any new contract, the law will presume
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that he has continued for another like period, and at

the same compensation.

See Wallace v. Floyd, 29 Pa. 184, 72 Am. Dec. 620, Cas. Ag. 525;

Standard Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 84 Ga. 714, 8 L. R. A. 410, Cas. Ag. 273.

§229. Recoupment by principal. — In an action

brought by the agent for the recovery of his compensa-

tion, the principal may recoup any damages he may

have sustained by reason of the agent's failure to per-

form his duty in the execution of his authority.

See Nashville R. R. Co. v. Chumley, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 327; Mobil*

Ry. Co. v. Clanton, 59 Ala. 392, 31 Am. Rep. 15.

2. Rc-irnbursement and Indemnity of Agent.

§230. Agent's right to re-imbursement. — The

agent is entitled to be re-Jiul.iirsed by the principal

for all of his advances, expenses and disbursements,

§§230-232.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT. 121

made in the course of hia employment, on account of or

for the benefit of his principal, if they were properly

and reasonably incurred, and were not rendered neces-

sary by the default of the agent.

See Merrill v. Rokes, 4 C. C. A. 433, 12 U. S. App. 183, 54 Fed.

Rep. 450; Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 37 L. ed. 819; Perin v. Par-

ker, 126 111. 201, 18 N. E. Rep. 747, 2 L. R. A. 336.

§231. Agent's right to indemnity. — The agent is

also entitled to be indemnified by the principal for any

loss or liability which the agent may sustain by reason

of his performing, at the direction of the principal, any

act which is not manifestly illegal and wjiich the agent

did not know to be wrong. In such cases the law im-

plies a promise by the principal to indemnify the agent.

See Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 37 L. ed. 819.

§232. None where act unlawful. — But no

promise to indemnify will be implied, and even an ex-

press promise will not be enforced, if the act was one

which the agent knew or must be presumed to have
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known was unlawful.

See Moore v. Appleton, 26 Ala. 633, 34 Ala. 147, 73 Am. Dec. 44S;

Coventry v. Barton, 17 Johns. 142, 8 Am. Dec. 376; D'Arcy v. Lyle,

5 Binney 441, Cas. Ag. 542; Pope t. Hanke, 155 111. 617. 40 N. E.

Rep. 839. 28 L. R. A. 568; Jemison v. Citizens Sar. Bank, 122 N. Y.

135, 25 N. E. Rep. 264, 9 L. R. A. 708.

1 .►.>

DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON.

[§ 233.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE PRINCIPAL TO

THIRD PERSONS.

!

233. In general.

234. "What questions arise.

I. LIABILITY FOR AGENT'S CON-

TRACTS.

235. In general.

a. The disclosed principal.

236-237. Principal liable, when.

b. The liability of the un-

disclosed principal.

238. In general.

239. Real principal liable

when discovered.

240. Exceptions.

cised.
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241. When right to be exer-

242. To what contracts rule

applies.

243. Agent also remains liable.

II. RESPONSIBILITY FOR AGENT'S

STATEMENTS, ETC.

244-245. What statements, etc.,

bind the principal.

III. RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAT-

TERS BROUGHT TO KNOWL-

EDGE OF AGENT.

§ 246-247. When notice to agent

is notice to principal.

248. Basis of rule.

249. Notice to sub-agent.

250. Notice to one of several

agents.

251. Notice to agents of cor-

porations.

IV. LIABILITY FOR AGENT'S

TORTS AND CRIMES.

252. Foundation of liability for

agent's torts.

253-257. Principal's liability

for agent's torts.

258. Limitations.

259. Principal's liability for

agent's criminal acts.

§ 233. In general. — This subdivision of the general

subject is naturally one of the most important ones. It

certainly is the one most frequently arising. The rea-

son for this is obvious. The very purpose of the crea-

tion of the agency is to enable the principal to put the

agent forward to act, contract, speak, deal and be dealt

with, in the place and stead of the principal in person.

The question, therefore, of the liability which the prin-

cipal incurs while thus acting through the intervention

of his agent must constantly and necessarily present

itself.

§§234-236.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 123

§234. What questions arise. — This question of the

liability of the principal to third persons presents four

chief aspects —

1. His liability upon contracts made by the agent.

2. His responsibility for the agent's statements,

admissions or representations.

3. His responsibility for matters brought to his

agent's knowledge.

4. His liability for his agent's torts and crimes.

I. LIABILITY FOR ACEXT'S CONTRACTS.

§235. In general. — The question of the liability of

the principal for the contracts of his agent may aris-

(a) where the principal at the time of making- the con-

tract was disclosed and known to exist, or (b) where

the principal at the time was undisclosed; and separate

consideration must be given to each aspect.

It is only with respect of contracts that the distinc-

tion between the disclosed and the undisclosed prin-

cipal becomes material.
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a. The Liability of the Disclosed Principal.

§230. Principal liable when.— It is not the pur-

pose here to inquire concerning the existence of the au-

thority. The question of how authority may be con-

ferred and upon whom, has already been discussed. As-

Burning that the relation of principal and agent exists,

the question becomes, What contracts of the agent are

binding upon the principal? To this question the an-

swer is: A principal is liable to third persons for all

the lawful contracts of his agent, made for the princi-

pal and in his behalf, while the agent was acting within

the scope of his authority and in the course of his un-

dertaking; or which have subsequently been ratitied by

the principal with full knowledge of the facts.

Stated negatively, the principal is not liable upon

124 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§§236-238.

contracts made by the agent not within the scope of

the authority and not subsequently ratified.

See Huntley v. Mathias, 90 N. C. 101, 47 Am. Rep. 516,

Cas. Ag. 408; Pickert v. Marston, 68 Wis. 465, 60 Am. Rep. 876,

Cas. Ag. 411; Komorowski v. Krumdick, 56 Wis. 23, Cas. Ag. 413;

Jackson v. National Bank, 92 Tenn. 154, 20 S. W. Rep. 802, IS L. R.

A. 663, Cas. Ag. 415; Brockway v. Mullin, 46 N. J. L. 448, 50 Am.

Rep. 442, Cas. Ag. 419; Vescelius v. Martin, 11 Colo. 391, Cas. Ag.

422; New York Iron Mine v. First Nat. Bank, 39 Mich. 644, Cas. Ag.

423.

§ 237. By the term "scope of the authority" is

meant the extent of the powers expressly or impliedly

conferred upon the agent. It includes not only those

actually given but those apparently conferred. It em-

braces those which custom may confer. It includes,

also, in a given case, those powers whose existence, as

against the party interested, the principal is estopped

to deny. It embraces, finally, all those powders whose

exercise, though not originally authorized, has been
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subsequently ratified with a full knowledge of the facts.

See ante § 132 et seq.

h. The Liability of the Undisclosed Principal.

§ 238. In general. — What has thus far been said in

this subdivision has had to do with the liability of the

principal who was known to be such at the time of the

transaction; but, as has been already intimated, it is

not always the fact that the existence and name of the

principal are thus known. The principal, for some rea-

son, may prefer to keep in the background, or the agent,

without the knowledge or authority of the principal,

may fail to disclose that he is an agent and deal as

though he were himself the real party in interest.

What then is the liability of such a principal?

It must be observed that, by the hypothesis, there is

a competent principal in existence who has authorized,

and is entitled to the benefits of the act of the agent;

§§ 228-239.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 125

he has simply not been disclosed. The ease, therefore,

is radically unlike that presented in the domain of rati-

fication where, by the hypothesis, then? was, at the time

of the act, no principal who had authorized it. This

distinction is not infrequently lost sight of, and the

two cases treated as substantially identical.

§ 239. Real principal liable when discovered. — It

is the general rule that the real principal in the trans-

action, though undisclosed at the time of making the

contract, may be held liable, when discovered, upon all

simple contracts made in his behalf by his agent, even

though at the time of making the contract the party

dealing with the agent did not know that he was an

agent or did not know who his principal was, and gave

credit to the agent supposing him to be the principal.

See Kayton v. Barnett, 116 N. Y. 625, Cas. Ag. 553; Maxcy Mfg.

Co. t. Burnham, 89 Me. 538, 36 Atl. Rep. 1003, 56 Am. St. Rep. 436.

In such a case the principal is bound by the apparent

authority given to the agent, and he can not escape lia-
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bility by showing that he had instructed the agent not

to do acts which are within the scope of his apparent

authoritv.

See Watteau v. Fenwick, L. R., [1893] 1 Q. B. Div. 346, Cas. Ag.

369; Hubbard v. Tenbrook, 124 Pa. 291, 16 Atl. Rep. 817, 10 Am. St.

Rep. 585, 2 L. R. A. 823, Cas. Ag. 367.

The case, however, presupposes that the principal at

the time of the contract was really undisclosed. For if

he were known at the time of the transaction and the

other party nevertheless elected to give credit to the

agent only, he cannot afterwards charge the principal.

Whether exclusive credit was given to the agent or not

is usually a question of fact.

See Paterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East 62, Cas. Ag. 545; Addison v.

Gandasequi, 4 Taunt. 573, Cas. Ag. 547; Thompson v. Davenport,

126 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§§ 239-240.

9 B. & Cr. 78, Cas. Ag. 547; Raymond v. Crown, etc., Mills, 2 Mete.

(Mass.) 319; James v. Bixby, 11 Mass. 34; Stehn v. Fasnacht, 20

La. Ann. S3; Brown v. Rundlett, 15 N. H. 360; Ferguson v. McBean

91 Cal. 63, 14 L. R. A. 65; Heffron v. Pollard, 73 Tex. 96, 15 Am. St.

Rep. 764.

The exemption of the principal, in such a case, is

strengthened by the fact that he has settled with the

agent supposing that the third party looked to the

agent only.

See Cleveland v. Pearl, 63 Vt. 127, 25 Am. St. Rep. 748, Cas. Ag.

556; James v. Bixby, supra.

§ 240. Exceptions. — To the general rule thus

giving the other party the right to hold the undis-

closed principal when discovered, there are two excep-

tions: —

1. The principal can not be held where, although he

was not disclosed at the time of the transaction, he has

since been disclosed and the other party has then, with

full knowledge as to the principal and with power of

alone.
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choice, deliberately elected to give credit to the agent

Knowledge not only of the existence but of the name

of the principal is necessary, and what the other party

may have done before he received such knowledge can-

not bind him as an election. And even with such

knowledge, the mere presentation of a claim against

the agent or even the commencement of a suit against

him, will not, it has been held, be conclusive evidence

of an election to hold the agent only.

See Beymer v. Bonsall, 79 Pa. St. 298, Cas. Ag. 554; Curtis v.

Williamson, L. R. 10 Q. B. 57.

2. The principal can not be held where, before the

other party presents his claim, the principal has settled

with the agent* relying upon some conduct of the other

§§240-242.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 127

party from which it was reasonable to infer- that the

agent has already settled with sueli third party.

See Paterson v. Gandasequi, 15 East, 62, 2 Smith L. C. 342, Cas.

Ag. 545; Thompson v. Davenport, 9 Barn. & Cr. 78, 2 Smith L. C.

351, Cas. Ag. 547; Irvine v. Watson, 5 Q. B. Div. 414, 29 Moak's Eng.

Rep. 371, Cas. Ag. 550.

The American cases, so far as they have considered the subject,

would support the rule only so far as the * See Fradley v. Hyland,

37 Fed. Rep. 49, 2 L. R. A. 749; Laing v. Butler, 37 Hun, (N. Y.)

144; Thomas v. Atkinson, 38 Ind. 248; Clealand v. Walker, 11 Ala.

1058; McCullough v. Thompson, 45 N. Y. Super. 449; Belneld v. Na-

tional Supply Co. 189 Pa. 189, 42 Atl. Rep. 131. But the English rule

is right, and will doubtless be followed in the United States. See

23 Am. L. Rev. 5G5.

' §241. When right to be exercised. — The right of

the other party to so hold the undisclosed principal

must be exercised within a reasonable time after the

principal is discovered.

See Smethurst v. Mitchell, 1 Ell. & Ell. 622.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:55 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t7dr2xb9s
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

The existence and identity of the principal may be

shown by parol evidence.

See Waddill v. Sebree, 88 Va. 1012, 14 S. E. Rep. 849, 29 Am. St.

Rep. 766.

§ 242. To what contracts rule applies. — The rule

applies to all simple contracts, whether written or un-

written, and to those required to be in writing as well

as to those not so required; but it does not apply to

negotiable instruments, or to instruments under seal,

though if the seal were unnecessary, the principal may

be held liable on the consideration, if he has ratified

or accepted the benefit of the contract. In other words,

he may be held liable upon an implied contract to pay

for the benefit so received.

See Byington v. Simpson, 134 Mass. 169. 45 Am. Rep. 814, Cas.

Ag. 558; Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357. 21 Am. Rep. 617. Cas. Ag.

128 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§§ 242-244.

436; Mahoney v. McLean, 26 Minn. 415; Badger Silver Min. Co. v.

Drake, 31 C. C. A. 378, 88 Fed. Rep. 48.

In Texas the rule does not apply to conveyances of real estate

though not under seal: Sanger v. Warren, 91 Tex. 472, 44 S. W. Rep.

477. 66 Am. St. Rep. 913.

Specific performance may be had of a contract to buy land:

Waddill v. Sebree, 88 Vt. 1012, 14 S. E. Rep. 849, 29 Am. St. Rep.766.

§243. Agent also remains liable. — This liability

of the undisclosed principal is an additional, and not

an exclusive one; that is to say, the third person is

not obliged to pursue the principal when discovered.

He may do so at his option. The agent also remains

liable, and the creditor, if he prefers, may pursue him

because he was the party with whom he contracted.

See Beymer v. Bonsall, 79 Penn. St. 298, Cas. Ag. 554.

IL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AGENT'S STATEMENTS, ETC.

§ 214. What statements, etc., bind the principal.

— The responsibility of the principal is net necessarily

confined to what the agent does: it may in many cases
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include also what he says. Indeed the agent may be

authorized expressly and solely to make. statements or

representations; but even where his chief duty is to act,

the authority will include power to say whatever natu-

rally and appropriately accompanies, characterizes or

explains the thing done. The rule is this: The state-

ments, representations and admissions of the agent,

made while acting within the scope of his authority —

(him fervet opus, as it is sometimes put — and in refer-

ence to the subject matter of his agency are admissible

against the principal if the agent's authority has first

been shown by other evidence.

See Sidney School Furniture Co. v. Warsaw School District, 122

Pa. 494, 15 Atl. Rep. 881, 9 Am. St. Rep. 124; Albert v. Mutual

Life Ins. Co., 122 N. C. 92, 30 S. E. Rep. 327, 65 Am. St. Rep. 693;

Larson v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 110 Mo. 234, 19 S. W. Rep.

§§ 244-246.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 129

416, 33 Am. St. Rep. 439; Adams Express Co. v. Harris, 120 Ind.

73, 21 N. E. Rep. 340, 16 Am. St. Rep. 315, 7 L. R. A. 214; Cleveland,

etc., Ry. Co. v. Closser, 126 Ind. 318, 2G N. E. Rep. 159, 9 L. R. A.

754; Worthington v. Gwin, 119 Ala. 44, 24 So. Rep. 739, 43 L. R. A.

382.

§ 245. The power to bind the principal by what

is thus said is implied because it is a part of tin- act

authorized to be done — because it tends to characterize

or explain it, or because it is a natural and appropriate

accompaniment of it. It follows, therefore, that the

power exists only while the act is being performed.

The agent has no implied power to make nana (ions

concerning past transactions. It is only while he is

acting within the scope of his authority that the state-

ments are relevant. Hence the rule that, in order to be

considered as made while he was acting within the

scope of his authority, the statements, representations

or admissions must be made cither while the agent is

actually engaged in the execution of his authority, or

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 16:56 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t7dr2xb9s
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

so soon thereafter as to be really a part of the same

transaction. In other words, they must constitute a.

part of the res gestae.

See Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99, Cas. Ag.

572; Jammison v. Chesapeake, etc., Ry. Co., 92 Va. 327, 23 S. E. Rep.

758, 53 Am. St. Rep. 813; Borland v. Nevada Bank, 99 Cal. 89, 33

Pac. Rep. 737, 37 Am. St. Rep. 32; Barker v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co..

126 Mo. 143, 28 S. W. Rep. 866, 26 L. R. A. 843; Carroll v. East Ten-

nessee, etc., R. Co., 82 Ga. 452, 10 S. E. Rep. 163, 6 L. R. A. 214;

Giberson v. Patterson Mills Co., 174 Pa. 369, 34 Atl. Rep. 563, 52 Am.

St. Rep. 823.

ni. RESPONSIBILITY FOR MATTERS BROUGHT TO KNOWL-

EDGE OF AGENT.

§246. When notice to agent is notice to prin-

cipal. — The question of notice or knowledge occupies

a large place in our law. The duty to take action often

arises only upon notice of some fact or condition; the

\ 30 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§ 246.

obligation to make repairs or take precautions exists

often only upon notice of their need; whether one ob-

tains a perfect title or a defeasible one depends in many

cases upon his having or not having notice of prior

liens or defen •es; etc. Assuming that notice or knowl-

edge might, in a given case, affect the principal if it

came to him personally, the question at once arises, how-

will he be affected by notice to or knowledge of his

agent? In respect of this, the rule is, that the law-

charges the principal with notice of any fact, relating

to the subject matter of the agency, which the agent

acquires or obtains while acting as such agent and

within the scope of his authority. Many, but not all,

cases go further and charge the principal not only with

the notice or knowledge which the agent acquires during

the agency, but also with that which he may previously

have acquired and then has in mind, or which he had

acquired so recently as to reasonably warrant the as-

sumption that he then remembered it.
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The English courts impute to the principal the knowledge pos-

sessed by the agent though he acquired it before he became agent.

Dresser v. Norwood, 17 Com. B. (N. S.) 466; Rolland v. Hart, L. R.

6 Ch. App. 678. The Supreme Court of the United States does the

same, The Distilled Spirits Case, 11 Wall. 367. The lower Federal

courts of course follow this ruling: Brown v. Iron & Coal Co., 18

C. C. A. 444, 25 U. S. App. 679, 72 Fed. Rep. 96.

And it is the rule sustained by the weight of authority: Con-

stant v. University, 111 N. Y. 604, 7 Am. St. Rep. 769, Cas. Ag. 560;

Brothers v. Bank, 84 Wis. 381, 54 N. W. Rep. 786, 36 Am. St. Rep.

932; Wilson v. Minnesota Ins. Ass'n, 36 Minn. 112, 1 Am. St. Rep.

659; Snyder v. Partridge. 138 111. 173, 32 Am. St. Rep. 130; Trentor

v. Pothen, 46 Minn. 298, 24 Am. St. Rep. 225, and note; Fairfield

Savings Bank v. Chase, 72 Me. 226, 39 Am. Rep. 319; McClelland v.

Saul, 113 Iowa 208, 84 N. W. Rep. 1034, 86 Am. St. Rep. 370.

Certain of the State courts limit the rule to knowledge acquired

during the agency. Thus, Alabama, Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala.

398, 5 So. Rep. 190, 2 L. R. A. 808, Cas. Ag. 362; Pennsylvania,

Houseman v. Girard, etc., Ass'n, 81 Penn. St. 256; etc.

Notice after the termination of the agency, of course, does not

bind: Boardman v. Taylor, 66 Ga. 638.

§§246-247.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 131

The notice or knowledge which is so to be imput d

to tlie principal must relate to the subject matter of the

agency, and not to some other matter concerning which

the agent has neither duty nor authority. It mi . ap-

pear to be material, and it must come from such au

apparently authentic and reliable source that an ordi-

narily prudent man would be bound to give heed to it.

See Fairfield Sav. Bank v. Chase, 72 Me. 226, 39 Am. Rep.

Trentor v. Pothen, 46 Minn. 298, 49 N. W. Rep. 129, 24 Am. St. Rep.

225; Congar v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 24 Wis. 157, 1 Am. Rep. 164;

Shafer v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 361; Kearney Bank v. Froman,

129 Mo. 427, 31 S. W. Rep. 769, 50 Am. St. Rep. 456; Washington

Nat. Bank v. Pierce, 6 Wash. 491, 33 Pac. Rep. 972, 36 Am. St. Rep.

174.

§ 247. Three exceptions to the rule exist: Such

notice will not be charged to the principal —

1. Where it is such as it is the agent's duty to some

other principal not to disclose.

Thus, for example, much information comes to an attorney
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which it is his duty to his client not to disclose — in the language of

the law, it is privileged. Such information will not be imputed

to another client of the attorney, because the law will not require

him to violate his duty to one client in order to perform what other-

wise might be his duty to some other client. See Melms v. Pabst

Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 153, 66 N. W. Rep. 244, 57 Am. St. Rep. 899;

Akers v. Rowan, 33 S. Car. 451, 12 S. E. Rep. 165, 10 L. R. A. 705.

2. Where the agent, though nominally acting as

such, is really acting in his own or another's interest

and adversely to his principal.

In such a case, the agent really ceases to be agent at all. The

law does not permit him to be an agent in such a case, and it does

not presume that he will perform a duty which his adverse interest

renders certain that he will not perform. See Atlantic Mills v. In-

dian Orchard Mills, 147 Mass. 268, 9 Am. St. Rep. 698; Innerarity v.

Bank, 139 Miss. 332, 52 Am. Rep. 710, Cas. Ag. 569; Frenkel v. Hud-

sou, 82 Ala. 158, 60 Am. Rep. 736; Dillaway v. Butler. 135 Mass.

479; Gunster v. Scranton Power Co., 181 Pa. 327, 37 Atl. Rep. 550.

59 Am. St. Rep. 650; Hickman v. Creen, 123 Mo. 165, 29 L. R. A. 39;
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Allen v. South Boston R. Co., 150 Mass. 200, 22 N. B. Rep. 917, 15

Am. St. Rep. 185, 5 L. R. A. 716.

3. Where the person who claims the benefit of the

notice had colluded with the agent to cheat or defraud

the principal.

See National L. Ins. Co. v. Minch, 53 N. Y. 144; Western Mortg.

Co. v. Ganzer. 11 C. C. A. 371, 23 U. S. App. 608, 63 Fed. Rep. 647;

Hudson v. Randc'ph, 13 C. C. A. 402, 23 U. S. App. 681, 66 Fed. Rep.

216.

§ 248. Basis of rule.— The rule that notice to

the agent is notice to the principal finds its origin in

the duty, already considered, resting upon the agent

to inform his principal of all matters coming to his

notice or knowledge, concerning the subject matter of

the agency, which it is material for the principal to

know for his protection or guidance. So far as third

persons are concerned, however, the law will not per-

mit the principal to escape the consequences of notice

by alleging that his own agent has not performed his
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duty. The rule, therefore, does not depend upon

whether or not the agent has actually communicated

his knowledge to the principal; the law presumes that

he has done so and charges the principal, although in

fact he knew nothing about it.

o

See ante § 189; Cox v. Pearce, 112 N. Y. 637, 20 N. E. Rep. 566,

3 L. R. A. 563.

§ 249. Notice to sub-agent. — Whether notice to a

sub-agent is notice to the principal depends upon

whether the sub-agent, under the rules already con-

sidered, is to be regarded as the agent of the principal

or of the original agent only. If, having been ap-

pointed with the express or the implied authority of the

principal, the sub-agent is deemed the agent of the

principal, notice to him, within the limits affecting any

agent, is notice to his principal ; otherwise, it is not.

§§ 249-251.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 133

See Hoover v. Wise, 91 U. S. 308; Bates v. American Mortgage

Co., 37 S. Car. 88, 16 S. E. Rep. 883, 21 L. R. A. 340.

§250. Notice to one of several agents. — Notice

to ODe of two or more joint agents is notice to the prin-

cipal. So notice to one of several but not joint agents

will be notice to the principal if it relates to matters

concerning which such agent is under a duty to disclose.

See Wittenbrcck v. Parker, 102 Cal. 93, 36 Pac. Rep. 374, 41 Am.

St. Rep. 172; Fulton Bank v. Canal Co. 4 Paige (N. Y.) 127; North

River Bank v. Aymar, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 262.

§ 251. Notice to agents of corporations. — The rules

respecting notice are of constant application in the

case of corporations.

See Johnson v. First National Bank, 79 Wis. 414, 48 N. W. Rep.

712, 24 Am. St. Rep. 722; Morris v. Georgia Loan Co., 109 Ga. 12,

34 S. E. Rep. 378, 46 L. R. A. 506; Hotchkiss Co. t. National Bank,

15 C. C. A. 284, 37 U. S. App. 86, 68 Fed. Rep. 76; Cooper v. Hill, 36

C. C. A. 402, 94 Fed. Rep. 582; Wilson t. Pauly, 18 C. C. A. 475, 37

r. S. App. 642, 72 Fed. Rep. 129; Hamilton v. Ins. Co., 98 Mich. 535,
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57 N. W. Rep. 735, 22 L. R. A. 527; Johnston Harvester Co. v. Mil-

ler, 72 Mich. 265, 40 N. W. Rep. 429, 16 Am. St. Rep. 536; Home Ins.

Co. v. Mendenhall, 164 111. 458, 45 N. E. Rep. 1078, 36 L. R. A. 374.

But by reason of the fact that corporations often

have many agents with a great variety of duties and

scattered, not infrequently, over a wide range of terri-

tory, it is indispensable that the notice or knowledge

should be acquired or possessed while the agent in ques-

tion was acting as such, and should relate to some mat-

ter within the scope of his authority.

See cases Nat. Bank v. Clark, 139 N. Y. 307, 34 N. E. Rep. 908,

36 Am. St. Rep. 705; Commercial Bank v. Burgwyn, 110 N. Car.

267, 14 S. E. Rep. 623, 17 L. R. A. 326; Phccnix Ins. Co. v. Flem-

ming, 65 Ark. 54, 44 S. W. Rep. 464, 39 L. R. A. 789.

The exeex>tions to the general rule also apply here.

The one most frequently applied is the second, namely,

that if though sometimes agent he w T a« not acting as
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such in the transaction in question, or though ostensibly

agent was really acting adversely to his principal, or

attempting to defraud him, the notice is not imputed.

See Allen v. South Boston R. Co.. 150 Mass. 200, 22 N. E. Rep.

917, 15 Am. St. Rep. 185, 5 L. R. A. 716; Seaverns v. Presbyterian

Hospital, 173 111. 414, 50 N. E. Rep. 1079, 64 Am. St Rep. 125; Ship-

man v. Bank, 126 N. Y. 318, 12 L. R. A. 791; National Bank of Com-

merce v. Feeney, 9 S. Dak. 550, 70 N. W. Rep. 874, 46 L. R. A. 732;

Dorr v. Life Ins. Co., 71 Minn. 38, 73 N. W. Rep. 635, 70 Am. St. Rep.

309; Holm v. Atlas Nat. Bank, 28 C. C. A. 297, 55 U. S. App. 570,

84 Fed. Rep. 119; Hadden v. Dooley, 34 C. C. A. 338, 63 U. S. App.

173, 92 Fed. Rep. 274; American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133,

42 L. ed. 977; Thompson, etc., Co. v. Capitol Co., 12 C. C. A. 643, 22

U. S. App. 669, 65 Fed. Rep. 341.

IV. LIABILITY FOR AGENT'S TORTS AND CRIMES.

§252. Foundation of liability for agent's torts.

— It very rarely happens that a principal confers ex-

press authority for the commission of torts, or con-

templates in any way that they will be committed. It
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is verv rare, too, that the commission of a tort can be

of benefit to the principal; it is much more likely to

work to his disadvantage. It is likely, therefore, that

instead of authorizing a tort, the principal will caution

or direct against it, and, in employing agents, will ex-

ercise precautions to employ none but those who will

avoid the commission of torts.

Notwithstanding all his precautions, however, and

although he may have expressly forbidden the commis-

sion of such acts, the principal, in many cases> is held

responsible in law for torts committed by his agents.

He is so held, in the ordinary case, not because he di-

rected the commission of the tort, but because he au-

thorized the doing of some other act in the doing of

which the tort was committed, and to which it was an

attribute or incident, however much deplored and un-

expected.

§§252 254.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. L35

The rule in this respect is that —

§ 253. Principal's liability for agent's torts. — The

principal is liable to thin! persons in damages for the

negligence, trespasses, frauds, misrepresentations and

deceits of his agent committed while the agent was act-

ing in the execution of his undertaking and within the

scope of his authority.

The older cases hold the principal not liable for the

agent's wilful and malicious acts, but the modern rule

is that he is liable for these also if the agent committed

them while he was acting in the execution of his agency

and within the scope of his authority.

It is entirely immaterial that the principal did not

direct or know of the act complained of, or even that

he disapproved or forbade it, if it were done while the

agent, as has been stated, was acting in the execution

of his agency and within the scope of his authority.

See Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, Cas. Ag. 8; Wilson v.

Owens, 16 Ir. L. Rep. 225, Cas. Ag. 9; Bank v. Railroad Co., 106 N.
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Y. 195, 60 Am. Rep. 440, Cas. Ag. 576; Friedlander v. Railway Co.,

130 U. S. 416, Cas. Ag. 579; Southern Express Co. v. Brown, 67 Miss.

260, 19 Am. St. Rep. 306; Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117, 25 N.

E. Rep. 14. 23 Am. St. Rep. 809; Cosgrove v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255,

10 Am. Rep. 361; Garretzen v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104, 11 Am. Rep.

405; Phelon v. Stiles, 43 Conn. 426; Fifth Ave. Bank v. Forty-second

Street, etc., Ry. Co.. 137 N. Y. 231, 33 N. E. Rep. 378, 33 Am. St.

Rep. 712; Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach Co., 148 N. Y. 652, 43 N. E.

Rep. 68. 51 Am. St. Rep. 727; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Higdon,

94 Ala. 286, 10 So. Rep. 282, 33 Am. St. Rep. 119; Eichengreen v.

Railroad Co., 96 Tenn. 229, 34 S. W. Rep. 219, 54 Am. St. Rep. 833.

§ 254. The act will be deemed to have been done

while the agent was 11ms acting in the execution of

his agency and within the scope of his authority, if it

were done while the agent was engaged in doing that

which he was authorized to do — if the default com-

plained of were a part of, or incident to, or

interwoven With, the act authorized. Certainly
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if the thing complained of were designed to

facilitate or promote the act authorized, of which

it thus formed a part — if it were intended how-

ever mistakenly, to further the principal's business,

promote his welfare or protect his interests in matters

concerning which the agent was then acting and au-

thorized to act — it would be within the rule. But so

much as this cannot be required; for it is clear, by the

modern authorities at least, that though the agent at

the moment may not have had the principal's interests

in mind, though he may have been roused to resent-

ment, puffed up by brief authority, or quickened by

mere wantonness, still if he did the act complained of

while he was engaged, in the course of his employment,

in the performance of an act authorized to be per-

formed, the principal will be responsible. Especially is

this true, though it is not the criterion, where the in-

strument or means of injury is some implement, tool,

machine or other agency with which he has been in-
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trusted by the principal for the execution of his

authoritv.

See Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Starnes, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 52, 24 Am.

Rep. 296; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dickson, 63 111. 151, 14 Am. Rep.

114; Southern Express Co. v. Platten, 36 C. C. A. 46, 93 Fed. Rep.

936.

§ 255. In the case of carriers of passengers who

owe their passengers a special duty of protection, and

others in like situation, the rule may, perhaps, be more

broadly stated. For if a principal who owes such a

duty entrusts its performance to an agent, he will not

only be liable if it be not performed, but he will clearly

be responsible if the agent not only does not perform

it, but adds to the wrong of non-performance the ag-

gravation of vranton, wilful or malicious injury.

See Craker v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 17 Am. Rep.

§5 255-258.] DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. 1 37

501; Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180, 8 Am. Rep. 311; Stewart v. Brook-

lyn, etc., R. Co., 90 N. Y. 588, 43 Am. Rep. 185; Chicago, etc., R. Co.

v. Flexman, 103 111. 546, 42 Am. Rep. 33; McKinky v. Chicago, etc.

Ry. Co., 44 Iowa 314, 24 Am. Rep. 748.

See the same principle applied to telegraph companies in McCord

v. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Minn. 181, 39 N. W. Rep. 315, 12 Am.

St. Rep. 636, and as to the duty to furnish safe appliances, etc.:

New York, etc., R. Co. t. O'Leary, 35 C. C. A. 562, 93 Fed. Rep. 737.

§ 256. The doctrine of ratification is constantly

applied, and the rule that he who with knowledge of

the facts receives the fruits or takes the benefits of an

act, must adopt also the liabilities, is especially appli-

cable. Frequent illustrations are found in cases where-

in false representations have been made by the agent

to obtain the benefit which the principal has appro-

priated.

See Mayer r. Dean, 115 N. Y. 556, 22 N. E. Rep. 261, 5 L. R. A.

540; Fairchild v. McMahon, 139 N. Y. 290, 34 N. E. Rep. 779. 36 Am.

St. Rep. 701; Meyerhoff v. Daniels, 173 Pa. St. 555, 34 Atl. Rep. 298,
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51 Am. St. Rep. 782; Baltimore Trust Co. t. Hambleton, 84 Md. 456,

36 Atl. Rep. 597, 40 L. R. A. 216; Hoffman y. Mayand, 35 C. C. A.

256, 93 Fed. Rep. 171; Kilpatrick v. Haley, 13 C. C. A. 480, 66 Fed.

Rep. 133.

§ 257. The rule of liability extends also to the

acts of sub-agents, where they have been so appointed,

within the principles already considered, as to make

them in law the agents of the principal.

See Arff t. Ins. Co., 125 N. Y. 57, 25 N. E. Rep. 1073, 10 L. R. A.

609; Goode v. Ins. Co., 92 Va. 392, 23 S. E. Rep. 744, 30 L. R. A. 842;

Steele v. Ins. Co., 93 Mich. 81, 53 N. W. Rep. 514, IS L. R. A. 85.

§ 258. Limitations.— It is not to be assumed, how-

ever, that the principal is responsible for every act

which his agent may commit. If the agent has finished

that which he was authorized to do, or if he leaves the

principal's affairs to attend to some matter of his own,

and then commits the act complained of, the principal

will not be responsible. So if, prompted by curiosity

1 38 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§§ 258-259.

or ill-will, he is where he has no business to be — where

he has no duty to perform, where his authority does

not call him — if he be engaged in that which does not

concern his principal — and then commits the tort, the

principal is not liable.

See Mitchell v. Crassweller, 13 Com. B. 237; Storey v. Ashton, L.

R. 4 Q. B. 476; Maddox v Brown, 71 Me. 432, 36 Am. Rep. 336; Stone

v. Hills, 45 Conn. 44, 29 Am. Rep. 635; Adams v. Cost, 62 Md. 264,

50 Am. Rep. 211.

§ 259. Principal's liability for agent's criminal

acts.— The principal may also be held liable in a civil

action for the criminal or penal act of his agent com-

mitted under the same circumstances. Thus the agent

may be prosecuted for assault and battery and the

principal be held liable in damages, as the result of the

same act.

The principal will not ordinarily be criminally liable

unless he has, in some way, participated in, counte-

nanced or approved the act; but he may become liable
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to a penalty for permitting his agent to perform acts

which a statute has imposed a penalty for performing.

If, for example, a statute forbids, under penalty, the

sale of liquors to minors, or the keeping open of saloons

on Sunday, the principal will be liable for the penalty

if the forbidden act be done by the agent, even though

the principal had no knowledge of it.

See State v. Kittelle, 110 N. C. 560, 28 Am. St. Rep. 698; People

v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 50 Am. Rep. 270; State v. Armstrong, 106

Mo. 395, 16 S. W. Rep. 604, 27 Am. St. Rep. 361; Hall v. Norfolk &

West. R. Co., 44 W. Va. 36, 28 S. E. Rep. 754, 67 Am. St. Rep. 757;

Commonwealth v. Stevens, 153 Mass. 421, 26 N. E. Rep. 992, 25 Am.

St. Rep. 647, 11 L. R. A. 357; Commonwealth v. Joslin, 158 Mass.

482, 33 N. E. Rep. 653, 21 L. R. A. 449.

§§ 260-262.] DUTIES OF THIRD PERSONS TO AGENT.
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CHAPTER XV.

OF THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THIRD PERSONS TO

THE AGENT.

§ 260. In general.

1. In Contract.

261. Agent usually no right of

action.

262. Sealed instruments or ne-

gotiable instruments

made in agent's name.

§ 3. Contracts made without

disclosing principal, etc.

264 What defences may be

made.

2. In Tort.

265. What actions maintaina-

ble.

§ 260. In general. — The question of the liability of
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the third person to the agent may present the same two

aspects which have been noticed in the preceding sub-

divisions, namely, the liability: 1. In Contract. 2. In

Tort.

1. In Contract.

§261. Agent usually no right of action. — The

agent usually has no right of action against third per-

sons upon contracts made by him with them for his prin-

cipal. His duty is, in general, as has been seen, to act in

the name as well as for the benefit of his principal ; and

where he has done so, the rights of action must of course

accrue to th,e principal.

Exceptional cases, however, may arise which require

exceptions to the rule.

§ 262. Sealed instruments or negotiable instru-

ments made in agent's name.— Thus, if, though acting

for the principal, the agent makes a contract under seal

in his own name, or if he takes a negotiable instrument

payable to himself alone, the action must be brought

in the name of the agent, though the recovery will be

for the benefit of the principal.
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§ 263. Contracts made without disclosing princi-

pal, etc. — So in other cases than those mentioned in the

preceding section, if the agent makes a contract without

disclosing his principal, or if he makes a written con-

tract in his own name, the action may be brought in the

name of the agent because it was made in his name.

See Deitz v. Insurance Co., 31 W. Va. 851, 8 S. E. Rep. 616, 13

Am. St. Rep. 909; Carter v. Southern Ry. Co., Ill Ga. 38, 50 L. R.

A, 354.

But in cases other than those referred to in the pre-

ceding section this right of action in the agent is usually

not exclusive. Because the contract was made for the

principal, he may ordinarily enforce in his own name

or permit the agent to sue. And where the principal

may sue (a matter to be discussed more fully in the

following chapter), his right is paramount, and he may

always sue to the exclusion of the agent, unless the

aeent had some beneficial interest in the contract.

See Rhoades v. Blackiston, 106 Mass. 334, 8 Am. Rep. 332, Cas.
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Ag. 584; Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206, Cas. Ag. 257; Thompson v.

Kelly, 101 Mass. 291, 3 Am. Rep. 353, Cas. Ag. 653; Wilson v.

Groelle, 83 Wis. 530, 53 N. W. Rep. 900.

§264. What defences may be made.— When the

agent sues in his own name, the other party may ordi-

narily make any defence against the agent which he

may have, either against the agent or against the prin-

cipal in whose behalf the action is brought.

See Gibson v. Winter, 5 B. & Ad. 96; Gardner v. Allen, 6 Ala.

187, 41 Am. Dec. 45. Set off of claim against the principal cannot

be made if would defeat agent's right to reimbursement for ad-

vances: Young v. Thurber, 91 N. Y. 388.

2. In Tort.

§ 205. "What actions maintainable. — The agent may

sue third persons in tort for injuries done by them to

property of the principal confided to the agent's posses-

§265.] DUTIES OF THIRD PERSONS TO AGENT. 141

sion — certainly wherever he has a special property in

the goody, possibly in any case.

See Moore v. Robinson, 2 Barn. & Adol. 817, 22 Eng. Com. L. 344.

Compare I ick v. Jerome, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 294; Pullman Car

Co. v. Gavin, 93 Tenn. 53, 23 S. W. Rep. 70, 21 L. R. A. 298.

He may also recover of third persons in tort for frauds

or deceits practiced by them upon him while he was en-

gaged in making contracts with them on the principal's

account, and which have rendered him liable to his prin-

cipal.

He may also recover of them for damages caused by

their wrongfully procuring his dismissal by his princi-

pal; and for slander or other wrong whereby they de-

prive him of his right to earn the stipulated compensa-

tion or commission.

Seo Lucke v. Clothing Cutters Assembly, 77 Md. 396, 19 L. R. A.

x08; Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219, 33 L. R. A. 225; Whittemore

v. Weiss, 33 Mich. 318; Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me. 166, 38 Atl. Rep.
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96, 60 Am. St. Rep. 252.

142 DUTIES OF THIRD PERSON TO PRINCIPAL. [§§ 266-267.

CHAPTER XVI.

OF THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THIRD PERSONS TO

THE PRINCIPAL.

§ 266, In general.

1. In Contract.

267. What contracts principal

may enforce.

268. "What defences open.

269. Right to follow and recov-

er money or property.

§ 270. Right to rescind unau-

thorized dealings.

2. In Tort.

271. Right to recover damages

for collusion.

272. Recovery for enticing

agent away, disabling

him, etc.

§ 266. In general. — The question of the duties and
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liabilities of third persons to the principal, presenting

the same general aspects as the preceding ones, may be

considered under the same classification: 1. In Con-

tract, and 2. In Tort,

1. In Contract.

§267. What contracts principal may enforce. —

The principal may enforce against third persons all law-

ful contracts made in his own name with them by his

agent. This is, of course, the ordinary and familiar

case. Here the principal will be disclosed and the con-

tract will be made in his name and in his behalf.

He may also show himself to be the principal and

enforce contracts, whether written or unwritten, made

on his behalf with them by his agent, though he was not

disclosed at the time of the contract and the contract

was made in the agent's name, except in the cases men-

tioned in the preceding subdivision, namely, contracts

under seal and negotiable instruments payable to the

agent only.

§§ U67-269.J DUTIES OF THIRD PERSON TO PRINCIPAL. 143

See Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 371, Cases on Ag. 587;

Ilarkness v. W. U. Tel. Co., 73 Iowa, 190, 5 Am. St. Rep. 672; Mil-

liken v. W. U. Tel. Co., 110 N. Y. 403, 1 L. R. A. 281; Powell v.

Wade, 109 Ala. 95, 19 So. Rep. 500, 55 Am. St. Rep. 915, and note;

Kingsley v. Siebrecht, 92 Me. 23, 42 Atl. Rep. 249, 69 Am. St. Rep.

486.

If the agent has a property interest in the contract

equal to its value, or if the contract were really made

with the agent as the contracting party, to the exclusion

of the principal, as where the third person with knowl-

edge of the principal has elected to deal only with the

agent, these cases also would be exceptions.

§ 2G8. What defences open. — In an action by the

principal, the other party may make any defences which

he may have against the principal, and also, usually, any

defence, such as payment or set-off, which he may have

acquired against the agent before the discovery of the

principal, if the principal was not disclosed and the

agent was permitted to appear as the ostensible prin-
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cipal.

See Baxter v. Sherman, 73 Minn. 434, 76 N. W. Rep. 211, 72 Am.

St. Rep. 631; Belfield v. National Supply Co., 189 Pa. 189, 42 Atl.

Rep. 131, 69 Am. St. Rep. 799; Rosser v. Darden, 82 Ga. 219, 7 S. E.

Rep. 919, 14 Am. St. Rep. 152; Montagu v. Forwood [1893], 2 Q.

B. 350.

The principal must also, of course, be affected by any

defences growing out of the fraud, misrepresentation

or deceit of the agent in securing the contract.

See Honaker v. Board of Education, 42 W. Va. 170, 24 S. E. Rep.

544, 57 Am. St. Rep. 847, 32 L. R. A. 413.

>: 209. Right to follow and recover money or prop-

erty. — Where property or money belonging to the

principal comes into the hands of the agent for some

particular purpose, use or disposition, such property or

money becomes charged with a trust which can not be

144 DUTIES OF THIRD PERSON TO PRINCIPAL. [§ 269.

defeated except by the act of the principal or the greater

equities of some third person. Any disposition of the

property or money contrary to the purpose for which

the agent received it is unauthorized, and the person

who received it must restore it to the principal unless

he can establish a paramount right. Third persons,

therefore, who by fraud, collusion or sharp practices

obtain such property or money may be compelled to

restore it. And even if the third person has obtained

it in good faith, he must still return it unless he can

show that he is a bona fide holder for value without

notice of the trust.

In the case of ordinary chattels a person, however

free from bad faith he may be or however good a con-

sideration he may give, can obtain no better title than

his grantor had, unless the true owner has done some-

thing which estops him from asserting his title. In the

case of negotiable instruments and money, which is

sometimes said to have no "earmark" by which it may
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beMistinguished, one who parts with value in good faith

may be protected.

In pursuing his property or money, it makes no dif-

ference how much it has been changed in form, or

through how many hands it has passed; the principal

may recover it if he can identify it, and if it has not

come into the hands of a bona fide holder for value.

See Farmers' Bank v. King, 57 Penn. 202, 98 Am. Dec. 215, Cas.

Ag. 590; Baker v. N. Y. Bank, 100 N. Y. 31, 53 Am. Rep. 150, '

Ag 596; Roca v. Byrne, 145 N. Y. 182, 39 N. E. Rep. 812, 45 Am. St.

Rep. 599; Midland National Bank v. Brightwell, 148 Mo. 358, 49 S.

W. Rep. 994, 71 Am. St. Rep. 608; First Nat. Bank v. Hummel, 14

Colo. 259, 23 Pac. Rep. 986, 8 L. R. A. 788; Holly v. Domestic, etc.,

Society, 34 C. C. A. 649, 92 Fed. Rep. 745; Gerard v. McCormick, 130

N. Y. 261, 29 N. E. Rep. 115, 14 L. R. A. 234; Dorrah v. Hill, 73

Miss. 787,' 19 So. Rep. 961, 32 L. R. A. 631; Stevenson v. Kyle, 42

W. Va. 229, 24 S. E. Rep. 888, 57 Am. St. Rep. 854; Gilman Oil Co.

V. Norton, 89 Iowa 434, 56 N. W. Rep. 663, 48 Am. St. Rep. 400.

§§ 270-272.] DUTIES OF THIRD PERSON TO PRINCIPAL. 145

§ 270. Right to rescind dealings where agent

secretly in employment of other party. — As has been

seen, an agent cannot, consistently with his duty, under-

take to represent his principal where he is at the same

time secretly in the employment of the other party.

Where, therefore, he was thus at the same time secretly

in the employment of the other party, the principal is

not bound, and he may, if he so elects, rescind dealings

with the other party and recover from him what he has

parted with to him.

As has been seen also, it is not necessary for the prin-

cipal in such a case to show that he has been injured

or that the agent has in fact betrayed his interests; his

right to repudiate the transaction is absolute, provided

he acts promptly and before the rights of innocent third

parties have intervened.

See New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. National Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 85;

United States Rolling Stock Co. v. Atlantic R. Co., 34 Ohio St. 450,

32 Am. Rep. 380.
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2. In Tort

§ 271. Right to recover damages for collusion. —

The principal may also recover damages from third per-

sons who have colluded with his agent to defraud him;

and he may recover money which such persons have

received from him by virtue of such collusion, or may

defeat a recovery against himself by showing such col-

lusion.

See Boston v. Simmons, 150 Mass. 461, Cas. Ag. 598, 15 Am. St.

Rep. 230; Mayor of Salford v. Lever [1891], 1 Q. B. Div. 168, Cas.

Ag. 601; City of Findlay v. Pertz, 13 C. C. A. 559, 66 Fed. Rep. 427,

29 L. R. A. 188; Glaspie v. Keator, 5 C. C. A. 474, 56 Fed. Rep. 203;

Sbipway v. Broadwood [1899], 1 Q. B. 369.

l'72. Recovery for enticing agent away, disa-

bling him, etc. — The principal may also maintain ac-

10

146 DUTIES OF THIRD PERSON TO PRINCIPAL. [§ 272.

tions of tort against third persons who maliciously en-

tice his agent to break his contract of service, or who

prevent him from performing, or who so injure him as

to disable him from performing.

See Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601, 16 Am. Rep. 780; St. Johns-

bury R. R. Co. v. Hunt, 55 Vt. 570, 45 Am. Rep. 639, Cas. Ag. 608;

O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 236, 37 Atl. Rep. 843, 61 Am. St. Rep.

702; Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 111. 608, 52 N. E. Rep. 924, 68 Am.
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St. Rep. 203.

§273.]

SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS.

147

CHAPTER XVII.

OP SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS

§ 273. In general.

1. Of Attorneys at Law.

274. Relation of attorney to

client.

275. How appointed.

276. Duration of relation.

277. Implied powers of attor-

ney.

278. Attorney bound to utmost

loyalty and honor.

279. Dealings between attor-

ney and client.

280. Confidential communica-

tions privileged.

281. Liability of attorney to
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client.

282. Liability of attorney to

third persons.

283. Attorney's right to com-

pensation.

Contingent compen-

sation.

— How reasonable value

284.

shoVn.

286. Attorney entitled to re-

imbursement and in-

demnity.

287. Attorney's lien.

§288.

289.

290.

291.

292.

293.

294.

295.

296.

297,

298.

299.

300.

301-

303.

304.

305

306

307

308

309

310.

311.

2. Of Auctioneers.

How authorized.

Terms of sale.

Implied powers.

Duties to principal.

Liability to third persons.

Compensation and lien.

Liability of principal.

3. Of Brokers.

How appointed.

Implied powers.

Same subject.

Duties to principal.

148 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§278-276.

the Attorney at Law, the Auctioneer, the Broker, and

the Factor.

1. Of Attorneys At Law.

§ 274. Relation of attorney to client. — The attor-

ney at law is an officer of the court in which he prac-

tices, and is in some sense an officer of the State. But

the relation of the attorney to his client is a relation of

agency, and is in general governed by the same rules

which apply to other agencies.

§ 275. How appointed. — No formal power is ordi-

narily necessary, but the attorney's authority may be

shown as in other cases. When a duly admitted attor-

ney appeal's for a party in a cause, the law presumes

that his appearance was authorized, and while this pre-

sumption is not conclusive, it will suffice until some

showing is made to the contrary, and then the attorney

may be required to produce his authority.

See Reynolds v. Fleming, 30 Kan. 106, 46 Am. Rep. 86, Cas. Ag.

615.
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Proceedings taken in reliance upon such an appear-

ance are also presumed to be valid, and only to be im-

peached upon by a direct proceeding. If the principal

is injured by the application of this rule to proceedings

really unauthorized, he has a remedy against the attor-

ney.

See Corbitt v. Timmerman, 95 Mich. 581, 55 N. W. Rep. 437, 35

Am. St. Rep. 586.

§270. Duration of relation. — The employment of

an attorney to conduct a cause is presumed to be an

entire contract on his part for the whole suit, and he

can not lawfully abandon the case before its termina-

tion without just cause and reasonable notice. But on

the part of the client, the engagement is deemed to be

19 17C-277.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. 149

at will merely, and be may discharge the attorney at

any time upon paying him for services already rendered.

See Tenney v. Berger, 93 N. Y. 524, 45 Am. Rep. 263; Under-

wood t. Lewis [1894], 2 Q. B. 306.

§ 277. Implied powers of attorney. — An attorney

at law employed to conduct a case has implied authority

to control the conduct and management of the cause,

and to do all things which are necessary or incidental

to the prosecution or defense of the cause, and which

affect the remedy only and not the right of action. His

acts and stipulations, therefore, which affect the prac-

tice only will bind his client, but he has no implied

power to confess judgment or compromise or release his

client's cause of action, release liens, levies, or securi-

ties, grant extensions of time, or waive or give up the

substantial rights of his client. He may receive pay-

ment of the claim, either before or after judgment, and

may take the necessary steps to enforce the judgment;

but he cannot release the judgment without payment in

ment
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full, or assign it, or receive anything but money in pay-

See Moulton v. Bowker, 115 Mass. 36, 15 Am. Rep. 72, Cas. Ag.

619; Kirk's Appeal, 87 Penn. 243, 30 Am. Rep. 357, Cas. Ag. 621;

Nichells v. Nichells, 5 N. Dak. 125, 64 N. W. Rep. 73, 57 Am. St.

Rep. 540, 33 L, R. A. 515; Smith v. Jones, 47 Neb. 108, 66 N. W.

Rep. 19, 53 Am. St. Rep. 519; Gardner v. Mobile R. Co., 102 Ala.

635, 15 So. Rep. 271, 48 Am. St. Rep. 84; Garrett v. Hanshue, 53

Ohio St. 482, 42 N. E. Rep. 256, 35 L. R. A. 321.

As in the case of other agents, his powers will con-

tinue after a discharge unless notice of that fact be

given.

See Beliveau v. Amoskeag Co., 68 N. H. 225, 40 Atl. 724, U L.

R. A. 167.

150 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§ 278-280.

§ 278. Attorney bound to utmost loyalty and

honor. — The attorney is bound to exercise the highest

honor and integrity towards his client, not to take his

case if he has any adverse interest which will prevent

his giving his individual allegiance to his client, and to

maintain at all times the utmost loyalty to his client's

interests.

See Strong v. International Building Union, 183 111. 97, 55 N. E.

Rep. 675, 47 L. R. A. 792; Darlington's Estate 147 Pa. 624 23 Atl.

Rep. 1046, 30 Am. St. Rep. 776.

Like other agents also he must absolutely refrain

from permitting his own interests to conflict with those

of his client. He may not buy his client's property at

sales in litigation in which he is concerned. He may not

profit by his own defaults or take advantage of his sit-

uation to make gains for himself at his client's expense.

See Olson v. Lamb, 56 Neb. 104, 76 N. W. Rep. 433, 71 Am. St. Rep.

670; Eoff v. Irvine, 108 Mo. 378, 18 S. W. Rep. 907, 32 Am. St. Rep.

609; Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U. S. 494; Cunningham v. Jones,
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37 Kan. 477, 1 Am. St. Rep. 257; Davis v. Kline, 96 Mo. 401, 9 S. W.

Rep. 724, 2 L. R. A. 78.

§ 279. Dealings between attorney and client. —

Dealings between attorney and client must be charac-

terized by the utmost fairness and good faith. Some

cases hold them absolutely voidable at the option of the

client, but the true rule seems to be that while they will

be scrutinized with great strictness, they will be upheld

if they are entirely fair and voluntary, but of this the

attorney has the burden of proof.

See Elmore v. Johnson, 143 111. 513, 32 N. E. Rep. 413, 36 Am.

St. Rep. 401, 21 L. R. A. 366; James v. Steere, 16 R. I. 367, 16 Atl.

Rep. 143, 2 L. R. A. 164; Barron v. Willis [1900], 2 Ch. 121; Stout

v. Smith, 98 N. Y. 25, 50 Am. Rep. 632, Cas. Ag. 628.

§ 280. Confidential communications privileged. —

Confidential communications made by the client to his

§5 280-281.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGEXTS. 151

attorney, and all information received by the attorney

from the client or from his papers, and of a confidential

nature, arc "privileged," and the attorney will not be

permitted i«» disclose them without the consent of his

client. The operation of the privilege is perpetual

survives not only the relation of attorney and client,

but the lives of the attorney and client as well. It van

only be removed when it becomes necessary for the at-

torney's own protection against his client, or for the

furtherance of public justice.

See Orman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 604, 58 Am. Rep. 662; Mitchell

v. Bromberger, 2 Xev. 345, 90 Am. Dec. 550; Liggett v. Glenn, 2

C. C. A. 286, 51 Fed. Rep. 381; Butler v Fayerweather, 33 C. C. A.

625, 91 Fed. Rep. 458; O'Brien v. Spalding, 102 Ga. 490, 31 S. E.

Rep. 100, 66 Am. St. Rep. 202.

The privilege is the privilege of the client and not of

the attorney; and it may be waived by the client.

See Michael v. Foil, 100 X. Car. 178, 6 S. E. Rep. 264, 6 Am. St.

Rep. 577.
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It exists only when the communication can fairly be

regarded as confidential, and. the relation of attorney

and client must exist.

See Bruley v. Garvin, 105 Wis. 625, 81 X. W. Rep. 1038, 48 L.

R. A. 839. Communications to a law student are not privileged:

Schubkagel v. Dierstein, 131 Pa. 46, 18 Atl. Rep. 1059, 6 L. R. A. 481.

Where several persons employ the same attorney in

the same matter their communications are privileged

as to third persons, but not in a controversy between

themselves.

See Seip's Estate, 163 Pa. 423, 30 Atl. Rep. 226. 43 Am. St. Rep.

803; Haley v. Eureka County Bank, 21 Xev. 127, 26 Pac. Rep. 64.

12 L. R. A. 815.

§281. Liability of attorney to client. — Theattor-

13 ney impliedly agrees with his client that he posses

15.2 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§281-282.

and will exercise a reasonable degree of professional

knowledge, skill and diligence. He does not agree that

he knows all the law and will make no mistakes, but he

will be liable if he is ignorant of the well settled rules

of law or practice, from which his client sustains injury.

He will also be liable to his client for losses sustained

bv him, caused by the failure of the attorney to exercise

reasonable care, skill and diligence in collecting claims,

in bringing suit, in trying the cause, in examining titles,

in preparing contracts, and the like.

He is liable for the neglects and defaults of his part-

ners and clerks in the same manner as for his own. It

is no defence to him that he was acting gratuitously.

See Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa. 532, 37 Atl. Rep. 98, 57 Am. St.

Rep. 662; Citizens', etc., Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N. E.

Rep. 1075, 18 Am. St. Rep. 320, 7 L. R. A. 669; Babbitt v. Bumpus,

73 Mich. 331, 41 N. W. Rep. 417, 16 Am. St. Rep. 585; Midgley v.

Midgley [1893], 3 Ch. 282.

§ 282. Liability of attorney to third persons. —
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The attorney is not liable to third persons for the neg-

lect of duties which he owes to his client only ; but he

may make himself liable to third persons where he con-

tracts with them personally, though on his client's be-

half.

See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195; Houseman v. Girard

Ass'n, 81 Pa. 256; Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. Rep. 900,

52 Am. St. Rep. 88, 31 L. R. A. 862; Atwell v. Jenkins, 163 Mass.

362, 40 N. E. Rep. 178, 28 L. R. A. 694.

He will not ordinarily be liable to third persons who

may be injured by malicious or wrongful actions insti-

tuted by his client in which he was attorney, but he will

be liable if he shares and aids his client's malice, or if he

acts from malice of his own. He will also be liable with

his clienl where he directs the service of void or illegal

process.

§§282-285.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. 153

See Peck v. Chouteau, 91 Mo. 140, 60 Am. Rep. 236; Cook v. Hop-

per, 23 Mich. 511.

§283. Attorney's right to compensation.— Unless

he has undertaken to serve gratuitously, the attorney

is cut ii led to compensation for his lawful services. The

amount to be paid may be fixed by the contract of the

parties or be left to be determined according to the

reasonable value of the service rendered.

See Davis v. Webber, 66 Ark. 190, 49 S. W. Rep. 822, 45 L. R. A.

196; Russell v. Young, 36 C. C. A. 71, 94 Fed. Rep. 45; Bartlett v.

Savings Bank, 79 Cal. 218, 21 Pac. Rep. 743, 12 Am. St. Rep. 139;

Bowman v. Phillips, 41 Kan. 364, 21 Pac. Rep. 230, 13 Am. St. Rep.

292, 3 L. R. A. 631.

§ 284. Contingent compensation. — A contract

for compensation contingent upon success is valid, and,

in most States, it is no less valid because the attorney

is to receive as his compensation a portion of the money

or thins: recovered.

i t>
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See Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548, Cas. Ag. 631; Duke T.

Harper. 66 Mo. 51, 27 Am. Rep. 314.

§ 285 How reasonable value shown. — When

no amount has been agreed upon, the attorney is enti-

tled to recover the reasonable value of his services, and

for the purpose of proving this he may call other law-

yers as witnesses to give their opinion. In such cases

the nature and difficulty of the matter, the amount in-

volved and the character and standing of the attorney

may be considered in determining the value.

See Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548, Cas. Ag. 631; Eggleston v.

Boardman, 37 Mich. 14; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, 136 111.

87, 26 N. E. Rep. 493, 11 L. R. A. 787; Selover v. Bryan;

434, 56 N. W. Rep. 58, 40 Am. St. Rep. 349. 21 L. R. A. 418; Wi .

v. Kohn, 7 C. C. A. 314. 58 Fed. Rep. 462; Davis v. W T ebber, 66 Ark.

190, 49 S. W. Rep. 822, 45 L. R. A. 196.

154 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS [§§ 286-288.

§ 280. Attorney entitled to reimbursement and

indemnity. — The attorney is also entitled to reimburse-

ment for his necessary and legitimate expenses and to

indemnity for liability properly incurred in his client's

behalf.

See Clark v. Randall, 9 Wis. 135, 76 Am. Dec. 252.

§ 287. Attorney's lien. — For the purpose of secur-

ing the payment of his costs and charges, the attorney is

entitled to a lien. This lien is of two kinds:

1. A general or retaining lien which entitles him to

retain his client's papers, property or money in his

hands until his claim is paid; and

2. A special or charging lien, which exists in most

States and which attaches to the judgment, money or

property recovered by the services of the attorney, and

secures the payment of his costs and charges in that

particular suit.

In many States the attorney's lien is regulated by

statute.
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See Goodrich v. McDonald, 112 N. Y. 157, Cas. Ag. 633; In re Wil-

son, 12 Fed. Rep. 235, Cas. Ag. 638; Weeks v. Judges, 73 Mich. 256,

Cas. Ag. 648; .Hanna v. Island Coal Co., 5 Ind. App. 163, 31 N. E.

Rep. 846, 51 Am. St. Rep. 246, and note; Manning v. Leighton, 65

Vt. 84, 26 Atl. Rep. 258, 24 L. R. A. 684; Randall v. Van Wagenen,

115 N. Y. 527, 22 N. E. Rep. 361, 12 Am. St. Rep. 828.

2. Of Auctioneers.

§ 288. How authorized. — The auctioneer does not

require to be authorized in any particular manner,

though the authority must contemplate a sale by auc-

tion, for general authority to sell property does not jus-

tify a sale by auction.

See Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360, 55 Am. Dec. 195, Cas. Ag. 358.

Parol authority is usually sufficient, even to sell land.

See Doty v. Wilder, 15 111. 407, 60 Am. Dec. 756.

§§ 289-291.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. 155

§281). Terms of Bale.— The owner of the property

to be sold has tin' righl to fix the terms and conditions

of the sale, and where they are made known at the sale,

a purchaser can not acquire a good title in violation of

t hem. But secret limitations would not affect the rights

of a purchaser who lias relied in good faith upon the

usual powers exercised by such agents.

See Farr v. John, 23 Iowa, 286, 92 Am. Dec. 426; Bush v. Cole,

28 N. Y. 261. 84 Am. Dec. 343, Cas. Ag. 650.

§ 290. Implied powers. — The auctioneer has implied

authority to accept the bid, and to receive the price,

though he can not sell for anything except money or

receive anything but money in payment of the price. He

may sue in his own name to recover the price of personal

property sold by him. He has no implied power to dele-

gate his authority, or to sell on credit, or to rescind the

sale, or to sell at private sale, or to warrant the quality

of goods sold unless that is usual. Like other agents, he

is disqualified to sell to himself.
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See Thompson v. Kelly, 101 Mass. 291, 3 Am. Rep. 353, Cas. Ag.

653; Boinest v. Leignez, 2 Rich. (S. C.) L. 464, Cas. Ag. 655;

Blood v. French, 9 Gray (Mass.), 197; Dodd v. Farlow, 11 Allen,

426, 87 Am. Dec. 726.

§ 201. Duties to principal. — The auctioneer is

bound to his principal for the exercise of good faith and

for reasonable skill and diligence.

See Hicks v. Minturn, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 550.

He must obey instructions, take reasonable care of

the goods, and account to the principal for their pro-

ceeds.

See Steele v. Ellmaker, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 86; Montgomery v.

Pacific Coast Land Bureau, 94 Cal. 284. 29 Pac. Rep. 640. 28 Am.

St. Rep. 122.

156 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§292-293.

§ 292. Liability to third persons. — The auctioneer

who discloses his principal and sells as agent only, and

within the limits of his authority, incurs no liability to

third persons on the contract of sale, but if he conceals

his principal, he is personally liable upon the contract.

See Bush v. Cole, 28 N. Y. 261, 84 Am. Dec. 343, Cas. Ag. 650;

Seemuller v. Fuchs, 64 Md. 217, 54 Am. Rep. 766.

He is also liable to third persons for injuries which

they may sustain by reason of his acting without au-

thority.

See Dent v. McGrath, 3 Bush (Ky.) 174; Harris v. Nickerson, L.

R. 8 Q. B. 286, Cas. Ag. 659.

It has been held that an auctioneer who receives and

sells the goods of a stranger is liable, even though he

acted in good faith supposing them to be the goods of

the person from whom he received them ; but other cases

hold that he is not so liable where he has paid over the

money to the person from wiiom he received the goods

before he had notice of the fact that such person was not
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the owner. The weight of authority seems to be that

he is liable in these cases also.

See Farebrother v. Ansley, 1 Camp. 343; Higgins v. Lodge, 68

Md. 229, 6 Am. St. Rep. 437, Cas. Ag. 656; Frizzell t. Rundle, 88

Tenn. 396, 17 Am. St. Rep. 908; Robinson v. Bird, 158 Mass' 357, 35

Am. St. Rep. 495; Kearney v. Glutton, 101 Mich. 106, 59 N. W. Rep.

419, 45 Am. St. Rep. 394; Consolidated Co. v. Curtis [1892], 1 Q. B.

495; Milliken v. Hathaway, 148 Mass. 69, 19 N. E. Rep. 16, 1 L. R.

A. 510. A fortiori will be liable if he had notice of the third person's

rights: Morrow Shoe Mfg. Co. v. New England Shoe Co., 6 C. C. A.

508, 57 Fed. Rep. 685, 24 L. R. A. 417.

§293. Compensation and lien. — The auctioneer is

entitled to compensation for his services, and to reim-

bursement for his necessary expenditures and liabilities.

He has a special property hi the goods delivered to him

§§293-295.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. 157

for sale, and a lien upon the goods and their proceeds

for his commissions and charges.

See Webb v. Smith, 30 Ch. Div. 192, Cas. Ag. CC1.

§ 294. Liability of principal for acts of auctioneer.

— The principal is bound, as in any other case of

agency, by the contracts made by the auctioneer with-

in the scope of the authority. And to the same extent

as in other cases, also, he is affected by the represen-

tations which the auctioneer makes in order to effect a

sale.

See Cockcroft v. Muller, 71 N. Y. 3G7; Roberts v. French, 153

Mass. 60, 26 N. E. Rep. 416, 25 Am. St. Rep. 611, 10 L. R. A. 656.

3. Of Brokers.

§ 295. How appointed. — Brokers, as has been seen,

are of many kinds, according- to the special branch of

trade which they pursue, but their rights and powers

are substantially the same. They are appointed like

other agents, and their powers are terminated as in

other eases. Their powers and duties are much con-
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trolled by usage, with which it is not only their right

hut their duty to comply unless otherwise directed.

Usage, however, will not justify a departure from pos-

itive instructions, or the disregard of an express con-

tract.

See Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 950, 37 L. ed.

819; Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl. Rep. 874, 21 L. R. A.

102; Fairly v. Wappoo Mills, 44 S. Car. 227, 22 S. E. Rep. 10S. 29

L. R. A. 215; De Cordova v. Barnum, 130 N. Y. 615, 29 N. E. Rep.

1099, 27 Am. St. Rep. 538.

The broker is usually a special agent who can bind

his principal only while acting in pursuance of the limi-

tations put upon his authority.

See Clark v. Cumming, 77 Ga. 64, 4 Am. St. Rep. 72. Cas. Ag. 6GH.

158 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§ 296 298.

§ 29G. Implied powers. — The broker lias no implied

authority to delegate his powers, except under the same

circumstances which justify it in the case of other

agents. His acts usually should be done in the name

of his principal only.

See Delafield v. Smith, 101 Wis. 664, 78 N. W. Rep. 170, 70 Am.

St. Rep. 938; Haas v. Ruston, 14 Ind. App. 8, 42 N. E. Rep. 298, 56

Am. St. Rep. 288.

Where he has not been limited as to the price at

which he shall buy or sell, he has implied power to fix

the price, if he acts in good faith and confines him-

self to the usual price, or to a fair and reasonable one

where there is no usage.

See Daylight Burner Co. v. Odlin, 51 N. H. 56, 12 Am. Rep. 45;

Putnam v. French, 53 Vt. 402, 38 Am. Rep. 682.

§ 297. Same subject. — He has no general power to

sell with a warranty of quality, but may give one where

it is usually given with such goods at that time and

place. If not restricted, he may sell upon a reasonable
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credit. When not entrusted with the possession of the

goods he sells, he has no implied authority to receive

payment. Having once made a valid contract he has

no implied authority to rescind it.

See Hitchcock v. Griffin & Skelley Co., 99 Mich. 447, 58 N. W. Rep.

373, 41 Am. St. Rep. 624; Andrews v. Kneeland, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 354;

Dodd v. Farlow, 11 Allen (Mass.) 426, 87 Am. Dec. 726; Adams v.

Fraser, 27 C. C. A. 82 Fed. Rep. 211; Saladin v. Mitchell, 45 111. 79.

§298. Duties to principal. — The broker must obey

the principal's instructions, and will be liable for a loss

caused by his disobedience. He owes to his principal

the possession and exercise of a reasonable degree of

care, skill and diligence. He must be faithful to the

interests of his principal, and must not allow his own

interests or those of any other employer to conflict with

those of his principal.

.-

§§298-300.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. 159

See Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 333. 32 L. ed.

658; Taussig v. Hart, 58 N. Y. 425; Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211,

13 Am. Rep. 507, 66 N. Y. 518, 23 Am. Rep. 80; Myles v. Myles, 6

Bush (Ky.) 237; Farnsworth v. Hemmer, 1 Allen (Mass.) 494, 79

Am. Dec. 756; Levy v. Spencer, 18 Colo. 532, 33 Pac. Rep. 415, 36

Am. St. Rep. 303.

§299. Acting for both parties. — He will not be

allowed to represent both parties to the transaction,

without the full and intelligent consent of both, except

in those eases in which he acts as mere middle-man,

bringing- the parties together and then leaving them to

contract for themselves.

See Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, Cas. Ag. 12;

Bell v. McConnell, 37 Ohio St. 396, 41 Am. Rep. 528, Cas. Ag. 538;

Vinton v. Baldwin, 88 Ind. 104, 45 Am. Rep. 447, Cas. Ag. 664.

Contracts made while the broker is secretly in the

employment of the otber party are avoidable as in other

similar cases.

See Ferguson v. Gooch, 94 Va. 1, 26 S. E. Rep. 397, 40 L. R. A.

395.
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234; Cannell v. Smith, 142 Pa. St. 25, 21 Atl. Rep. 793, 12 L. R. A

§300. Liability to third persons. — The broker

will not be personally liable upon the contracts which

he makes where he discloses the name of his principal

and contracts in his name and within the limits of his

authority; though he may make himself personally lia-

ble by exceeding his authority, concealing his principal,

or contracting on his own responsibility.

See Simmons v. More, 100 N. Y. 140, Cas. Ag. 505.

He will, however, be liable, it seems, where he sells

the property, such as stocks, of a third person, even

though he acted in good faith supposing that the per-

son from whom he received the stock for sale was tic

true owner and although he has paid over the proceed ;

to such person.

ICO SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§300-302.

See Swim v. Wilson, 90 Cal. 126, 27 Pac. Rep. 33, 25 Am. St. Rep.

13 0, 13 L. R. A. 605, and cases cited ante §292; Roach, v. Turk, 9

Heisk. (Tenn.) 708, 24 Am. Rep. 360; Compare Leake v. "Watson.

58 Conn. 332, 20 Atl. Rep. 343, 18 Am. St. Rep. 270.

§ 301. Compensation. — The broker is entitled to his

compensation when he has completed his undertaking.

If employed to find a purchaser, he is entitled to his com-

pensation when he has found a person ready, willing

and able to buy on the terms proposed, or, if no terms

are fixed, to whom the principal sells. He is not to be

deprived of his compensation because the principal sub-

sequently changes his mind or his terms, or because the

principal's title fails, or because, he can not make a sat-

isfactory conveyance. It is not necessary in these

cases that the broker shall have actually completed a

binding contract. It is enough if he is the procuring

cause of the sale, though the transaction is concluded

by the principal.

Sea Vinton v. Baldwin, 88 Ind. 104, 45 Am. Rep. 447, Cas. Ag. 664;
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Plant v. Thompson, 42 Kan. 664, 16 Am. St. Rep. 512, Cas. Ag. 666;

Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378, 38 Am. Rep. 411, Cas.

Ag. 301; Brackenridge v. Claridge, 91 Tex. 527, 44 S. W. Rep. 819,

43 L. R. A. 593; Gilder v. Davis, 137 N. Y. 504, 33 N. E. Rep. 599,

20 L. R. A. 398.

§ 302. Unless there is an express agreement to

the contrary, the principal may revoke the broker's au-

thority at any time before the purchaser has been

found, and in such a case the broker will not be entitled

to any compensation for what he has done in endeavor-

ing to find a purchaser. Where, however, the broker

substantially performed, the principal will not be

permitted to revoke the authority and complete the sale

himself for the very purpose of avoiding the payment

of the commission.

See Cadigan v. Crabtree, 179 Mass. 474, 61 N. E. Rep. 37, 551*.

R. A. 77; Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., svpra.

§§ 302-304.] SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. 1G1

Where two or more brokers arc employed, he only is

entitled to tin* commission whose services were the ef-

ficient cause of the sale, even though the others have

also contributed in producing the result.

See Whitcomb v. Bacon, 170 Mass. 479, 49 N. E. Rep. 742, 64 Am.

St. Rep. 317.

§ 303. Compensation from both parties. — lie can

not have compensation from both parties except when

he acts as agent of both with their full knowledge and

consent.

Where, however, the broker was acting as a mere

"middle-man," bringing the parties together only and

then leaving them to make their own bargains, — the

broker standing entirely indifferent between them, —

the rule forbidding double compensation does not ap-

ply. In such a case it is held that the broker may

have compensation from each principal although each

may have been ignorant of the broker's relations to the

other.
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See Rice v. "Wood; Bell v. McConnell, supra; McDonald v. Maltz,

94 Mich. 172, 53 N. W. Rep. 1058, 34 Am. St Rep. 331; Montross

v. Eddy, 94 Mich. 100, 53 N. W. Rep. 916, 34 Am. St. Rep. 323; Rice

v. Davis, 136 Pa. St. 439, 20 Atl. Rep. 513, 20 Am. St. Rep. 931.

§ 304. Reimbursement, indemnity and lien. — He is

entitled to reimbursement and indemnity like other

agents for losses and liabilities properly incurred and

advances made on his principal's account; but no! where

the loss was caused by his own default or the advances

were made to further a transaction known to be un-

lawful.

See Perin v. Parker, 126 111. 201, 18 N. E. Rep. 747. 9 Am. St.

Rep. 571, 2 L. R. A. 336; Ellis v. Pond Syndicate [1898], 1 Q. B.

426; Harvey v. Merrill, 150 Mass. 1, 22 N. E. Rep. 49, 15 Am. St.

Rep. 159; Gillett v. Whiting, 141 N. Y. 71, 35 N. E. Rep. 939, 38 Am.

St. Rep. 762.

13

162 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§304-307.

The broker is ordinarily not in possession of the

goods he sells, and therefore generally he has no right

of lien. Since it is his duty to contract in the name

of his principal, he has usually no right to sue in his

own name upon the contracts which he makes.

See Fairlie v. Fenton, L. R. 5 Exch. 169, Cas. Ag. 669.

4. Of Factors.

§ 305. How appointed. — The authority of the factor

may be created and terminated like that of other agents.

§306. Implied powers. — He may sell the goods in

his own name, may grant a reasonable credit, and may

give a warranty where that is usual. He has no implied

power to pledge or transfer the goods for his own debt,

though by statutes called Factors' Acts now found in

many States innocent pledges are protected. He has

no implied power to exchange the goods, to delegate

his authority, to compromise the claim for the pur-

chase price, to rescind the sale, to extend the time of

payment, to make negotiable paper, or to receive any-
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thing but money in payment for the goods.

See Pinkham v. Crocker, 77 Me. 563, Cas. Ag. 676; Warner v.

Martin, 11 How. (U. S.) 209, Cas. Ag. 678; Insurance Co. v. Kiger,

103 U. S. 352, Cas. Ag. 686; Commercial Bank v. Hurt, 99 Ala. 130,

12 So. Rep. 568, 19 L. R. A. 701, 42 Am. St. Rep. 38; Romeo v.

Martucci, 72 Conn. 504, 45 Atl. Rep. 1, 99, 47 L. R. A. 601; First

National Bank v. Schween, 127 111. 573, 20 N. E. Rep. 681, 11 Am. St.

Rep. 174; Argersinger v. Macnaughten, 114 N. Y. 535, 21 N. E. Rep.

1022, 11 Am. St. Rep. 687; Peek v. Heim, 127 Pa. St. 500, 17 Atl.

Rep. 984, 14 Am. St. Rep. 865; Barnes Safe Co. v. Bloch Bros. Co.,

38 W. Va. 158, 18 S. E. Rep. 482, 22 L. R. A. 850, 45 Am. St. Rep. 846.

§ 307. Duties to principal. — He must act in good

faith, be loyal to his trust and exercise reasonable skill

and diligence.

See Phillips v. Moir, 69 111. 155, Cas. Ag. 671; Conway v. Lewis,

120 Pa. St. 215, 13 Atl. Rep. 826, 6 Am. St. Rep. 700; Usborne v.

§§307-309.1 SPEC I.\ I, CLASSES OF AGENT!

Stephenson, 36 Oreg. 328, 48 L. R. A. 432; Sims v. Miller, 3.

Car. 402, 16 S. E. Rep. 155, 34 Am. St. Rep. 762; Charlotte Oil Co.

v. Hartog, 29 C. C. A. 56, 85 Fed. Rep. 150.

§308. Same subject. — He must obey instructions

as to the time and terms of sale, and will be Liable Cor

losses caused by his disobedience; except thai where lie

lias made advances on the goods t<> his principal, he may

sell contrary to orders, for his own reimbursement, if

the principal has neglected to reimburse him within a

reasonable time after demand; and he is not obliged to

sell at a price fixed by the principal when he would

thereby imperil his security.

See Talcott v. Chew, 27 Fed. Rep. 273, Cas. Ag. 689; Lehman v.

Pritchett, 84 Ala. 512, Cas. Ag. 693; Hatcher v. Comer, 73 Ga. 418,

Cas. Ag. 698; Davis v. Kobe, 36 Minn. 214, 1 Am. St. Rep. 663, Cas

Ag. 700; Dolan v. Thompson, 126 Mass. 183, Cas. Ag. 684; Comer v

Way, 107 Ala. 300, 19 So. Rep. 966, 54 Am. St. Rep. 93.

§ 309. Duty to account.— It is the duty of the fae

tor to account to his principal for all goods, proper t;
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and moneys of the principal, which come into his hands

as factor, after deducting his own proper advances and

commissions.

See Cooley v. Betts, 24 Wend. 203, Cas. Ag. 702.

The principal may follow and recover his propeity

or its proceeds so long as it can be identified and urtiil

it comes into the hands of a bona fide holder for value.

See ante § 269; Drovers' Nat. Bank v. Roller, 85 Md. 495, 37 Atl.

Rep. 30, 36 L. R. A. 767; Ferchen v. Arndt, 26 Ore. 121, 37 Pac. Rep.

161, 29 L. R. A. 664.

Where the factor sells upon a del credere commis-

sion he guarantees the payment of the price.

See Lewis v. Brehme, 33 Md. 412, 3 Am. Rep. 190. Cas. Ag. 706;

Balderston v. National Rubber Co., 18 R. I. 33S, 27 Atl. Rep. 507,

49 Am. St. Rep. 772.

164 SPECIAL CLASSES OF AGENTS. [§§ 310-311.

§ 310. Compensation, reimbursement, lien. — The

factor is entitled to compensation, reimbursement and

indemnity, like other agents. He has also a lien upon

all the goods in his possession, and upon the price of

those sold and on securities taken for goods sold to se-

cure the payment of the general balance of the account

between himself and his principal, and he may sell the

goods to satisfy his claim.

See McGraft y. Rugee, 60 Wis. 406, 50 Am. Rep. 378, Cas. Ag. 717;

Comer y. Way, 107 Ala. 300, 19 So. Rep. 966, 54 Am. St. Rep. 93;

Warren v. First Nat. Bank, 149 111. 9, 38 N. E. Rep. 122, 25 L. R. A.

746.

Whether the factor must enforce his lien before call-

ing for reimbursement is in dispute.

See Balderston y. Nat. Rubber Co., 18 R. I. 338, 27 Atl. Rep. 507,

49 Am. St. Rep. 772.

§ 311. Right to sue. — He may sue in his own name

for the price of goods sold by him, and he has such a spe-

cial property in the goods that he may maintain actions
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of trespass, replevin and trover in respect of them.

See Ilsley v. Merriam, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 242, 54 Am. Dec. 721;

Fitzhugh v. Wiman, 9 N. Y. 559.

INDEX.

[References are to sections.]

ABANDONMENT—

when agent may abandon agency 122

compensation in case of, see "Compensation"

ACCOUNT—

duty of agent to 185 et seq.

see also "Attorney at Law," "Auctioneer," "Broker," "Factor."

ACTION—

in what form of, agent liable to principal 174

in what form of, agent liable to third persons usually 196

no right of, against third persons 261

when agent may sue third person 2G2, 263

what actions maintainable 265

auctioneer may sue 290

factor may sue 311

ADMISSIONS—

of agent will not establish agency 70

bind principal, when 244

ADVERSE INTEREST—
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agent may not assume 51

AGENCY—

defined 1

a contractual relation 2

exists usually by assent of principal 3

may be created by law 4

differs from —

trust 9

sale 10

lease H

contract of 12

classification of 13 t 24

actual or ostensible 13

universal, general and special 14

how proved 18

professional and non-professicnal 12, 24

distinction between classes of 24, 27

may be created for any lawful purpose 27

exceptions 29, 34

165

166 INDEX.

[References are to sections.]

AGENCY— Continued.

what contracts for, void 34, 35

how to determine nature of 73

why created HI

enforcement of contract of 119

at will 120

how terminated, see "Termination of Agency"

AGENT—

duties and liabilities of, see "Duties and Liabilities.'

how authority of, exists 2, 3

compared with servant 5, 8

compared with independent contractor 8

the contract appointing 12

classes of 13, 24

distinction between classes of .24, 27

validity as between principal and 34

who may be 43, 51

may not assume adverse interest 51
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may represent joint principals 52

several, may jointly represent the same principal 55, 58

appointment of

method of 59, 60

to execute instruments 61, 62

by corporations 63

to sell and convey interest in land 64

by parol 65

doctrine of estoppel on 67, 70

evidences of 70, 74

cannot ratify his own act 82

as a rule cannot delegate authority 100, 103

power of, to appoint sub-agent 103, 106

extent of interest Ill

power to renounce authority 118

discharge of 121

renunciation by 122

death, insanity and bankruptcy of, terminates authority. 125, 128

duty of, in general 158

forbidden to do certain things 167

purpose of 190

how sued 213

APPOINTMENT OF AGENT—

see "Agent."

ATTORNEY AT LAW—

definition of 20

relation to client 274

INDEX. 167

[References are to sections.]

ATTORNEY AT LAW— Continued.

how appointed 275

duration of relation 276

implied powers of 277

bound to loyalty and honor 278

donlirrs of, must be fair and in good faith 279

confidential communications privileged 280

liability to client 281

liability to third person 282

right to compensation 283, 284

how amount determined 285

reimbursement and indemnity of 286

lien of 287

AUCTIONEER—

definition of 21

his function 24

how authorized 2S8

terms of sale 289
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implied powers of 290

duties of, to principal 291

liabilities of, to third person 292

compensation and lien of 293

liability of principal for acts of 294

AUTHORITY—

to act as agent 3

created by law 4

delegation of 27, 34

to execute instruments under seal 61, 62

of corporation to appoint 63

required by statute to be in writing 64

may be conferred by parol 65

not to be proved by agent's admissions 70

written instrument best evidence of 72, 73

to appoint sub-agent 103

coupled with an interest Ill et. seq.

termination of 121, 132

express 133

implied 134

general 135, 139

special 136, 144

distinction between, and instructions 138

powers incident to 142, 150, 158

construction of,

in general 144, 149

In particular 150, 158

168 INDEX.

[References are to sections.]

AUTHORITY— Continued.

to sell land 150, 151

to sell personal property 152, 153

to buy 154

to collect or receive payment 155

to make negotiable paper 156

to manage business 157

how executed,

in general 158

execution of, excessive or defective 159

written instruments 160

sealed instruments 161

negotiable instruments 162

other similar contracts 163

parol evidence to explain 164

BANKRUPTCY—

of principal or agent, effect of 127

BENEFITS—
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acceptance of, will ratify 88

BROKER—

definition of 22

his function 25

how appointed 295

implied powers of 296, 297

duties to principal 298

acts for both parties 299

liability to third persons 3 ;0

compensation of 301, 304

reimbursement, indemnity and lien of 304

CLIENT—

relation of attorney to 274

duration of relation 276

must receive loyalty and honor from attorney 278

dealings between attorney and 279

has privilege of confidential communications with attorney. 280

liability of attorney to 281

CLUBS, SOCIETIES, ETC.—

as principals , 54

COLLUSION—

defeats notice 232

between agent and third person 271

COMPENSATION—

cannot be recovered by agent who serves two principals 167

the right to have 215

amount of, determined 216

INDEX. 16S

[Reference* are to sections.]

COMPENSATION— Continued.

when earned 217

under conditions 218 et seq.

right of professional and non-professional agents to

of attorney 2S3, 285

of auctioneer 293

of broker 304

of factor 310

contingent 284

CONSTRUCTION—

necessity for Hi

of particular powers 149 et seq.

CONTRACT—

agency based on 1

appointing agent 12

when, of agency void 34

Illegal in part 35

enforcement of contract of agency 119
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presumed for definite time 120

execution of simple contract 163 et seq.

when agent liable on 197

CORPORATIONS—

may be principal ' 36

as agents 49

how may appoint agent 63

may ratify what they can authorize 80

CO-TENANTS—

as principals 53

DAMAGES—

see "Duties and Liabilities."

DELEGATION—

see "Sub-Agent."

of personal duty, etc 29

of authority by agent 100, 106

of power includes incidental authority to effect power

granted 142

of authority by auctioneer 290

of authority by factor 306

DESTRUCTION OF SUBJECT MATTER—

effect of, on agency 130

DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL—

see "Principal," also "Duties and Liabilities."

DUTIES OF THE AGENT TO THE PRINCIPAL—

in general 153

to be loyal to his trust 166

170 INDEX.

[References are to sections.]

DUTIES OF AGENT TO PRINCIPAL— Continued.

barred from some acts 167, 168

unloyal act voidable 169

further limitations 170

usage does not alter rule 171

must obey instructions 172 et seq.

good faith — no excuse 173

in what form of action liable 174

sudden emergency as excuse 175

ambiguous instructions 176

effect of custom 177

to exercise care 178

special skill required in some cases 179

when services gratuitious . 180

liable for negligence

in loaning money 181

in effecting insurance 182

in collecting 183
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liable for defaults of correspondents 184

to account for money and property 185, 189

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE AGENT TO THIRD

PERSONS—

in general .' 190

in contract without authority 191, 199

when no responsible principal 199, 201

where agent pledges his personal responsibility 201 et. seq.

to disclose principal 202, 203

when principal foreign £04

when principal is known 205

when agent has obtained money from third person ...207, 208

when agent has received money from third person 209

in cases of tort 210, 212

non-feasance — misfeasance 211

trespass — conversion 212

how sued 213

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE PRINCIPAL TO

THE AGENT—

to pay compensation 215

rules regulating payment 216, 230

when compensation deemed to be earned 217, 221

where authority rightfully revoked 221

when authority terminated by operation of law 222

where agent abandons his undertaking 223

where agent acted for two principals 224

where agent violated his trust 225

INDEX. 171

[ReferenceB are to sections.]

DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO AGENT— Continued.

rules where agency unlawful 226

where extra duties required 227

where agent holds over 228

recoupment by principal 229

reimbursement and indemnity of agent 230, 333

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE PRINCIPAL TO

THIRD PERSONS—

liability for agent's contracts 235, 214

liability of disclosed principal 238, 244

liability of undisclosed principal 238, 211

responsibility for agent's statements 244, 246

responsibility for matters brought to knowledge of agent 246, 252

liability for agent's torts and crimes 252, 260

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THIRD PERSONS TO THE

AGENT—

in contract,

usually no right of action 261
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exception — sealed instruments or negotiable instruments

made in agents' name 262

when principal undisclosed 263

in tort 265

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THIRD PERSONS TO THE

PRINCIPAL—

in contract 267, 271

what contracts principal may enforce 267

what defences open 268

right to follow and recover money or property 269

right to rescind dealings where agent secretly in em-

ployment of other party 270

In tort 271, 273

right to recover damages for collusion 271

recovery for enticing agent away, disabling him, etc... 272

ESTOPPEL—

doctrine of, as applied to agents 67

applied to ratification by conduct 87

may effect determination of authority 138

EVIDENCE—

of authority, see "Authority."

necessity for 145

parol, to explain 164

EXECUTION—

defective or excessive 157

of written instrument 'l60

172 INDEX.

[Refereaces are to sections.]

EXECUTION— Continued.

of sealed instruments 161

of negotiable instruments 162

FACTOR—

definition 23

his function 26

how appointed 305

implied powers of 306

duties of, to principal 307, 310

compensation, reimbursement and lien 310

right to sue 311

FORGERY—

as to ratification of 78

GENERAL AGENCY—

definition 14

number possible 16

how proved 18

ILLEGAL ACTS—
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agency cannot be created to perform 28

cannot be ratified 77

IMPLIED POWER—

of agent 142, 150 et seq.

of attorney 277

of auctioneer 290

of broker 296, 297

of factor 306

INCAPACITY—

natural or legal 39

of insane persons 40

of infants 41, 44

of married women 42

more important in principal than in agent 43

arising from adverse interest 51

of agent to serve two principals 167

INDEMNITY—

of agent 231, 232

of attorney-at-law 286

of broker 307

"INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR"—

how compares with agent 8

INFANTS—

as principals 41

as agents 44

how authorized 45

may ratify what they can authorize 81

INDEX. 173

[Reference* are to flections.]

INSANE PERSON—

cannot be principal 40

INSANITY—

of principal or agent terminates 126

JOINT AGENTS—

discussion of 55, 58

JOINT PRINCIPALS—

discussion of 52, 55

LEASE—

differs from agency 11

LIABILITY—

of various parties, see "Duties and Liabilities."

LIEN—

of attorney 287

of auctioneer 293

of broker 3 °4

of factor 310

MANAGE BUSINESS—
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authority to 157

MARRIAGE OF PRINCIPAL—

when agency is affected by 128

MARRIED WOMEN—

as principals 42

as agents 46, 47

may ratify what they can authorize SI

NEGOTIABLE PAPER—

execution of authority to make II

execution of 162

parol evidence in case of 1C4

NOTICE—

duty of agent to give 189

to agent is notice to principal 246

defeated by collusion between agent and third person 247

PAROL EVIDENCE—

to explain authority 164

; ARTNERSHIPS—

may be principal 36

as agent 50, 56

may ratify what they can authorize SO

PERSONAL PROPERTY—

authority to sell 152

what included 153

PRINCIPAL—

duties and liabilities, see "Duties and Liabilities."

•when assent of, necessary *3, 4

1

174 INDEX.

[References are to sections.]

PRINCIPALr— Continued.

number of agents possible 15, 16

validity as between, and agent 34

who may be 37, 38

incapacity to be 39, 43

natural or legal 39

insane persons 40

infants 41

married women 42

more competence required than in agent 43

may be joint 52

partners, co-tenants, etc., as 53

clubs, societies, etc., as 54

may be represented by joint agents 55, 58

usually appoints agent 59

responsible for authority of agent 70

effect of ratification as between, and others 94 et seq.
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may authorize agent to employ other agents 99

power of, to revoke agency Ill

must give notice of revocation 117

death of, terminates authority 124

insanity of, terminates authority 126

bankruptcy of, terminates authority 127

marriage of, terminates authority 128

appearance given to authority by, controls 137

distinction between authority and instruction of 138

duty of agent to disclose 202

agent of foreign 204

presumption that, to be bound 205

liable for acts of auctioneer 294

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS—

between attorney and client 280

PUBLIC POLICY—

agencies for purposes opposed to, void 28

RATIFICATION—

definition of 75

what acts subject to 76, 78

of forgery 78

by whom may be made 79, 83

conditions of 83

what amounts to f 84, 92

by instrument under seal 85

by authority subsequently conferred 86

by conduct SV

by accepting benefits 88

INDEX. 175

[References are to sections.)

RATIFICATION— Continued.

by bringing suit 89

by acquiescence 90, 91

effect of,

in general 92, 93

as between principal and agent 94

as to rights of third party against principal 95

as to rights of principal against third party 96

in contract 97

in tort 98

may effect determination of authority 138

RECOUPMENT—

principal may recoup damages caused by agent's act 229

REIMBURSEMENT—

of agent 230

of attorney-at-law 286

of broker 304

of factor 310
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RENUNCIATION—

by agent 118

when justifiable 122

REPRESENTATIONS OF AGENT—

when principal bound by 244, 245

REVOCATION—

compensation, in case, see "Compensation."

of ratification 93

by principal HI

not when coupled with interest 113, 116

distinction between "power" and "right" of 115

need not be express 116

notice of 117

SALE—

distinguished from agency 1°

terms of 289

SEALED INSTRUMENTS—

authority to execute 61

ratification of 85

execution of 161

who bound in 164

SERVANT—

compared with agent 5-8

SIMPLE CONTRACT—

how executed 163

176 INDEX

[References are to sections.J

SOCIETIES, CLUBS, ETC.—

as principals & *

SPECIAL. AGENCY—

14

definition •

number of special agents possible 16

how to be proved 1 ®

SUB-AGENT—

see "Delegation."

when appointment justifiable 103

relation of sub-agent to principal 104, 105

termination of authority of agent terminates power of 131

SUBJECT-MATTER—

destruction of, terminates agency 130

termination of power over 131

TERMINATION OF AGENCY-

by act of parties,

1. original agreement 108
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2. subsequent act of parties,

by mutual consent HO

revocation by principal HI, 118

renunciation by agent 118, 123

by operation of law,

death 124, 125

insanity 128

bankruptcy 127

marriage 128

war 1^9

destruction of subject matter 130

termination of power over subject-matter 131

of sub-agents 131

TORT—

may be ratified 98

see "Duties and Liabilities."

TRUST—

differs from agency 9

not necessarily a contract relation 9

UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL—

liable when discovered 239

his exceptions 240

agent also liable 243

liable in tort, see "Duties and Liabilities."

UNIVERSAL AGENCY—

definition 14

number of universal agents possible 15

INDEX. 177

[B«forenc«t irt to »»ctlon».]

USAGE—

contributes to determine authority 188

WAR—

effect of, on agency 128

WITNESS—

when agent may be called as 71

WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS—
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execution of ISO

